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
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Air power lessons from the days of Sandino—page 85

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
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SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA IN THE NEXT DECADE

DR. GABRIEL MARCELLA

WE are witnessing the emergence of a new consensus in the intellectual, political, and defense communities within the United States—a belief that the United States must focus sustained attention and resources on the security of Latin America. This new consensus is a consequence of many factors, which include the Central American crisis, the extension of Soviet power into the hemisphere, and the increasing political and economic weight of Latin America in the international community. A friendly southern flank that does not drain U.S. resources is considered to be fundamental to the nation's ability to project its power and influence elsewhere. Latin America is also perceived to be



important in terms of the perception of the effectiveness of U.S. power. The American people, Latin Americans, and much of the world regard the responses of the United States to the challenges at its doorstep as important measures of maturity, confidence, and determination in dealing with complex international issues. At home and abroad, failure would be taken as a sign of declining U.S. power.¹ The U.S. policy responses to this point include the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the implementation of aspects of the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, and the effort to manage the \$383 billion debt crisis in Latin America. These have served as a backdrop for the reengagement of U.S. political, economic, and military power to promote security, democracy, social and economic development, and national reconciliation in Central America.

U.S. policy responses must take into account the complex challenges that the community of nations face. Equally fundamental is a new pragmatism that recognizes the global responsibilities of U.S. power and the advantages of having secure, economically prosperous, and politically advanced nations in Latin America as fully participating partners in the world community. As the Reagan administration officials asserted repeatedly in 1984 and 1985, the United States does not want other Cubas, nor does it wish the democratic renaissance under way in Latin America to fail and lead to another round of frustrated hopes, violence, and authoritarian rule. Its differentiated responses to the latest security challenges in the hemisphere indicate that the United States is willing to recognize the North-South dimensions of the problem, particularly when these impinge on its global responsibilities.

Traditionally, U.S. defense planning has given Latin America a limited role in global strategy. The United States currently deploys a limited number of forces in the region—a unified command in Panama (U.S. Southern Command) and a specialized infantry brigade (the

193d) to defend the Panama Canal, to help administer security assistance in Latin America for internal defense and development, and to maintain a military presence for political purposes.² Other important tasks include assistance in combating the international drug traffic and in conducting disaster relief operations.

This infrastructure is supplemented by naval and air elements located at Roosevelt Roads (Puerto Rico), the Guantanamo Naval Station (Cuba), and various communications and undersea surveillance facilities. The maritime-oriented Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia, shares defense responsibilities with the United States Southern Command. The Atlantic Command has jurisdiction in the Caribbean and the ocean areas around Central and South America, while the Southern Command has responsibility over the land areas of Central and South America. Responsibility for the Caribbean has been delegated to U.S. Forces Caribbean Command, a subunified command under the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command and located in Key West, Florida. Additional forces on the U.S. mainland could provide reinforcements for contingencies in Latin America. By the year 2000, this infrastructure could change drastically, since U.S. defense sites in the former Canal Zone are to be turned over to the Panamanian government. The decision of where to locate the theater command and its supporting forces will require careful planning and will be an important indicator of U.S. commitment to regional security.

The relative security of its strategic backyard traditionally permitted the United States the flexibility to project power and influence to other theaters, practically unconstrained by competing requirements on its southern flank. However, the era of security minimally resourced on the southern flank is clearly over.³ The complex threat includes the growing Soviet air and naval reach into the Central and South Atlantic and into the Caribbean. Cuba's ability to project military power into the Car-

ibbean, the emergence of a militarized and sovietized Nicaragua, the new and much more sophisticated revolutionary warfare in Central America, and other insurgencies in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. The low-intensity conflicts in Latin America are now engaging the attention of strategists as never before. Leaders throughout Latin America and the Caribbean are concerned about the new revolutionary warfare—waged by the Marxist left and backed by Soviet and Cuban power—that feeds on social and economic deprivation. There are at least eight insurgencies at various stages of development. The conventional and unconventional use of Sandinista military power poses threats to neighboring El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas are expanding their defensive perimeter by actively supporting the development of an infrastructure of violence in the region. The Soviets and their allies have also undertaken a long-term program of cultural penetration, which is beginning to yield handsome strategic rewards. Thousands of scholarships are offered to Latin American students for university-level training in socialist countries. This gesture is but one dimension in the development of a sophisticated infrastructure to wage low-intensity warfare in the future.

Cuba presents a continuing strategic dilemma. In the context of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, Cuba could impede the progress of U.S. military forces unless neutralized either diplomatically or militarily. Since the credibility and the viability of the NATO deterrent posture in Europe depend on timely logistical resupply from the United States, and approximately 60 percent of this resupply would have to transit around Cuba, planners must devote resources to the Cuban problem. Analyzing U.S. and Cuban strategic options, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, writes that “. . . a potentially hostile Cuban force cannot be allowed to threaten the NATO flank during a Central Front War. . . .

U.S. strategy is designed to motivate Cuba toward demonstrable neutrality.”⁴ However, although the Cuban leadership appears to be pragmatic, it would be imprudent for the United States simply to assume Cuba's neutrality and to be unprepared for an overt threat. The Cuban ability to interdict U.S. shipping is formidable and growing: 270 Soviet-supplied jet combat aircraft, an unknown number of Mi-24 Hind-D helicopters, three Foxtrot-class diesel submarines, two Koni-class frigates, Osa/Komar missile-firing patrol boats, and Turya-class hydrofoil patrol boats. Cuba is also the conduit for Soviet assistance to the revolutionary left in Latin America. During the past two decades, Cuba has trained about 20,000 insurgents for Latin America, while developing and maintaining a sophisticated apparatus to promote revolutionary violence. U.S. military planners must therefore take into account the relationship of the Caribbean theater of operations to other theaters in the event of conflict between East and West.

Dilemmas for U.S. Power in Latin America

The emerging strategic consensus of the 1980s reverses the trend of the 1960s and 1970s. Understanding this history is fundamental to understanding future directions. The decline of U.S. influence has various causes. Some Latin American countries developed national security doctrines that focused on internal social and economic development and national political integration as prerequisites for national security. The Brazilian and Peruvian doctrines and strategies, variously adapted by other Latin American countries, equate social and economic development with national security. The national security doctrines merged with dependency theory to explain Latin America's marginal and vulnerable position in the global distribution of wealth and power. Historically, Latin American concepts of national security have contrasted with the U.S.

emphasis on military security. However, as the United States became more keenly aware of the importance of the economic element of national security and regional power, its focus and policies changed significantly.

At the international level, important changes in arms transfers and security assistance patterns affected Latin America directly. In the United States, Congress limited arms sales to Latin America.⁵ By the early 1980s, the United States was no longer the prime source of armaments, and it suffered a diminished capability to influence military institutions or affect conflict resolution. Moreover, sophisticated indigenous arms industries began developing in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. By failing to respond to Latin America's military equipment and training needs, the United States heightened the insecurity of Latin American leaders and diminished their belief in the United States as a responsible security partner. Moreover, this U.S. stance complicated the defense planning of various states, making them dependent on a variety of foreign sources for equipment. Some Latin American leaders even argued that U.S. unresponsiveness jeopardized the security of their nations.

