INTERNATIONAL SECURITY II: THE CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
SYLLABUS
AY 18
JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL COURSE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
21st Century Leaders for 21st Century Challenges

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE  
MAXWELL AFB, AL  

FOREWORD  

This syllabus for the International Security II course for the Air Command and Staff College, January-March 2018, provides both an overview of the course narrative, objectives and questions, as well as a detailed description of each lesson to assist students in their reading and preparation for lecture and seminar. Included herein is information about course methods of evaluation, schedule, and the fulfilment joint professional military education core goals.  

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY II
COURSE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION
This course explores the conduct of national security through the lens of military strategy: the employment of military means to achieve political ends. The course highlights the challenges associated with military strategy, including the constraints on its formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation. It then applies these concepts to strategies employed in the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). The course affords students the opportunity to cultivate and refine skills for advising senior leaders on meeting future security threats.

COURSE OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the challenges of formulating and executing military strategy to meet political objectives.
2. Comprehend the challenges of assessing and adapting military strategy during wartime.
3. Apply an understanding of military strategy and the challenges of its formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation across the GCCs.

COURSE QUESTIONS
1. Which factors shape the formulation and execution of military strategy toward the achievement of political ends, and how?
2. Which factors shape the assessment and adaptation of military strategy during wartime, and how?
3. Which factors shape strategic effectiveness across the GCCs, and how might the US better formulate, execute, assess, and adapt US military strategy across the GCCs?

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE
International Security II seeks to prepare analytically-minded leaders for operating within a complex international security environment, in service to complex national security objectives. The course focuses on military strategy, driving students to think critically about the challenges of employing the military instrument of power in pursuit of policy aims. It further explores the complicated interrelationships between grand strategy, military strategy, and the tactical and operational levels of war.

The three phases of International Security II are oriented around an examination of the challenges inherent to military strategy. Phase I centers on the formulation and execution of strategy, drawing from works of theory, policy, history, strategy, and military practice. It introduces and examines the assumptions on which conventional understandings of military strategy are based. It addresses factors – rational, organizational, and bureaucratic – that influence political and military leaders’ decision-making efforts. Phase I asks students to grapple with the links between decision-making constraints, political-military integration, and strategic outcomes.

Phase II builds on the themes of Phase I, but focuses more explicitly on factors that shape strategic assessment and adaptation, or decision-updating during war. It sheds light on political and military leaders’ responses to the risks and uncertainties of war, revealing that updating
under fire can be prone to cognitive and psychological biases, civil-military tensions, and the influence of strategic and organizational cultures. In keeping with the Phase I content, the Phase II material reinforces the overarching course narrative: military strategy is not formulated, executed, assessed, or adapted in a vacuum. Rather, it is subject to a host of factors that impact the employment of the military instrument in pursuit of national security interests. Phase II draws students to a more comprehensive and substantive grasp of the factors that affect strategy and strategic outcomes.

Phase III, which takes its guidance from the posture statements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, focuses on military strategic objectives, capabilities, and limitations across the GCCs. The readings and lectures will expose students to GCC-specific strategic objectives. In addition, they will prompt students to consider the capabilities and limitations of US military forces to act in pursuit of those objectives. Phase III also incorporates the conceptual threads developed in the previous phases of the course; it is designed to engage students in applying those threads to the GCC strategy cases. The concept-to-case approach invites students to determine how well (and why) military means are integrated to policy ends, and to offer constructive measures for advancing strategic effectiveness. The case evaluation method affords an appreciation of the utility of strategy, as well as the challenges of maximizing that utility.

The course content is oriented around a specific methodological approach. Readings and lectures are designed to introduce theoretically-rooted concepts, refine and assess the validity of those concepts, and then apply those concepts to contemporary and historical cases. Although the course adopts a particular methodology, the content is otherwise broadly interdisciplinary. It draws from the fields of history, political science, security studies, psychology, sociology, and economics. It combines concepts stemming from these disciplines with joint concepts from the Profession of Arms. The approach is intended to allow for enhanced understanding of military strategy, and the forces that shape its service to grand strategic and policy ends. And, it is intended to allow for enhanced understanding of military strategy’s practical links to and effects on the tactical and operational levels of war.

The complexity of the international security environment – and the consequent complexity of national security objectives – calls for joint officers who are cognizant of the function and utility of military strategy. This requires joint officer development that accounts for critical-analytical approaches to understanding the grand strategic context within which operations take place, as well as the military strategic objectives they serve. International Security II aims to provide officers with the tools for evaluating strategy and strategic effectiveness in contemporary and historical context.

**JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-1)**

International Security II: The Conduct of National Security addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. The course supports the following Joint Learning Areas and Objectives, listed below:
Learning Area 1 – National Military Capabilities Strategy
a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces to conduct the full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.
   • IS2: 503, 504, 505, 512, 513, 514, 515, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 examine military strategy via contemporary and historical cases. The cases address the capabilities and limitations of ground, naval, and air forces.
d. Comprehend strategic guidance contained in documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, Global Force Management Implementation Guide (GFMIG), and Guidance for Employment of the Forces.
   • IS2: 500, 502, 503, 520, 522, 524, 526, 528, 530 address the National Military Strategy and its influence on the various Geographic Combatant Commanders’ posture statements.

Learning Area 2 – Joint Doctrine and Concepts
a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.
   • IS2: 500, 501 explores excerpts from JP 1, Chapter II.
c. Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex or ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and current joint doctrine.
   • IS2: 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 examine contemporary cases involving strategic responses to regional threats. The cases address the operational effectiveness of strategic threat responses.