The human rights policy of the Carter administration may have also accelerated the decline of strategic consensus. The human rights emphasis followed closely upon congressional legislation that limited the projection of U.S. power into the Third World. For example, provisions inserted into the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and subsequent amendments prohibit security assistance to governments found to be conducting "gross" violations of human rights. The linkage of human rights records to U.S. security assistance resulted in either Latin American government- or U.S.-initiated withdrawal from U.S. military assistance programs. Consequently, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Nicaragua were denied access to U.S. security assistance programs.

The Carter effort to promote greater respect for human rights, laudable in many respects, may well have been counterproductive, in both the short and long term. In countries with serious internal problems, particularly in Central America, reductions or suspensions of security assistance weakened the confidence that governments had in the U.S. commitment to their national security. They also reduced U.S. access to the host country's military, thus surrendering a capability to affect decisions made by the military, which ultimately affected the political development of these countries, increased their sense of insecurity, and thus perhaps contributed unwittingly to greater human rights violations. This apparent decline in U.S. concern may well have enhanced the confidence of leftist insurgents and their foreign supporters. Moreover, the general reduction in U.S. transfers did not reduce the arms expenditures by countries of the region, nor was it emulated by other suppliers, such as France, Israel, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Indeed, it also accelerated the search for military technological autonomy among the more industrially capable countries, such as Brazil and Argentina.

Finally, the general decline in security assistance also resulted from doubt about its value in advancing U.S. global interests. There are two distinct schools of thought on this issue in the United States. Security assistance optimists stress a variety of benefits: regional stability, professionalization of recipient institutions, and increased U.S. influence over decisional elites. Pessimists, however, warn that the definition of professionalization is a function of culture and that influence is itself a difficult value to measure. Both agree, however, that to be effective, security assistance must be an element of a comprehensive bilateral relationship that ought to exist between the United States and the recipient country, a relationship balanced by economic and political components. As is amply demonstrated by the efforts in Central America, no amount of security assistance

can bring a society out of the injustices of underdevelopment. Security assistance will simply buy time for the necessary reforms to take place.

In a significant departure from Carter's policy, the Reagan administration adopted a more pragmatic approach to security assistance and arms transfers, tying its policy more directly to the requirements of U.S. national security, but within the broader context of democratization.⁶ Human rights laws were not abandoned. Unquestionably, the coming of the Central American crisis aided this pragmatism and its gradual acceptance by Congress and the American people. The demonstrable success of a carefully developed program of economic and military assistance to El Salvador has diminished both political and moral misgivings about the use of such instruments of power.

The sweeping Carter assessment of the role of human rights in foreign policy must be seen as deeply rooted in what Samuel P. Huntington calls the conflict between American ideals and institutions.⁷ This conflict is as old as the American republic and was intensified during the height of the American effort to promote democracy in the Third World in the 1960s and 1970s—at the same time that bipartisan foreign policy consensus ceased to exist in American society and the Congress. Congress was asserting greater influence in foreign policy. By attempting to limit the abuse of American power, it also limited the projection of American power abroad. It was the time of a national reassessment of political conduct in the United States that once again found an expression in foreign policy.

We may also better understand the Carter policy and its impact in Latin America through what Huntington and others call the American people's view of the just war. Americans frequently perceive the insurgencies and low-intensity conflicts typical of Latin America as involving the use of force by governments, often military in nature, the political legitimacy of which they regard as dubious. Thus, they perceive the counterinsurgency effort of





For twenty-six years, Fidel Castro (above) has been the godfather of revolution in Latin America. He remains a committed Marxist-Leninist and an avowed friend of the Soviet Union. The fellow with the mustache (left) is Federico Vaughn, a cohort of Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomás Borge. According to testimony presented in U.S. congressional hearings in 1984, Vaughn was loading cocaine on a U.S.-bound plane at Los Brasiles airport.



While Castro's generation passes, those stepping to the fore are no less committed Marxist-Leninists. Equipped with Soviet weapons, the third generation of militant Cuban revolutionaries begins training at an early age.

those governments as illegitimate. Consequently, American power in the form of military and economic assistance must be negotiated through the American political process on behalf of recipients of dubious legitimacy. President Reagan's search for consensus support for his Central American policy exemplifies this difficulty.

Latin American understanding of the domestic constraints on American power is poor, and American comprehension of the policy process in the Latin American nations is no better. Consequently, it is not surprising that many Latin American leaders view American initiatives on arms transfers, security assistance, and human rights as morally selective, strategically shortsighted, and unworthy of a great power. Some argue that whereas the United States is concerned about individual human rights, it is not concerned about the individual and collective rights of societies at war with Marxist guerrillas or at war with the oppressive forces of underdevelopment and social injustice—the true enemies of human rights. Moreover, many Latin American leaders see the real purpose of the human rights policy to be the restoration of foreign policy consensus in the United States and the need to generate leverage against the Soviet Union at the expense of the powerless Latin Americans, a replay of a familiar theme in U.S. relations with Latin America. Given the traditionally marginal role of Latin America in U.S. strategic thinking, they argue that the United States could assume this posture with relative impunity. Going even further, some friends and enemies may have read these initiatives as being tantamount to American disengagement from Latin America. An excellent case could be made that the United States disengaged its economic, political, and military instruments of power from Central America in the 1970-80 decade.

These mutual misunderstandings increased under a foreign policy that sought to reduce contacts with the very military institutions

with which the United States needed better communication. The United States has lost contact with the younger generations of military officers in some of the key countries of Latin America. The reductions in security assistance during the mid-1970s also made it difficult to justify resuming that same assistance on an expanded scale in 1979-81, when the Central American conflict reached crisis proportions. Though the Reagan administration in its first years deemphasized human rights, it later discovered that the defense of human rights has pragmatic advantages as a policy lever.⁸ As an enduring feature of American domestic and foreign politics, human rights will continue to affect U.S. relations with Latin America, particularly the sensitive security dimension. The democratization now under way may make security and economic assistance more politically palatable to the U.S. Congress. Yet, there are a number of countries, such as Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico, beset with either latent or manifest low-intensity conflicts that could complicate not only their domestic politics but also relations with the United States. At the very least, the new revolutionary warfare waged by the radical left is intended to intensify these conflicts in order to disengage U.S. support from the targeted governments. The strategy of the Central American revolutionary left clearly seeks the delegitimation of those governments as a critical step in disengaging U.S. support.

Domestic constraints are an important consideration in developing defense relations. An equally important constraint is the Latin American fear that U.S. power could once again be used against them or that U.S. security commitments are transitory and not to be trusted. Thus, many Latin American leaders view instrumentalities, such as the Treaty of Rio (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) and the Organization of American States, "not primarily as an alliance against an external threat but rather as an elaborate jurid-

ical and moral structure to limit U.S. intervention in the hemisphere."⁹ While these views may appear to overstate fears about American power, it is critical to underscore that Latin American leaders, including the new Marxist revolutionaries, have always perceived a need to limit that power. Moreover, they want to channel that power in directions useful to their domestic and foreign policies, directions that may do little to enhance the interests of the United States.