Learning Area 3 – Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War
a. Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders.
   • IS2: 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 address links between the security environment and the employment of Joint Forces (toward military strategic objectives). Lessons 518-520, in particular, examine the employment of Joint Forces in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders’ theater strategic objectives.
c. Comprehend the interrelationships between among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
   • IS2: 502, 503, 505, 519, 520, 521, 522, 524, 525, 526, 528, 530 examine military strategic influences on tactics and operations; they also examine the effects of tactical and operational capabilities and limitations for the development (and redevelopment) of strategy.
d. Comprehend how theory and principles of joint operations pertain to the operational level of war across the range of military operations to include traditional and irregular warfare that impact the strategic environment.
   • IS2: 502, 503, 504, 505, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 address the range of military operations and how they impact the strategic environment.
e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests.
   - IS2: 500, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 514, 515, 518, 520, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 addresses interagency, allied, and partnered efforts in support of security interest.

f. Comprehend the relationships between national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post conflict transition to enabling civil authorities.
   - IS2: 502, 503, 504, 505, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 explores the relationship between military objectives and national security. Specifically, IS2-521 to IS2-524 will address the challenges in post conflict transition to civil authorities.

Learning Area 4 – Joint Planning and Joint Execution Processes

a. Comprehend relationship among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by the national level systems.
   - IS2: 500, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 explore the links between national objectives and the military (strategic) means for addressing those objectives.

f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, region, culture/diversity, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations across the range of military operations.
   - IS2: 500, 502, 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 address links between the security environment – with reference to the influence of factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, region, culture/diversity, and religion – and joint force operations across the range of military operations.

Learning Area 6 – Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms

a. Comprehend the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment.
   - IS2: 500, 502, 503, 504, 505, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530 examine the role of the Profession of Arms in a complex and dynamic contemporary security environment.

b. Comprehend critical thinking and decision making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate/adapt to surprise and uncertainty.
   - IS2: 500, 504, 505, 512, 513, 516, 517, 518, 525, 526 examine the effects of environmental change and uncertainty for military strategy; the lessons devote particular attention to the effects of change and uncertainty for assessment, adaptation, and transformation.
c. Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it may present when considering the values of the Profession of Arms.
   - IS2: 502 highlights the ethical dimensions of strategic and operational leadership; 525 and 526 examine the ethical challenges of matching military operational means to humanitarian strategic ends.

e. Communicate with clarity and precision.
   - IS2: 520, 522, 524, 526, 528, 530, 600, and 602 require that students provide briefings on strategic responses to regional threats and / or submit written exam responses to questions regarding military strategy.

f. Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations.
   - IS2: 500, 504, 505, 516, 517, 518, 523, 525, 526, 527, 529, 530 examine the links between military strategy, adaptation, and operational outcomes.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. READINGS. Before lecture and seminar, students are expected to complete all assigned readings for the day. Students are encouraged to read the explanation given in the syllabus before reading the assigned books and articles. The syllabus also provides information on current joint doctrine, as it relates to the topic of the day. Students are required to read limited joint doctrine for this course, but they are encouraged to explore the connections between military theory, military strategy, operational art, and current joint doctrine.

2. LECTURES. Students will attend faculty lectures relating to assigned readings and seminar. These presentations compliment the readings and seminar discussion, and therefore enhance knowledge of the course concepts. Lectures provide historical and theoretical background to stimulate and enhance learning in seminar, as well as apply the theories and concepts presented in the readings and discussed in seminar to historical and contemporary case studies.

3. SEMINAR PARTICIPATION. Student participation in seminar discussions is vital to the success of the course. Students must prepare for each seminar by completing all of the assigned readings. Each member of seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion.

4. BRIEFING. There is one in-class, graded briefing assignment in fulfillment of the requirements of the International Security II course. The briefing assignment is a response to a designated debate question.

5. WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS. There are two written, graded assignments in fulfillment of the requirements of the International Security II course. They include one 4-5 page take-home paper and one 5-6 page take-home (debate briefing) response paper.
METHODS OF EVALUATION. There are two written, graded assignments in fulfillment of the requirements of the IS2 course: One 3-4 page take-home examination worth 35% of the grade, one in-class briefing worth 25% of the grade, and one 5-6 page take-home examination worth 40% of the grade.

COURSE ADMINISTRATION

There are two types of readings in this course: 1) readings from books issued from the ACSC Book Issue Room; and 2) selected chapters and articles posted electronically. To avoid confusion, the syllabus denotes all readings posted electronically as “EL” (“electronic”). Electronically, students can access the syllabus, course calendar, and selected readings as well as other supplemental materials. In addition, lecture slides will be posted electronically at least twenty-four hours prior to lecture.

ACSC provides students with copies of the following course books, which must be returned at the conclusion of the course:


Please refer any questions to Dr. Ann Mezzell (Course Director) or Lt Col Anson Chiu (Deputy Course Director).
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY II: THE CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

COURSE SCHEDULE

DAY 0 – COURSE INTRODUCTION

DATE: TBD

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the course objectives, course questions, and course narrative.
2. Comprehend the course syllabus and methods of evaluation.
3. Comprehend expectations for the course.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-500 (L): Course Overview (Mezzell)

Overview: The Conduct of National Security introduces military strategy, focusing on factors that complicate the employment of military means in service of political ends. This lecture introduces students to the course objectives, schedule and requirements, as well as the overall narrative and three phases of the course.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-501 (S): Course Introduction

Overview: In this seminar, instructors introduce themselves to their seminars, discuss classroom policies, and set the stage for seminar discussions schedule for Day 1.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS
2. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“National Strategic Direction,” “Strategic Guidance and Concepts,” and “Unified Action”), pp. II-1 to II-8. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
None.
DAY 1 – MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLITICAL-MILITARY INTEGRATION