Beyond Central America: The Enduring Challenge of Inter-American Security

What appears to be the "Central Americanization" of foreign policy risks distracting the United States from the larger strategic interests in Latin America. Unless Sandinista Nicaragua becomes a fully sovietized and militarized state, subordinating its national interests to those of Cuba and the Soviet Union, promoting "the revolution without frontiers" in Central America, and allowing the installation of Soviet and Cuban air and naval power on its territory, Central America may not remain the focus of American strategy.¹⁰ By early 1986, it seemed that the combined pressures of the democratic opposition and the United States, together with the increasing isolation of Nicaragua within the international community, were having some impact on Managua. Whether any fundamental change in the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba or in the Sandinistas' Marxist-Leninist domestic and foreign policies will occur is uncertain. It is important to note that Nicaragua is not an island that can be sealed off from regional influences, as Cuba is. Important sectors of pluralism have survived in Nicaragua, despite the increasingly totalitarian superstructure. These attributes may ultimately modify or defeat the Sandinistas totalitarian predispositions, but it may be a long twilight struggle for Central America and the United States.

As regards El Salvador, since neither Democrats nor Republicans want to "lose Central America to communism," U.S. political, economic, and military support for a government in El Salvador that makes progress in its reforms and counterinsurgency will probably increase. By April 1985, El Salvador was showing indications of becoming a success story for U.S. policy. The 31 March election had been an important victory for José Napoleón Duarte, for the supporters of evolutionary change, and for the proponents of the political center in Washington and Central America. The Salvadoran government was gaining an important edge in the struggle for legitimacy at the same time that the battlefield performance of its army improved. The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)—beset with battlefield setbacks, desertions, and the loss of international allies—switched its strategy to smaller operations and urban terrorism. Joaquín Villalobos, the leading strategist of the FMLN, emphasized the importance of prolonging the war beyond 1988. There is no question that the insurgent leadership can conduct acts of violence and economic destruction for years to come. The Salvadoran struggle and indeed the entire Central American crisis will require a long-term commitment by the United States, as the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America clearly states. Building responsive and effective national institutions takes time.

Cuba, too, will remain a long-term problem. Barring any change in the orientation of the leadership in Havana, no great improvement in Cuban relations with the United States and Latin America is foreseen. Despite the increasing sovietization of Cuba—in its economy, politics, and military—a more pragmatic generation of Cuban leaders may steer Cuba back to the Western community of nations. Even in his dotage, Fidel Castro may not surrender his revolutionary pretensions, the anti-American thrust of his foreign policy, and efforts to spread communist revolutions in Central and

South America. The loss of Grenada, through the self-destruction of the New Jewel Movement and the U.S. military action in 1983, was a serious defeat for Cuban foreign policy, emphasizing once again Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union. In early 1985, Fidel Castro, perhaps tiring of the costs of the peculiar alliance with the Soviet Union, appeared amenable to improved relations (on his own terms) with the United States. Maintaining a confident manner, in the face of continued contradictions in his foreign policy and rejection by a number of Latin American leaders, he once again spoke optimistically about the inevitability of revolutionary conflict in Latin America and the legitimacy of Cuban support for revolution.¹¹ The United States will seek ways to neutralize Cuba either politically or militarily in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact contingency. Cuba's ties to Marxist-Leninist groups in the region and its efforts to nurture and exploit other revolutionary opportunities bear watching.

It is with the larger powers—Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Colombia—that the United States has important long-term interests at stake. Developments among these states are having an increasingly critical impact on the United States. The larger Latin American states are becoming better integrated and more active participants in the international system. This international emergence coexists, however, with the dilemma confronting all developing countries: maximizing economic productivity, improving social and political participation, and distributing the benefits of growth more equitably while simultaneously minimizing the tensions that erode the support base of government. Moreover, this political challenge must be met as these countries face an overwhelming financial liquidity crisis. These weaknesses will seriously reduce the chances that these nations will contribute to regional defense more actively. Moreover, the competing demands for welfare and security will have a dramatic impact on civil-military relations in the emerging redemocratiza-

tion of the region. Democratization in such countries as Argentina, Guatemala, Uruguay, and El Salvador (and also, prospectively, in Chile) must also heal deep wounds between the civilian leadership and the military. The military has a central role to play in making democracy viable.¹² Furthermore, it is in its institutional interest that democracy succeed. To be true to its own values and to promote civil-military peace, the United States must forge new military relations that enhance military support for democracy.

Coalition Defense or Strategic Ambiguity?

In the interest of regional security and sharing the defense burden, some strategists have proposed that the United States develop a coalition defense strategy with key powers—for example, with Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, and Chile. While this proposal may appear to be a promising direction for security cooperation, prudence recommends a cautious approach. Ambiguity may be more appropriate than certainty, as shown by the examples of Brazil and Mexico.

In recognition of Brazil's importance in world affairs, the United States agreed to conduct high-level consultations on matters of mutual interest—the Brazil-United States Memorandum of Understanding of 21 February 1976. These data underscore Brazil's importance: the largest and most populous country in Latin America and sixth in the world (130 million people); the eighth largest economy in the world; an expanding and sophisticated industrial base; the largest aggregate of armed forces in South America; and, by one ranking, the sixteenth in the world in military capabilities.¹³ Brazil also has an advanced nuclear power program. Some Brazilian strategists see the need to expand Brazil's maritime surveillance and control capacity in the strategic chokepoint known as the Atlantic Narrows.

For the United States, there are dangers in

assigning Brazil a power status that it does not have and a strategic role that it may not want. Brazil's pragmatic foreign policy stresses the importance of remaining linked to the Western community while holding to what the Brazilians call an "ecumenical" approach with the rest of the world in order to pursue its national interests.

At the same time, Brazil clearly understands its defense vulnerabilities. The "impossible war" between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982 exposed Brazil's shortages in military technology and preparedness and urged President João Baptista Figueiredo to declare the need for enlarging the armed forces, but budgetary constraints make this expansion difficult in the short term. As it seeks greater military technological autonomy, Brazil is exporting sophisticated equipment, such as aircraft and armored personnel carriers, to Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Diplomatically, it has the means but perhaps not the disposition to be a spokesman between the Third World and the industrialized nations.

It is imperative for the United States to maintain a cooperative relationship with Brazil as Brazil's self-confidence and its world role increase. President Reagan's trip in 1982 established binational work groups to study the feasibility of cooperation in weapons production, nuclear energy, science and technology, aerospace activities, and economy and finance. The 1984 U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on Industrial-Military Cooperation is designed to advance cooperation on arms production. From the Brazilian perspective, the technology transfer is critical to its interests, or, as the prestigious São Paulo daily *O Estado de São Paulo* stated, "it complements Brazilian technology in producing various types of military equipment without affecting the plans to nationalize the weapons industry or the goal of self-sufficiency in supplying weapons to the armed forces."¹⁴

While these considerations appear to justify

a closer military relationship with Brazil, the United States must be sensitive to Brazil's posture, to its aspirations for autonomy, and to its aversion to automatic alignments. Brazil's foreign policy stresses that the bloc division of the world aggravates international insecurity. From this view emerges a reluctance to promote military relationships that might intensify rather than diminish the potential for conflict. Accordingly, the United States ought to be cautious in assessing a possible Brazilian security role in the South Atlantic or in continental South America. Even if it wanted to, Brazil is very unlikely to have projectable military forces for a long time, except possibly a maritime surveillance and coastal control capability.¹⁵ For the United States and Brazil, strategic ambiguity—a relationship wherein both sides retain flexible options—is preferable to an articulated and structured alliance. An alliance with Portuguese-speaking Brazil would also endanger relations with the Spanish-speaking countries. Brazil's aspirations for autonomy will grow.