DATE: 09 January 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the relationship between grand strategy and military strategy, and its links to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.
2. Comprehend the foundations of political-military integration (PMI) and the tensions inherent to reconciling military means to political ends.
3. Analyze the sources of the US’s strategic defeat in Vietnam, with a focus on PMI.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-502 (L): [TITLE TBD] (LaSaine)
Overview: This lecture addresses foundational concepts of the course. It analyzes the relationship between grand strategy and military strategy, and illustrates processes of political-military integration.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-503 (S): Military Strategy and Political-Military Integration
Overview: Phase I of IS2 examines the complicating factors that shape the formulation and execution of military strategy. The Day 1 readings address the foundations of military strategy and the challenges inherent to those foundations. Clausewitz upholds war as “an instrument of policy,” which suggests that we can conceive of military strategy as the use of military means toward political ends. Posen suggests that we can further regard military strategy as a sub-component of a state’s grand strategy, or its plan for creating its own security. Achieving security in the face of abundant international threats and finite national resources, he notes, requires careful integration of military means to political ends. Yet, political-military integration (PMI) can be difficult to achieve. To this point, McMaster examines (the origins of PMI shortcomings in) the Vietnam War, in which the US earned tactical victories but suffered strategic defeat. Exploring the strained political-military relations that colored the lead-up to the war, he attributes strategic failures to political and military leaders alike.

Note: Posen uses the term “military doctrine” synonymously with “military strategy.”

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT
• ASSIGNMENT FOR 4-5 PAGE MIDTERM PAPER DISTRIBUTED.
REQUIRED READINGS
2. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Ch. 1 (“The Importance of Military Doctrine”), pp. 13-33. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
2. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter II (“Section A: National and Department of Defense Guidance”), pp. II-1 to II-11.
DAY 2 – CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING AND EXECUTING MILITARY STRATEGY

DATE: 12 January 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the factors – including the complexities and uncertainties of war, and the ambiguities of grand strategy – that complicate the formulation and execution of military strategy.
2. Analyze the influence of those factors on military strategy and PMI.
3. Apply concepts of uncertainty and risk to cases of wartime decision-making and planning for future wars.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-504 (M): Obama at War (PBS Frontline), 2015
Overview: This documentary explores the Obama administration’s Syria policy, and the decision-making challenges associated with developing a coherent Syria strategy. It examines a series of factors that complicated decision-making processes.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour movie

IS2-505 (S): Complexity, Uncertainty, and Political-Military Integration
Overview: Given the range of factors that complicate military strategy, are rational means-ends links (and PMI) attainable? And if so, how can they best be achieved? Like Clausewitz, Betts admits that the “boundless complexities and uncertainties” of war can remove it from its underlying rationale. He examines arguments about the realities of war and their effects for strategy, concluding that it is difficult, but not impossible, to match military means to political ends. Goldman, in turn, suggests that peacetime complexities – and the related ambiguities of grand strategy – may be as likely to confound planning and strategy as wartime conditions. Fitzsimmons explores the dilemmas of planning in the midst of uncertainty, urging strategists to hone their risk assessment skills. Echevarria, finally, applies arguments about the dilemmas of strategic planning to NATO’s future wars.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter I, pp. I-10 to I-11; and Chapter II (“Unified Command”) pp. II-7 to II-11 and (“Interagency Coordination”) pp. II-13 to II-20.
2. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter II (“Section A: National and Department of Defense Guidance”), pp. II-1 to II-11.
DAY 3 – RATIONALIST ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 16 January 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the principles and assumptions of the rational actor model.
2. Analyze the links between rational actor decision-making and the formulation and execution of military strategy.
3. Apply the principles and assumptions of the rational actor model to explain historical examples of military strategy, including the Afghan surge case.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-506 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Grieco)
Overview: This lecture introduces the key principles and assumptions of the rational actor model. It further applies the model to a selection of historical cases of military strategic decision-making.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-507 (S): Model 1 - Rational Actor Model (RAM)
Overview: What can we infer from the RAM? What characterizes rational decision-making with respect to the formulation and execution of military strategy? Rationalist accounts of war predict that unitary states will respond to threats by identifying strategy options, assessing their respective costs and benefits, and selecting the utility-maximizing alternative. Schelling likens the process to a game scenario, suggesting that parties at conflict will seek “wins” by adopting bargaining, mutual accommodation, and/or avoidance strategies. Fearon builds on Schelling’s concepts, introducing the element of miscalculation to conventional accounts of rational decision-making. Assuming that “rational” states would opt to avoid the risks and costs of war, says Fearon, it is important to determine why some instead choose to accept those risks and costs. Afghan Surge Comparison Case – Model 1: Bapat treats Afghan surge decision-making, and some of the ostensibly illogical elements of the surge strategy, as products of leaders’ rational responses to political incentives.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

2. Joint Publication 3.0, Chapter I (“Interorganizational Coordination in Unified Action”), pp. I-11 to I-12. Note: Indirect link to Day 3 content; direct link applies to content for Days 4-5.
DAY 4 – ORGANIZATIONAL (CIVIL-MILITARY) ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 19 January 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the principles and assumptions of the organizational behavior model.
2. Analyze the links between organizational behavior, decision-making, and the formulation and execution of military strategy.
3. Apply the principles and assumptions of the organizational behavior model to explain historical examples of military strategy, including the Afghan surge case.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-508 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Milburn)
Overview: This lecture previews key concepts of the organizational behavior model. In addition, it roots organizational accounts of military strategy in Clausewitzian theory.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-509 (S): Model 2 – Organizational Behavior Model
Overview: What can we infer from the organizational behavior model? What functions do organizations serve, and how do their programs and routines influence the formulation and execution of strategy? Allison and Zelikow note that standard operating procedures may constrain the (rational) choice options available to leaders. Posen and Snyder, respectively, examine connections between organizational behavior and strategic preference. Both propose that military organizations may be inherently biased toward offensive strategies. Afghan Surge Comparison Case – Model 2: Greentree links the inconclusive results of Operation Enduring Freedom to the challenges of adapting enduring institutional behaviors to the needs of counterinsurgency strategy.

Note: Despite its title, Greentree’s article predominantly centers on organizational (not bureaucratic) accounts of strategy implementation.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
DAY 5 – BUREAUCRATIC-INTERAGENCY ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 23 January 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the principles and assumptions of the bureaucratic-interagency politics model.
2. Analyze the links between bureaucratic-interagency politics, decision-making, and the formulation and execution of military strategy.
3. Apply the principles and assumptions of the bureaucratic-interagency model to explain historical examples of military strategy, including the Afghan surge case.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-510 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Campbell)
Overview: This lecture introduces key concepts of bureaucratic politics. It examines the practical challenges of the interagency process and their influence on military strategy.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-511 (S): Model 3 – Bureaucratic-Interagency Model (Governmental Politics Model)
Overview: What can we infer from the bureaucratic-interagency model? How does bureaucratic-interagency gamesmanship influence strategy formulation and execution? Allison and Zelikow contend that regularized bargaining among government players may shape decision-making in ways that generate “deviations from ideal rationality.” Krasner agrees that decisions are likely to reflect competing agencies’ efforts to promote their own objective. He goes on to raise questions, though, about the implications of the bureaucratic model. Daalder examines the interagency wrangling that initially confounded US responses to the Bosnian War. Afghan Surge Comparison Case – Model 3: Marsh addresses the bureaucratic maneuvering and competition associated with the surge decision and its “lopsided compromise” effects.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS
1. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ch. 5 selections, pp. 255-258 and 294-311.
2. Stephen Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? Or Allison Wonderland,” Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972): 159-179. [EL]
3. Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy, Ch. 5, pp. 162-189.
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

PHASE II: THE ASSESSMENT AND ADAPTATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY

DAY 6 – COGNITION AND STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

DATE: 26 January 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the influence of cognitive-psychological bias on military strategy.
2. Analyze the links between cognition-psychology, decision-making, and the assessment of military strategy.
3. Apply cognitive-psychological explanations to historical examples of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-512 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Forsyth)
Overview: This lecture examines cases of strategic failure, tracing the sources of failure to decision-makers’ cognitive and psychological biases. The lecture contextualizes arguments stemming from cognitive-psychological theories of decision-making.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-513 (S): Cognition and Strategic Assessment
Overview: Phase II of the course examines the complicating factors that influence the assessment and adaptation of military strategy. The Day 6 readings address the connections between cognition, decision-making, and wartime strategic assessment (and updating). Jervis explores the implications of decision-makers’ susceptibility to misperception. He notes that leaders are subject to various cognitive constraints, and may be inclined to misread others’ likely aims and behaviors. Highlighting another form of cognitive bias, Khong considers the hazards of reasoning by analogy. He treats the US intervention in Vietnam as an effect of questionable assessment – the product of leaders’ sometimes-faulty reliance on the “lessons of history.” Rapport, finally, examines decision-making preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, employing psychology to help explain senior leaders’ optimistic assessments of (a projected) post-war Iraq.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS
2. Yuen Khong, Analogies at War, Chs. 1 and 4, pp. 3-18 and 71-96.
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter II (“Assessment”), pp. II-8 to II-11.
DAY 7 – CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

DATE: 30 January 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the influence of civil-military relations on military strategy.
2. Analyze the links between civil-military relations, decision-making, and the assessment of military strategy.
3. Apply civil-military relations explanations to historical examples of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-514 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Redman)
Overview: This lecture examines civil-military relations and military strategy during the early Cold War period. Employing historical case material, it highlights links between strained civil-military relations and the disruption of military means from political ends.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-515 (S): Civil-Military Relations and Strategic Assessment
Overview: What accounts for the challenges of wartime strategic assessment? How do civil-military relations further complicate those challenges? Gartner links assessment difficulties to information overload, uncertainty, and noise. Rothstein contends that they also stem from fundamental differences between policymakers and military professionals. The civil-military assessment gap, he notes, is apt to result in strategic failures. Rovner highlights a similarly problematic relationship between politicians and the intelligence community; he warns that politicized intelligence may yield faulty assessments and thus, faulty strategy. Feaver and Hoffman examine assessments preceding the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. Feaver depicts the Iraq surge as a product of both civilian and military inputs; Hoffman ascribes initial Afghan surge struggles to the need for greater candor from military leaders.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT
• 4-5 PAGE MID-TERM PAPER DUE AT START OF CLASS
• ASSIGNMENT FOR BRIEFING AND 5-6 PAGE FINAL PAPER DISTRIBUTED

REQUIRED READINGS

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 2-0, Chapter IV (“Section D: Plan Assessment and Execution”), specifically pp. IV-9 to IV-14.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter II (“Assessment”), pp. II-8 to II-12.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter II (“Joint Planning”), specifically pp. II-9 to II-14; and Chapter VI (“Operation Assessment”), specifically pp. VI-1 to VI-7.
DAY 8 – STRATEGIC CULTURE AND ADAPTATION