Similar advice applies in U.S. relations with Mexico. Mexico has traditionally avoided any connotation of a security role in the subregion. Its foreign policy, consistent with the requirements of its domestic policy, has always emphasized nonmilitary approaches, such as espousal of nonintervention and self-determination. It employs revolutionary rhetoric in foreign policy for the purpose of domestic tranquility. In short, Mexico prefers co-optation to confrontation. Besides attempting to maintain a delicate balance between revolutionary ideology, political pragmatism, and the primacy of domestic politics, Mexico must balance the primacy of its relationship with the United States. The spillover potential of international conflict in Central America, especially the installation of militarized communism in Nicaragua, is having an impact on Mexican national security concerns, not only because it brings the East-West conflict much closer but because of its potentially destabilizing impact

on domestic Mexican politics, particularly in its contiguous southern region.¹⁶ The conflicts in Central America are, in an important sense, a constant reminder of Mexico's own internal weaknesses.

The most useful role which Mexico could play is that of moderating conflict in Central America through the use of the political and economic instruments most congenial to its own political requirements. Moreover, the exigencies of domestic politics do not allow Mexico to surrender its foreign policy autonomy to the United States. Mexico can play a limited role in the pursuit of development, democracy, and security in Central America and the Caribbean area.

The cautious approach with respect to Brazil and Mexico also applies to defense relations with the smaller countries. The United States is a partner in coalition defense with Panama, El Salvador, and Honduras, respectively. Each one of these partnerships responds to a strategic imperative—defense of the Canal, support for the Salvadoran counterinsurgency, and thwarting the Sandinista menace to Honduras. Yet, in very fundamental ways, the United States must goad reluctant and weak allies to cooperate among themselves to fight the common enemy—communist insurgents aided by the Sandinistas, Cubans, and Soviets. One U.S. field commander intimately familiar with El Salvador and Honduras quoted Simón Bolívar's famous phrase about "plowing the seas" in describing his own efforts in getting those two countries to put aside their differences and cooperate militarily. This comment illustrates that confident and effective democracies that represent the interests of their people can make better contributions to regional defense and to their own defense than can weakly based governments presiding over fragmented nations with prostrate economies and unjust social structures. The formidable challenge for the United States and Latin America is to fashion a strategy that unlocks the creative energies of the nascent democracies of Latin Amer-

ica. Only when their internal vulnerabilities are eliminated can they become effective defense partners.

I N the next decade, the United States must adjust to Latin American security concerns and recognize the correlation of economic development and security. The agenda for action will require pragmatism in the United States and in Latin America, an outlook that stresses the long term over the short term, accommodation over confrontation, and consensus over scapegoating. There is evidence that this type of approach is already developing as the United States and Latin American nations search for solutions to the economic crisis and revolutionary violence confronting various governments and strive to strengthen democracy. On the other hand, Latin American countries must demonstrate sensitivity to U.S. global responsibilities and to the limits of U.S. power, while adopting measures to share the burden of regional security.

The South Atlantic conflict of 1982 brought to the surface serious questions about the utility of the inter-American security system. Indeed, some advocated fashioning a Latin American defense system excluding the United States. This view reached a particular stridence in Venezuela, Peru, and, understandably, Argentina.¹⁷ However, the cause of peace, security, and developing in the western hemisphere is not advanced without U.S. participation and will not be advanced well without a greater Latin American contribution. A sophisticated view of security will recognize that all nations of the region have mutual interests, such as resolving the debt crisis that threatens the liquidity of the international financial system and strengthening fragile democratic structures. Revolutionary movements in Central and South America, reinforced by the Cuban-Soviet role in destabilizing regional security, require that there be a careful balancing of the East-West

and North-South approaches. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. The very ambiguity and immensity of challenges that are simultaneously East-West and North-South make it difficult for the United States to develop a coherent relationship with Latin America, one that is sustainable within the American political process and at the same time responsive to the security needs of Latin America. Short-term ad hoc crisis responses will no longer suffice in dealing with the complex security challenges.

They only postpone and perhaps intensify the problems.

These are then the strategic imperatives on the inter-American agenda as the year 2000 nears. The system of institutions is flexible enough to permit a prudent and pragmatic dialogue in the search for common approaches. Unless the current generation of leaders seizes the initiative, the next generation may have a much narrower range of options to choose from.

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Notes

1. For this interpretation, see Robert Kennedy and Gabriel Marcella, "U.S. Security on the Southern Flank: Interests, Challenges, Responses," in *Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin*, edited by James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft. Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1984), pp. 187-241. For a European view, see the articles by Socialist Fernando Moran, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Alois Mertes, Minister of State in the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany in *Third World Instability: Central America as a European-American Issue*, edited by Andrew J. Pierre (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985).

2. The Southern Command is composed of the headquarters at Quarry Heights, the 193d Infantry Brigade, the U.S. Air Force Southern Division (which also operates the Inter-American Air Forces Academy), and the U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (which monitors the operation of the U.S. Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School). The definition of U.S. security interests and objectives in Latin America has not varied substantially over the years. See, as examples, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, International Security Affairs, *U.S. Policies toward Latin American Military Forces*, 25 February 1965; and U.S. National Security Council, Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, *Review of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*, March 1971. It is the intensity of those interests which has recently increased.

3. For an elaboration of this view, see Kennedy and Marcella, op. cit.

4. Admiral Wesley L. McDonald describes Cuba's options in a European war scenario as follows: open belligerence, overt neutrality, covert belligerence, overt neutrality, deferred belligerence, true neutrality, or switch in sides. Also see McDonald, "Atlantic Security—The Cuban Factor," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 22 December 1984, pp. 1107-11.

5. For an insightful analysis of trends in arms transfers to Latin America in this period, see Norman M. Smith, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America," *Military Issues Research Memorandum*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 1977.

6. Thomas O. Enders and Richard R. Burt, "U.S. Arms Transfer Policy toward Latin America," *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1981, pp. 72-75. As an example of its application, see the justification of the F-16 sale to Venezuela, which breached the self-imposed U.S. limitation on the transfer of high-performance aircraft to Latin America.

7. See Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of*

Disharmony (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), especially pp. 221-62.

8. On the Reagan administration's human rights policy, see Elliot Abrams, "Quiet Diplomacy Advances Human Rights," *Washington Times*, 6 September 1984, p. 5D.

9. John Child, "Alliance Theory and the Organization of American States," unpublished paper, 1974, p. 8, in *The U.S.-Latin American Strategic Relationship*, collection of papers, 1965-77, at the U.S. Army War College Library.

10. U.S. Department of State, "Revolution beyond Our Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Central America," *Special Report No. 132*, September 1985.

11. Max G. Manwaring, "Brazilian Military Power: A Capability Analysis," in *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power*, edited by Wayne A. Selcher (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1981), pp. 65-98.

12. There is a growing awareness among the military institutions, long the arbiters of national politics, that they must support democratic change. The theme of the sixteenth Conference of the American Armies, held in Santiago, Chile, 11-16 November 1985, was "The Role of the Army in a Democratic Society." The presentation by the delegations of Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Brazil, among others, are excellent expressions of current thinking on democracy and how the military can strengthen it. A civilian perspective that is becoming increasingly popular argues that the militarization of Latin American politics has had pernicious effects on democracy. See, as examples, Juan Somavia, "Notas sobre la Cooperación Política Regional para la Democracia," paper presented at the International Seminar on Regional Political Cooperation for Democracy, 16-18 August 1985, Montevideo, Uruguay; Augusto Varas, "Democratization, Peace, and Security in Latin America," *Alternatives*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1985, pp. 607-23.

13. Manwaring, op. cit.

14. *O Estado de São Paulo*, 27 December 1983, p. 5, as reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Latin America)*, 19 December 1983, pp. D1-D2.

15. For additional insights on Brazilian security views, see Alexandre Barros, "Percepções Brasileñas sobre Seguridad Regional," paper presented at the International Seminar on Regional Security and Peace in Latin America, Viña del Mar, Chile, 19-22 November 1984; Robert J. Branco, *The United States and Brazil: Opening Up a New Dialogue* (Washington: National Defense University, 1984), pp. 73-92.

16. For some recent rethinking of Mexican strategic perceptions, see Olga Pellicer de Brody, "National Security in Mexico: Traditional Notions and New Perceptions," in *U.S.-Mexico Relations:*

Economic and Social Aspects, edited by Clark W. Reynolds and Carlos Tello (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 181-92.

17. For more information on the impact of the South Atlantic War on U.S.-Latin American relations, see Gabriel Marcella, "The Malvinas-Falklands War of 1982: Lessons for the United States and

Latin America," *Strategic Issues Research Memorandum*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1983. For a Peruvian view of the United States as an irresponsible security partner, see Jorge Hesse Ramirez, "Una Nueva Perspectiva sobre la Dependencia y los Mercados de Armas," *Defensa Nacional* (Peru), December 1982, pp. 115-21.

Central America is our near neighbor. Because of this, it critically involves our own security interests. But more than that, what happens on our doorstep calls to our conscience. History, contiguity, consanguinity—all these tie us to the rest of the Western Hemisphere; they also tie us very particularly to the nations of Central America. When Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed what he called his "Good Neighbor Policy," that was more than a phrase. It was a concept that goes to the heart of civilized relationships not only among people but also among nations. When our neighbors are in trouble, we cannot close our eyes and still be true to ourselves.

*Report of the National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America*, January 1984, p. 3

IN LOOKING SOUTHWARD, ARE WE LOOKING DOWN?

AIR power pioneers, World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, Air Force doctrine, military reform, SDI, Soviet capabilities—we've focused on a good many themes in past issues of this *Review*. This time, it is Latin America—but with an ironic twist.

Since the late 1940s, *Air University Review* has published, in addition to its English edition for U.S. Air Force professionals, two foreign-language editions—in Latin American Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese—which have been distributed to Latin American air force members and institutions. The purposes of these editions? To enhance hemispheric security and promote friendly inter-American relations. At a time when our nation's political and military leaders are giving unusual attention to those same concerns, our objectives seem right on target. However, as we publish this issue of the English-edition *Review*—our first concentrated on Latin America and U.S. hemispheric interests—the *Review* has been informed of a 65 percent cut in its publishing budget—a cut so drastic that its Latin American editions will be eliminated unless a new purse opens up. Thus, our Latin American readers may never read the articles in this issue. *Así es la vida*.

Perennially, in the much broader spheres of U.S. policy and attitudes, we North Americans have tended to ignore our southern neighbor-states unless the status quo in one of them seems likely to be upset. We know vaguely that

many people live in Latin America, yet seldom do we realize that by the year 2000—now less than fifteen years away—Latin America's population should reach more than 630 million people, while North Americans (in both Canada and the United States) will be considerably less than half that in number (approximating 275 million). Insulated by other, more immediate crises in our lives, we applaud Lady Liberty's engraved message during a weekend and fret about "too many illegal aliens" on Monday morning. We may be aware that some Latin American countries have difficult problems to solve: large national debts, dependency

on the market prices of a few commodities or minerals; widespread poverty, illiteracy, and malnutrition (in some cases, due to inequitable distribution of wealth); and social unrest that one day could ignite into violent revolution intended to effect changes. But we have our own national problems to worry about—our own national debt and trade imbalance concerns, our own farmers' crisis, our own unemployed and half-schooled and hungry and dissatisfied. To that list, add our anxieties about continuing crime, widespread drug addiction, terrorist acts, and the Soviet threat. Can we take on the troubles of other nations, even when they are geographically close to us? Should we?

It's much easier to look down—pretending that we haven't been aware of our neighbor's situations, assuming a position of a woe-begotten superpower whose next steps forward in human history have become truly arduous, perhaps assessing our Hispanic (and Anglo) hemispheric partners as less important than more powerful, more affluent nations farther from our shores. Withdrawal from long-term dilemmas, waiting for the chips to fall before paying attention, and reacting to events rather than shaping the future are simple endeavors. They cost no money, no time, no adrenaline,

and no talent. They allow us the luxury of self-absorption; free our time and funds and creative drive for application to societal needs; technological systems, and bureaucratic empires in our own land; and offer us manifold opportunities for both demoralizing woe-gathering and heartwarming, self-congratulatory nationalism—take your pick. Our vision can be limited—centered on the Now and the Here-at-Home and the Bucks-in-our-Pockets.

We are free to choose this posture—not an unfamiliar one, some Latin American observers might say. In our relations with our neighbors, we as a nation can reject long-term vision, selfless beneficence, international leadership, and the old-fashioned Yankee “can-do-it” spirit. Then, when something drastic happens in Latin America—some cataclysmic event that makes our page-one headlines—we shall be shocked. With eyes suddenly alert, we shall search the landscape before us, once again hoping to find the tools, vehicles, and paths needed to remedy that situation—at least for awhile.

It is tough to see the big picture each day and to work to improve it, bit by bit, over time. Do we want to be the visionaries who take on such commitments?

Janice M. Beck

U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: ASSESSING THE BALANCE SHEET


MAJOR BRIAN C. HAGGERTY

LATIN America is a region of vital and increasing concern to the United States in terms of the role that it must certainly play in the future national security of the United States. Complicating what may on the surface appear to be simple security matters associated with the threat of Soviet adventurism in the Americas are profound and often disturbing demographic, cultural, and economic changes occurring within the region. Such factors as rapid population growth coupled with inadequate food production, increasing urbanization, reordering of the classes,

and disagreements about the distribution of wealth promise to breed instability in many parts of Latin America well into the foreseeable future.