DATE: 06 February 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the influence of strategic culture – at the national, organizational, and service levels – on military strategy.
2. Analyze the links between strategic culture, decision-making, and the adaptation of military strategy.
3. Apply strategic culture explanations to historical cases of and contemporary debates on military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-516 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Kerr)
Overview: This lecture addresses key premises of strategic cultural explanations of military strategy. It applies those arguments to the challenges of US strategic adaptation in Iraq.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-517 (S): Strategic Culture and Adaption
Overview: How does strategic culture, at the national level, shape wartime adaptation? At sub-national levels, how do organizational and service cultures influence adaptation under fire? Farrell explains that US “liberal imperial aims” have been long served by American strategic culture: the political-military leadership community’s shared views on the use of force. Linn, in turn, suggests that the US military’s organizational culture is in flux. The experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, he says, have given way to new a new vision of warfare that emphasizes “uncertainty, adaptation, and innovation.” Builder adds to the discussion, examining US military behaviors by branch, and tracing seemingly-incongruous ways of warfare to individual service cultures. Builder’s arguments are rooted in the context of the late Cold War period; nonetheless, they can be applied to contemporary (service level) strategic adaptation debates. Vacca suggests that distinct Navy and Air Force traditions – those of Mahan versus those of Douhet – will yield different approaches to cyber security, despite attempts to maintain a unified strategy.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter I (“Joint Planning”), pp. I-1 to I-22; and Chapter II (“Strategic Guidance and Coordination”), pp. II-1 to II-32.
LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the nature of the post-Cold War “strategic pause” and its influence on military strategy.
2. Analyze the links between the strategic pause, strategic guidance, and the adaptation and transformation of military strategy.
3. Apply strategic pause explanations to historical cases of and contemporary debates on military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW
• **NO LECTURE. HOUR ALLOCATED TO SEMINAR.**
• **SEMINAR TO INCLUDE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF UPCOMING BRIEFING AND FINAL PAPER ASSIGNMENTS.**

IS2-518 (S): Strategic Guidance and Adaptation-Transformation

**Overview:** What accounts for challenges to adaptation and transformation? Specifically, how has the post-Cold War “strategic pause” influenced adaptation and transformation for the US and its allies? Goldman predicts that post-Cold War strategic ambiguities will likely persist for the near-term. She warns decision-makers against focusing on a discernible past to the exclusion of tentative futures. Echevarria, similarly, links US-NATO military reform shortcomings – particularly, doctrinal reform shortcomings – to the strategic pause of the 1990s. The period generated few attempts at thinking beyond “conventional maneuverist strategies,” effecting Coalition adaptation struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given that the absence of clear strategic guidance may now be “more the rule than the exception,” says Echevarria, proficiency in military strategy will be increasingly important. This raises key questions, namely: how can military strategy be crafted or improved in the absence of clear political objectives?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
PHASE III: STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO REGIONAL THREATS

DAY 10 – NORTHCOM: HOMELAND DEFENSE - DETERRENCE

DATE: 16 February 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend nuclear military strategy options and the factors that influence the integration of (nuclear, other) military means to political ends.
2. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation of military strategy with respect to homeland defense objectives.
3. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategies and factors to the debate question(s) provided for this day.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-519 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Bremer)
Overview: This lecture addresses the role of NORTHCOM, strategic options for achieving evolving homeland defense objectives, and the complexities of matching military means to those ends.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-520 (S): NORTHCOM: Homeland Defense - Deterrence
Overview: Glaser and Fetter explore the challenges of nuclear defense, focusing specifically on the technical and political difficulties of US national missile defense (NMD). Though it holds potential applications against rogue actors, they note, both Russia and China regard NMD as a threat. Talmadge, and then Lieber and Press, grapple with an alternate question: whether deterrence strategies are appropriate to countering the threat of nuclear terrorism. Talmadge suggests that deterrence is ill suited to those who have little fear of retaliation. She acknowledges, though, that expanded deterrence could be effective against states that facilitate nuclear terrorism. Lieber and Press are more optimistic about the prospects of deterring nuclear terrorism, given sound attack-attribution rates and the limited number of states that sponsor nuclear-aspirant terrorist groups.

Note: The NORTHCOM posture statement indicates “potential adversaries” – Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremists – “are pursuing advanced weapons development not seen in decades.” The readings address deterrence-based options, and particularly, the challenges of deterring nuclear threats.

Debate: How Effective Are Nuclear-Deterrent Means for Addressing Homeland Defense Ends (Specifically, Against Threats Emanating from Rogue Regimes and VEOs)? Does One Strategic Approach to Deterring Nuclear Threats Hold Greater Merit than the Other?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar
BRIEFING ASSIGNMENT (5-6 PAGE FINAL PAPER TO FOLLOW)

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REQUIRED READINGS
1. NORTHCOM Posture Statement. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.
DAY 11– SOUTHCOM: CAPACITY BUILDING

DATE: 20 February 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend military strategies of capacity building, and the factors that influence the integration of military means to political ends.
2. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation of military strategy with respect to counter-narcotics (and other) objectives.
3. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategies and factors to the debate question(s) provided for this day.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-521 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Hutto)
Overview: This lecture examines military exercises oriented toward capacity building objectives. It examines their links to, and implications for, the attainment of indirect “shaping” approaches to US interests in the Latin American region.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-522 (S): SOUTHCOM: Capacity Building
Overview: Shulz outlines options for “shaping” the Latin American security environment, highlighting the US’s recent-year preference for indirect strategic approaches in the region. While Schulz highlights civilian-institutional options for capacity building, Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker focus on security force assistance (SFA) options. Adopting a critical perspective, he emphasizes the limits of this approach in addressing complex security challenges. Dube and Naidu build on the SA debate, studying the effects of foreign military assistance on weak states and their internal conflicts. Addressing the case of Plan Colombia, they explore links between US military aid and political violence trends. Their findings suggest that foreign military assistance could benefit non-state combatants and undercut domestic political institutions.


CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

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REQUIRED READINGS
1. SOUTHCOM Posture Statement. [EL]


**RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE**

1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.

DAY 12: AFRICOM: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE – INTERVENTION

DATE: 23 February 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend military strategies of humanitarian assistance, and the factors that influence the integration of military means to political ends.
2. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation of military strategy with respect to humanitarian objectives.
3. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategies and factors to the debate question(s) provided for this day.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-523 (L): [TITLE TBD] (DiPrizio)
Overview: This lecture focuses on strategic decision-making with respect to cases of post-Cold War humanitarian intervention. It addresses the characteristics and challenges of interventionist strategies, and offers conclusions regarding their potential effectiveness in the contemporary security environment.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-524 (S): AFRICOM: Humanitarian Response - Intervention
Overview: Posen explores the post-Cold War interest in using military means toward “good” ends, proposing that the inclination could be misplaced. Humanitarian intervention is more likely to take the form of compellence than deterrence, he notes; this requires proof that one is capable of defeating – not just harming – the adversary. Rechia examines an alternate consideration: civilian “humanitarian hawks” must account for the reservations of military “intervention skeptics” with assurances of multilateral burden-sharing. Kuperman focuses on the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, suggesting that it increased the duration and death toll of the Libyan civil war. Chivvis stresses the positive effects of the intervention, but acknowledges the role that chance played in those outcomes.

Debate: Are Military-Interventionist Means Suited to the Achievement of Humanitarian Ends on the African Continent? What Are the Implications for US Action Elsewhere, Such as Syria?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour Seminar

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REQUIRED READINGS
1. AFRICOM Posture Statement. [EL]

**RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE**
1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.
DAY 13 – CENTCOM: DECAPITATION AND DRONE WARFARE

DATE: 27 February 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend decapitation as a military strategy and the factors that influence the integration of military means to political ends.
2. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation of military strategy with respect to counterterrorism objectives.
3. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategies and factors to the debate question(s) provided for this day.

LESSON OVERVIEW

Overview: This film highlights various factors that complicate wartime political-military decision making. While it largely centers on the moral dilemmas of war, the film also incorporates themes of cognitive bias, civil military relations, strategic culture, etc. Students are encouraged to assess the validity of the film’s treatment of these themes.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour movie

IS2-526 (S): CENTCOM: VEOs, Decapitation, and Drone Warfare
Overview: Counterterrorism encompasses a range of military strategies, the most prominent of which has been decapitation. These readings highlight debates regarding the effectiveness of decapitation. Jordan, Kosal, and Rubin question US approaches to ISIS; they focus specifically on the tendency to treat kinetic action as a strategy rather than a tactic. Price addresses decapitation’s impact on terrorist group mortality rates, noting that terrorist groups are prone to challenges of leadership succession. Byman, and then Kurth Cronin, debate the efficacy of drone warfare. Byman argues that drones provide economical and low-risk means of decapitation and denial; Kurth Cronin, though, warns against letting “either gadgets or fear determine strategy.” Staniland, finally, asks why the US and its allies often adopt “the same approach” to varied insurgent actors. He calls for strategies that are better tailored to countering particular insurgencies and their objectives.

Debate: Is Decapitation An Effective Use of Military Means for Achieving Counterterrorism Ends? Are Other Strategies Required and Why? When Is Decapitation More or Less Likely to be an Effective Strategy?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

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REQUIRED READINGS
1. CENTCOM Posture Statement. [EL]


**RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE**

1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.

DAY 14 – EUCOM: RESPONSES TO HYBRID WARFARE

DATE: 02 March 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend extended deterrence as a military strategy and the factors that influence the integration of military means to political ends.
2. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation of military strategy with respect to counter-hybrid and reassurance objectives.
3. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategies and factors to the debate question(s) provided for this day.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS2-527 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Connelly)
Overview: This lecture examines the strategic logic behind Russia’s recent resurgence and offers preliminary conclusions about its implications for US and NATO strategic responses.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-528 (S): EUCOM: Responses to Hybrid Warfare
Overview: Betts calls for a reconsideration of deterrence strategy and its relevance to the contemporary security environment. Acknowledging that there are risks of relying on deterrence, he notes that there are also risks in “rejecting it when the alternatives are worse.” Kroenig proposes a fundamental reevaluation of NATO defense strategy in Eastern Europe, calling for the development of new tactical nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of conventional forces. Lanoszka raises questions about such options, asking whether extended deterrence provides a suitable counter to Russia’s hybrid warfare efforts. Deni, finally, considers the potential effects of a modified forward presence in Eastern Europe.

Debate: Is Extended Deterrence the Most Effective Strategy for Responding to Russia’s Hybrid Efforts? Do Nuclear or Conventional Means Better Serve Those Ends?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

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REQUIRED READINGS
1. EUCOM Posture Statement. [EL]


**RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE**

i. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.

DAY 15 – PACOM: RESPONSES TO ACCESS DENIAL

DATE: 06 March 2018

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the range of deterrence strategies – in the form of sustained but “competitive” forward presence – and the factors that influence the integration of military means to political ends.
2. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation of military strategy with respect to counter-denial objectives.
3. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategies and factors to the debate question(s) provided for this day.