Nations to the south represent the full spectrum of development from near-total poverty, as in Haiti, to those with growing industrial bases, such as Brazil and Argentina. This spectrum includes a full array of economies, many of which are struggling to industrialize and free themselves from their dependence on a single crop or product.¹

Against this backdrop of indigenous tur-



moil, U.S. and Soviet interests and objectives in the region must be examined and long-term policies to protect U.S. security interests and objectives in Latin America must be instituted. A stable and friendly Latin America ensures a secure, if not impenetrable, southern flank for the United States. Conversely, an unfriendly (or even neutral) Latin America would force the United States to divert scarce defense assets from other critical areas of the globe in order to prevent interdiction of vital lines of communication and to defend against attacks on the United States itself.² Therefore, friendly and healthy Latin American neighbors are essential to long-term U.S. security, and continued U.S. involvement in the region is imperative.

TO create a clear picture of the potential impact of this vital region on the security of the United States, it is useful to commence with a geographic overview. Three subregions of Latin America are generally identified with varying degrees of U.S. security interest. The nations on the west coast of South America are a secondary source of strategic raw materials; and, in the event the Panama Canal were closed, this subregion's proximity to alternate shipping lanes and its ship repair and refueling facilities could become crucial.

U.S. security interest in the east coast of South America is far greater. Potential for control of South Atlantic shipping lanes from east coast bases is strategically significant due to the large percentage of petroleum shipments that transit these waters bound for the United States and Western Europe. U.S. strategic interests also include regional military capabilities coming of age, supported by maturing indigenous arms industries, especially in Brazil and Argentina. Thus, viable security relationships with the republics on the east coast have become an important, if somewhat elusive, aim of the United States.

Still closer to home, the Latin American subregion most crucial to U.S. security is the

Caribbean Basin, which commands both the Atlantic-Pacific and north-south sealanes. It is an area of extreme strategic vulnerability for both the United States and NATO. For resupply and reinforcement of NATO during wartime, more than one-half of all men, materiel, and petroleum supplies would embark from Gulf ports en route to Europe. For similar strategic considerations, the Panama Canal is also crucial to U.S. security.

Unfortunately, many of the nations of Latin America are politically unstable as a result of their own struggles to develop. This instability is fueled by the collision of backward economies with the fluctuating international economic system and, in many cases, by external interference in internally generated insurgencies. It is in the U.S. interest that political stability derive from governments which are responsible to both the economic and social needs of their citizenry.³

For the United States, military objectives range from defense of the Panama Canal to ensuring U.S. access to essential resources within the region. Preventing growth of hostile military capabilities without the commitment of large numbers of U.S. forces on a full-time basis is a prime objective, as is control of the Caribbean and South Atlantic sealanes. Thus, obtaining agreements, rights, and authorizations for necessary operations by U.S. and allied military forces serves the security interests of the United States. Despite the fact that Cuba has clear links to Moscow, keeping Latin America out of the realm of the East-West conflict to the greatest extent possible is also clearly a U.S. security interest—consideration of which requires a perusal of the current U.S. approach toward both the hostile and the more agreeable nations of the hemisphere.

The Reagan administration's approach to Cuba has been hard-line from the outset, largely in response to Cuban aid for revolutionaries in Central America. This approach is a remake of the diplomatic and economic embargo created by the Kennedy administration in the

early 1960s, which drove Cuba to almost total reliance on the Soviet Union for its survival, thereby removing nearly all potential for U.S. influence over the new island regime.⁴ Consistent with the administration's stance toward the hemisphere's first communist regime, definite parallels have emerged in U.S. relations with Nicaragua.

Meanwhile, in February 1982, President Reagan announced his Caribbean Basin Initiative, which is an economic development package for the area designed to provide aid and trade concessions selectively. When compared to the Alliance for Progress unveiled by the Kennedy administration in 1961, the Caribbean Basin Initiative is a program of modest proportions. Its major premise is the same as that of the Johnson administration's ill-fated modifications to the Alliance for Progress in 1964. That premise was that private-sector investment, as opposed to government programs, is the key to economic development. The same basic conditions that precluded the triumph of private-sector investment in the 1960s still exist.

Keeping the foregoing discussion of U.S. aims and interests in mind, one can make several preliminary observations about U.S. policy toward Latin America. First, the United States does not intend to build an enormous military establishment in the region; rather, it intends to assist nations in maintaining internal security and stability. That being the case, it is interesting that the current administration has been less than receptive toward solutions to Central American problems offered by such regional powers as Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama—the Contadora nations.

It is also apparent that the administration and Congress are not completely in concert on administration efforts to isolate the left, particularly in Central America; witness the heated debate about aid to the *contras* in Nicaragua. Moreover, Reagan administration policies seem to be a significant reversal of the Carter administration program, replacing a very vocal ap-

proach to human rights with one characterized by low-key persuasion. The abrupt and radical shift that occurred when the U.S. administration changed in 1981 has left many Latin Americans confused about U.S. values and commitments.

Soviet Designs on Latin America

While U.S. efforts in Central and South America have frequently elicited "yanqui, go home" responses, the Soviet Union's more subtle movements have drawn less Latin ire.

Communism took root in Latin America soon after World War I in the form of Communist parties in various republics; eleven such parties were founded by 1929. Not until Cuba's emergence as a communist nation in 1960, however, did the Soviet Union show significant interest in the region.⁶ Geographical remoteness may explain the Soviets' seeming indifference.

As a result of the 1962 missile crisis, the Organization of American States imposed a U.S.-sponsored embargo on Cuba. Cuba responded by exporting revolution to neighboring republics. This reaction opposed the Soviet strategy of "peaceful coexistence." The Soviets themselves pursued peaceful transition by supporting united fronts, touting their success when Salvador Allende, the Popular Unity candidate, was elected to lead Chile in 1970. However, the coup that deposed Allende in 1973 shook the Soviet belief in peaceful transition.⁷ Soviet strategy began to shift toward support of armed struggles, Nicaragua being the current example.

The relationship of Cuba and the Soviet Union has been complex, featuring both cooperative efforts and some divergent, independent actions. In February 1960, soon after Castro's triumph in Cuba, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan led a trade mission to the fledgling communist regime, initiating relations and a bond that has grown tremendously since then. The U.S. response to the new Cuban regime

was a highly successful effort to cut all diplomatic and economic ties between the island and its Latin American neighbors and other Western nations. This U.S. effort forced Cuba, unable to survive without massive economic aid, to rely on the Soviet Union, the only comparable source of assistance available to the fledgling government. Thus, U.S. policy stimulated Soviet interests in Cuba rather than undermining the revolution on the island.⁸

Soviet and Cuban differences have been modified significantly since the early 1960s when relations were strained over the issue of armed struggle versus peaceful transition. While Soviet strategy in the region has changed toward support of armed conflict, Cuba's regime has become more sovietized, particularly since 1970 when Castro departed from his personalized approach to the administration of his government.⁹ On the other hand, Cuba—which has portrayed itself as a leader among Third World nations—was more than a little embarrassed by the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Beyond meeting Cuba's basic security needs, Soviet objectives include the export of Cuba's revolutionary movement both within Latin America and beyond to other Third World regions. Large-scale deployments of Cuban troops to Africa, using Soviet logistical support, will no doubt make combat-seasoned forces available to conduct military operations within Latin America. A Soviet-Cuban political assault on the Caribbean islands has been mounted and given a more effective local flavor by the Cubans.¹⁰ The considerable political activity and the buildup of military equipment and facilities on Grenada prior to October 1983 illustrate this point.

Pronouncements from Moscow try to picture very clearly the aim of the Soviet Union's involvement in Latin America as advancing and defending the sovereignty of the nations of the region, supporting their independence from imperialism, and aiding them in economic and social development. In its recent turn away

from peaceful transition, the Soviet Union has been careful to appear consistent with its own pronouncements against U.S. imperialism. Through its Cuban surrogate, Moscow can capitalize on the growing unrest in the region without showing its own hand.¹¹

Moscow's primary objective in the Caribbean is strategic denial—that is, to strangle NATO reinforcement and resupply from ports on the U.S. Gulf Coast during contingencies by building an effective naval threat in the Caribbean and beyond in the Atlantic. Another Soviet objective is to divert U.S. attention from other areas of concern, such as the Indian Ocean Basin.¹²

The Soviet Union seeks to increase its influence in Latin America primarily through expanding relations and economic aid in the southern cone and by seizing opportunities created by revolutions that occur autonomously in the Caribbean region. The Soviet Union, along with Cuba, stands ready to challenge U.S. hegemony and “. . . tip the political balance in the hemisphere.”¹³

To prevent the Soviet Union from achieving these objectives and expanding its interests in this hemisphere to the detriment of U.S. national security and at the expense of the developing nations of the region, the United States must consistently pursue policies that capitalize on its assets while minimizing the impact of its liabilities. A summary of those assets and liabilities is instrumental to the discussion of how U.S. policy supports its objectives and promotes its interests.

U.S. Assets and Liabilities

In the strategic context, the Panama Canal is fundamental to U.S. global defensive strategy, allowing the United States to patrol three oceans with a navy force that would otherwise be sufficient for only one and one-half oceans. Further, access to strategically critical raw materials relatively close to U.S. shores is a significant asset. Large percentages of U.S.

bauxite, manganese, copper, iron, and zinc imports come from the region, as well as Venezuelan and Mexican oil. Latin America, also, achieves positive gains from these U.S. interests.

Also on the plus side, a framework of mutual defense agreements, including the 1945 Act of Chapultepec and the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the so-called Rio Treaty), though less effective today than in years past, has lent stability without expensive U.S. force deployment.¹⁴

In contrast to these assets, U.S. strategic vulnerabilities in the region are particularly noisome. All thirteen Caribbean sealanes vital to NATO contingency plans thread through four strategic chokepoints, vulnerable to interdiction.¹⁵ In addition, many Latin Americans have come to view anticommunism as a convenient pretext for U.S. interference in their national affairs and envision a United States at odds with self-determination, making socialists and the Soviets attractive by default.¹⁶ The implication of Soviet installations and forces in the Caribbean Basin for U.S. global strategy is tremendous: the strategic context, which has remained in balance, deterring global war since the close of World War II, would be altered substantially.¹⁷ Airfield and facility construction on Grenada prior to October 1983 is a prime example. These facilities might well have provided a staging base for Soviet aircraft en route to Central America and, in conjunction with bases in Nicaragua and Cuba, could have posed a threat to oil production facilities in the Caribbean area and the sealanes used to move crude through the region.

U.S. military assets in Latin America under the United States Southern Command (US-SOUTHCOM) include very modest force levels that require augmentation from the CONUS to meet any significant threat. Perhaps the most important U.S. military asset vis-à-vis the region is the ability to project forces where needed. The October 1983 operation on Grenada, exercises off the coasts and ashore in Central America, and reconnaissance flights over

Cuba are specific examples of this capability.

The U.S. Security Assistance Program for the region includes equipment transfers and advisory assistance as well as a variety of training and educational programs, ranging from senior service schools for officers to mobile training teams operating throughout Latin America. Although many Latin Americans have grown increasingly critical of the inter-American security system, most are still committed to the idea of collective security. The South Atlantic War in 1982 caused regional military establishments to reexamine their own preparedness.¹⁸

The United States has incurred some military liabilities in Latin America. U.S. strategic warning systems looking southward are virtually nonexistent, whereas Soviet and Cuban expansion has included construction of a large, sophisticated monitoring facility near Havana, which is capable of intercepting communications and tracking U.S. conventional and strategic forces. In response to U.S. application of balance and limitation criteria, many republics have turned to alternative sources for more sophisticated conventional arms, thus eroding U.S. influence. As a result, the U.S. military has lost opportunities to work on interoperability and standardization issues among the hemisphere's armed forces.¹⁹

Politically, a special relationship has existed between the United States and Latin America for many decades. A history based on sharing the Western Hemisphere tends to incline Latin Americans toward choices that are favorable to the United States. More recently, the human rights policy embodied in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, passed by Congress in 1976, has tended to make some of the Latin American military regimes appear to be less repressive—an impression that could ultimately improve the U.S. image in the region.

Cuban nationalism and desires for leadership in the Third World are also a potential asset to the United States. They may provide an

opportunity to alter Soviet-Cuban relations. In addition, U.S. participation in multilateral programs to assist Latin American nations is a potential asset. Mexico and Venezuela are both emerging powers, with vested interests in regional development: witness the Contadora Declaration, the San José Accord of August 1980, and their jointly sponsored summit in September 1982 to help resolve differences between Nicaragua and Honduras.

The most severe U.S. political liability in the region has been sporadic and inconsistent policies that the United States has employed over the years. The Good Neighbor Policy faded away, the Nixon-Ford era was a period of neglect, Carter administration policies were viewed by many Latin Americans as ambiguous and contradictory, and, most recently, President Reagan has dropped the strong human rights emphasis of the Carter era and pushed off in other directions.

Further, the United States and U.S.-based multinational corporations are blamed for the dependent status of many of the republics of the region, which typically have single-product economies. Many Latin Americans feel that they must recapture control of their resources from foreign interests and change the economic order if their national development is to proceed.²⁰

Another significant factor in regional instability is a radicalized younger generation present in elite university populations. This politicized and vocal minority is generally Marxist-oriented and has a strong desire to be rid of historical dependency relationships with the United States.²¹ U.S. backing of strong anti-communist dictators has created the impression that the United States favors the upper-class elites as opposed to the interests of the masses.²² Identifying with these ruling elites, the United States places all of its political eggs in one very small basket and runs the risk of that nation becoming hostile if the regime is deposed, as in Cuba and Nicaragua.²³

Because the political image of the United

States has been tarnished by several perceived failures in recent years, U.S. influence over Latin America has declined. Among these failures are the Bay of Pigs invasion, the war in Vietnam and its accompanying well-publicized domestic dissent, and, in the 1980s, the U.S. response to the Falklands/Malvinas crisis. When the United States ultimately abandoned its neutrality and supported Great Britain in the South Atlantic War, Latin Americans felt a deep sense of betrayal and perceived a U.S. abandonment of the terms of the Rio Treaty.