LESSON OVERVIEW
IS1-529 (L): [TITLE TBD] (Chiu)
Overview: This lecture examines the objectives and (grand strategic) interests of US allies in the Asia-Pacific region. More specifically, it asks whether the assumptions underlying US military strategies for the Asia-Pacific region account for allies’ objectives and interests.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0 hour lecture

IS2-530 (S): PACOM: Access Denial
Overview: Haddick examines China’s military strategy – the modernization and expansion of its air, sea, and land-based missile forces – and the risks it poses to US interests in the Asia-Pacific. The approach, he notes, exposes and exploits US force weaknesses in the region. It is vital, he asserts, that the US overcome its institutional barriers to adaptation; current responses to China are untenable, as they match resources to “China’s strengths rather than its weaknesses.” Haddick calls for a strategy that makes more effective use of US assets, and those of its allies, against China’s vulnerabilities. This will require more than a forward presence strategy, he notes; it will require significant steps toward shoring up deterrence and US-allied credibility.

Debate: Is Sustained Forward Presence the Most Effective Strategy for Mitigating China’s Anti-Access Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region? How Might the US Best Use Military Means to Achieve Those Ends?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

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REQUIRED READINGS
1. PACOM Posture Statement. [EL]
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II ("Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces"), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III ("Section D: Combatant Commanders"), specifically III-7 to III-9.
APPENDIX: COURSE FACULTY

Dr. Filomeno Arenas is an Associate Professor and Course Director of Leadership Studies at the Air University’s Air Command and Staff College. He received his doctorate degree from The George Washington University in Higher Education Administration and is also an adjunct professor with the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His current areas of research focus on leadership development, emotional intelligence, integrated learning environments, and virtual immersive learning models. He was an aerospace ground equipment technician and optometry technician in the AF and retired as a Medical Service Corps Officer in the Navy. Dr. Arenas retired from the military after 28 years of faithful service (14 USAF & 14 USN) in 2005.

Lt Col Jonathan Arnett, PhD, is an associate professor of national security studies in the Department of International Security at Air University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). Lt Col Arnett earned his PhD in political science from the Nelson A. Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy at the State University of New York in Albany. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and a 2006 graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

Dr. Terry Beckenbaugh is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Security at Air University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base. He came to ACSC from the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he taught for nine years in the Department of Military History. Dr. Beckenbaugh received his PhD in 19th Century US History from the University of Arkansas, and his Masters and Bachelors in US History and History, respectively, from Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania. Beckenbaugh has taught at a variety of undergraduate and graduate civilian institutions. He is currently working on a book on the White River Campaign in Arkansas in the spring-summer of 1862, and has numerous publications and conference presentations.

Maj Charlie Bueker is an Air Command and Staff College AY17 graduate and serves as an instructor in Air Command and Staff College's Department of International Security. Additionally, as the Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS) Course Director, he is tasked to deliberately develop field grade officers into International Affairs Specialists who will build positive relationships with global partners. Prior to his current assignment, Maj Bueker served as a B-1 pilot, Air Liaison Officer and Joint Terminal Attack Controller. He holds a MAS in Military Operational Art and Science from Air University, and a BS in Management from the United States Air Force Academy.

Dr. James D. Campbell is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the Joint Warfighting Department at Air University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). A retired US Army Brigadier General, Dr. Campbell served as an Infantryman and Strategic Plans and Policy Officer, with assignments at all levels of command and staff, in both the Regular Army and the National Guard. Most recently he served as the Deputy Chief, Operations Plans Division at US Central Command, and prior to his retirement served as the 39th Adjutant General of Maine and Commissioner of the Maine Department of Defense, Veterans and Emergency Management. While in this last position, he was appointed as a member of the Army Reserve.
Forces Policy Committee, a body of General Officers from all three Army components which advises the Secretary of the Army. Dr. Campbell holds a M.A. in European History and a PhD in British History. He is a graduate of the US Army War College and was an International Security Studies Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Prior to his arrival at ACSC, he worked as an Adjunct Professor of History at the University of Maine and as a History Instructor at the US Air Force Academy. Dr. Campbell has written on subjects ranging from Homeland Defense, to Irregular Warfare and British Military History.

Lt Col Anson Chiu is an Air Warfare Officer in the Republic of Singapore Airforce and joined the Department of International Security (DEI) in 2016, following his graduation from the Air Command and Staff College (in residence) program. Prior to joining Air Command and Staff College, he has served in a variety of staff and leadership appointments at the Squadron, Operational Command, and at the Headquarters level. Anson graduated with a Bachelor of Engineering (Second Class Upper Honors) in Mechatronics from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and has Masters Degree from Cranfield University, United Kingdom and Air Command and Staff College. In 2004, he was part of the Singapore's Joint Task Force and served as a liaison officer during the Tsunami Rescue and Relief Mission in Meulaboh, Indonesia.

Maj Andrew Clayton, Ed.D serves as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Leadership at the Air University’s Air Command and Staff College and deputy course director for the leadership course. Major Clayton is an academic affairs officer with more than 10 years and 5,000 hours teaching within Air University. Major Clayton also holds certifications as an Air Force Master Instructor and On-Line Instructor. He holds a doctorate in organizational leadership with an emphasis in higher education from Grand Canyon University, a master’s degree in adult education and training from the University of Phoenix, a bachelor’s degree in aviation administration from Purdue University, and is a graduate from Air Command and Staff College.

Dr. Dan Connelly currently serves as Assistant Professor and Director of Instruction, Department of International Security. He holds a PhD in Educational Psychology from Auburn University, an MS from the Joint Military Intelligence College, and an MA from American University and BA from Trinity College in Russian Studies. During his doctoral matriculation he specialized in Organizational and Social Psychology. He offers elective courses in Russian strategic culture and the contemporary applications of the Just War Tradition. Dr. Connelly was assigned to Squadron Officer College in 2004, returned there as Dean in 2010, and was assigned to the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) in 2015 for his last military assignment before retirement from the US Air Force.

Dr. Charles E. Costanzo is an Associate Professor of International Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College. A retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, Dr. Costanzo had assignments in ICBM operations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as a faculty member at the US Air Force Academy. His most recent co-authored article is “Busting Myths about Nuclear Deterrence.” Previous articles include “South Asia—Danger Ahead?,” an examination of potentially destabilizing military developments between India and Pakistan, and
“What’s Wrong with Zero?” and “What’s Still Wrong with Zero?”, both critical assessments of the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons from the US arsenal.

**Dr. Ronald Dains** currently serves as Chair, Department of International Security. He holds an MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of Alabama and an MAS in Aeronautical Science and BS in Professional Aeronautics from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. During his doctoral matriculation he specialized in International Relations with minor fields of study in American Politics and Public Administration. His dissertation, Lasswell’s Garrison State Reconsidered: Exploring a Paradigm Shift in U.S. Civilian-Military Relations Research, explored the existence of plausible indicators to determine the potential for an increasingly influential military presence in the US policymaking process. He offers elective courses in US Civil-Military Relations and Logistics and the Use of Military Force. Dr. Dains was assigned to the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) from 2005 to his retirement in 2006.

**Dr. William Dean** is an associate professor of history at the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, AL. He is a graduate of the Univ. of the South (Sewanee) and received his doctorate and master’s degrees from the University of Chicago in European military and diplomatic history. He was a Chateaubriand recipient from the French government and has won the Military Officer of America Association (MOAA) award for civilian educator of the year and the Major General John Alison Award for Air Force Special Operations. He has published on French colonial warfare, intelligence, and air power issues in Revue Historique des Armees, Penser les Ailes Francois, Defense Intelligence Review, and several chapters in various books.

**Dr. Rob DiPrizio** earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Delaware in 2000 with a focus on international security studies and comparative politics. After a short stint at West Virginia University, he joined the faculty at ACSC. Dr. DiPrizio has held numerous leadership positions there and currently serves as an Associate Professor of International Security Studies in the Department of International Studies. He teaches seminars on US national security, contemporary warfare, and Arab-Israeli conflict. He is the author of the book Armed Humanitarians: US Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, August 2002) and is currently revising his manuscript America in the World Today which introduces readers to America’s most pressing international security concerns.

**LCDR Sean Ferguson** is an Instructor of International Security Studies at Air University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), and he is a member of the International Security Studies course team. In addition to teaching core courses, he teaches in an elective on Small Wars. Prior to coming to ACSC, LCDR Ferguson served as Officer in Charge, Strategic Systems Programs Fleet Support Detachment where he trained and certified Pacific and Atlantic ballistic missile submarine crews in strategic weapon system operation. His previous tours include USS ASHEVILLE (SSN 758), Naval Nuclear Power Training Command, USS KENTUCKY (SSBN 737) (BLUE), and the Commander Submarine Force Pacific staff.

**Lt Col Benjamin D. Forest** is an instructor at Air Command and Staff College’s Department of International Security (DEI). During his 23-year Air Force officer and enlisted career, he has served in a variety of fields, including acquisition, cyberspace operations, recruiting, and
contracting. He holds four masters degrees, including a Masters of Systems Engineering Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, and is a recent graduate of the Air War College (AWC) in-residence program at Maxwell AFB, AL. He has served in aircraft and satellite program offices, on the Air Staff, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is a graduated squadron commander. His research areas include: military use of additive manufacturing (i.e., 3D printing), leveraging commercial space capabilities for military use, and international security.

Dr. Kelly Grieco is an assistant professor in the Department of International Security at the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). She is also the Course Director for War Theory and teaches courses in war theory, international security, and military effectiveness. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she was an affiliate of the Security Studies Program (SSP). She has held fellowships from the MIT Center for International Studies (CIS), the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Tobin Project. Her research interests include coalition warfare, coalition military effectiveness, military strategy and US force posture. She is currently working on a book manuscript on the sources of coalition battlefield effectiveness.

Dr. Mary Hampton is Professor of National Security at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB. She was the Associate Dean for Academics at ACSC and has been Professor of National Security at ACSC since 2003. Prior to ACSC, Dr. Hampton was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Utah for 14 years, where she went immediately after receiving her PhD from UCLA. Her research focuses on International Relations Theory, European security, German security and foreign policy, women and German politics, issues and identity in trans-Atlantic relations, Russian foreign policy, the media and foreign policy, and US foreign and security policy.

Maj Sarah K. Helms is an Air Command and Staff College AY17 graduate and serves as an instructor in Air Command and Staff College’s Department of International Security. Maj Helms is a USAF Test Pilot School, class 09A, graduate. She has held developmental engineer positions within AFRL and an Iraq deployment team supporting OIF, and flight test engineer positions at a variety of AFTC’s developmental test flight test squadrons. Prior to her tour at Air Command and Staff College, Maj Helms was the Director of Operations at the 746th Test Squadron and Central Inertial and GPS Test Facility. She holds an MS degree in Flight Test Engineering and an MAS degree in Military Operational Art and Science from Air University, an MS degree in Astronautical Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a BS in Astronautical Engineering from the United States Air Force Academy.

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Holz Zimmer has worked on recent policy concerns, first with GEN David H. Petraeus’ USCENTCOM Joint Strategic Assessment Team (9 October 2008- February 2009) and most recently conducting fieldwork in charting a U.S. Air Force strategy based upon President Obama’s famous “pivot to Asia” speech. He holds a PhD in military history from Temple University.

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