In the realm of economics, the United States enjoys significant advantages on the one hand but ails in several respects. The sheer volume of trade between the United States and Latin America is a significant asset. The United States provides 40 percent of Latin American imports while absorbing one-third of the region's exports. U.S. exports to South America alone are nearly four times its total exports to the rest of the developing world. Caribbean nations sell 60 percent of their exports to and receive 40 percent of their imports from the United States. Total U.S. investment in the region amounts to roughly \$39 billion annually, more than 18 percent of U.S. private investment abroad.²⁴

In the liabilities column, U.S. economic policies and programs (currently the Reagan administration's proselytizing on private-sector investment) are viewed skeptically in Latin America as advantageous to U.S. business interests and not conducive to the formation of indigenous production systems. The United States is blamed for sustaining chronic unemployment in the region. Latin American governments have begun to create a system of regional economic coalitions independent of the United States.²⁵ Their economies are turning away from bilateral relations with the United States toward international sources, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. They are expanding their economic relations with Western European, other Third World,

and, in some cases, Soviet bloc nations.

To complete the picture of factors affecting U.S. policy needs in Latin America, a closer look at Soviet assets and shortcomings in the region is necessary.

Soviet Assets and Liabilities

In pursuit of its objectives and interests, the Soviet Union's relationship with Cuba is its greatest strategic asset in Latin America. Cuba adds Hispanic flavor to Soviet propaganda efforts and supports subversive activities in nearly every Latin American and Caribbean Basin country, generally supporting the Soviet strategy of obtaining increased influence and leverage. Cuba is the Soviet beachhead in the Western Hemisphere, and its potential for prepositioning equipment for military contingencies could force the United States to reassess its defensive posture elsewhere.

Cuban facilities will enable the Soviet Union to use strategic denial to halt contingency reinforcement of NATO by interdicting Caribbean shipping lanes with considerably less force than the United States would require for prevention. A key ingredient in this effort is the Soviet monitoring facility near Havana, which seems to be the largest facility of its type outside the borders of the Soviet Union.²⁶

Because of the profile that the Soviets attempt to maintain in the region, trouble spots, such as border disputes, the South Atlantic War, and indigenous revolutions, generally work to the Soviet advantage. When the United States errs in its relations, the Soviet image is enhanced by default. Still, the strategic outlook for the Soviet Union is not without flaws. Although their differences have attenuated over time, one of the Soviet Union's greatest liabilities has been Cuba's autonomous action in supporting revolutions throughout the region, often in direct conflict with Soviet policy.

In addition to the Soviet Union's extreme distance from the region, its sensitivity to appearances of overt aggression is a liability. The

Soviets' well-publicized loss in the 1962 showdown with the United States concerning emplacement of missiles in Cuba, as well as the October 1983 action by the United States to thwart the Soviet-Cuban buildup on Grenada, illustrate both of these liabilities.

Soviet military assets in Latin America include its growing blue-water navy; augmented in the Caribbean by Cuban assets, it provides the Soviets with a sizable and increasing sea interdiction capability in the Caribbean and the Atlantic.²⁷ With more than 10,000 advisors, a 3000-man combat brigade, a squadron of MiG-23 fighters, hundreds of surface-to-air missiles, 650 tanks, and numerous other assets in Cuba, the Soviets have created a sizable force on the island as well.²⁸ Further, deployments of Cuban troops to Africa have created a seasoned combat force for use in the region. In its support of the armed struggles within the region, the Soviet Union has supplied fighter airplanes, tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and other military hardware to other nations in Latin America. Soviet arms sales in Latin America account for approximately 20 percent of the market.²⁹

But the Soviet Union is not without its military liabilities in the hemisphere. Loss of its potential facilities on Grenada was a setback militarily, although not nearly as severe as the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis and the prohibition of offensive weapons on Cuba. Yet the events on Grenada illustrate well that the proximity of the Cuban armed camp to the U.S. mainland, which is an asset in one respect, is at the same time a liability in that it falls well within range of U.S. reconnaissance and offensive military assets.

The Soviet beachhead in Cuba—wherein the Soviet Union supplanted the United States in an essentially protectorate-style relationship—has led to expanded diplomatic relationships in the region in the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that established Communist parties exist in nearly all of the republics, some dating back to the post-World War I era, facilitates Soviet en-

croachment in the region. Political infighting associated with conflicts, human rights violations, and other fluctuations also tend to favor the Soviets simply by comparison to the United States because of the Soviets' lower profile.³⁰ U.S. policies have actually aided the Soviet Union in gaining its foothold. The U.S.-sponsored embargo of Cuba not only forced the island to dependency on Moscow but also prompted many other Latin American countries to view the United States as at odds with self-determination.

Politically, the Soviets have some distinct disadvantages. Although less so today, their relationship with Cuba has been characteristically volatile, and the potential for future estrangement certainly exists.³¹ Other regional powers, such as Mexico and Venezuela, do not desire a Soviet presence in the region—a sentiment shared by most of the republics. The Soviets, therefore, walk a fairly fine line to keep from showing off their own imperialistic designs on Latin America.

In the economic sphere, many experts agree that the Soviets' greatest asset in the region is their trade relationship with Argentina. They are Argentina's largest grain and meat customer, and they provide the Argentines with hydroelectric turbines, generators, enriched uranium, and other products in a well-developed network of economic relationships. Overall, Soviet trade with Latin America increased from only \$70 million in 1960 to more than \$1 billion in 1980. Like the United States in the past, the Soviet Union buys relatively cheap raw materials and food products, often in trade for manufactured industrial goods.³² But offsetting these considerable economic advantages, the price tag for Cuban dependency is very steep. Soviet aid amounts to more than \$3 billion annually, accounting for one-quarter of Cuba's GNP.³³ Trade concessions for Cuban sugar crops are also costly to the Soviets. Furthermore, U.S. control of such assets as the Inter-American Development Bank has made some Soviet deals impossible.

A Prescription for Equilibrium

The basis for U.S. interests and objectives in Latin America, though not totally immutable, is relatively stable over time; but U.S. presidential administrations and their foreign policy assumptions and objectives do change. Each liability that the United States suffers in dealing with Latin America stems, at least in part, from the absence of a satisfactory long-term policy which is consistent and patient, which is capable of recognizing the needs and interests of the nations within the region, and to which individuals and agencies, from the President to the private businessman, are accountable. The same observation holds true in the other regions of the world as well. Latin America is merely the case in point.

To formulate and guide a genuine national policy, a United States Foreign Policy Institute that would function regardless of political changes in U.S. administration should be established by constitutional amendment. Adhering to this policy would make the U.S. approach to other nations consistent and reliable and less subject to the transitory interests of succeeding administrations. The institute's powers, as well as checks and balances, would derive from the Constitution through the three branches of the government, each sharing the responsibility for the institute. The foreign policy established by the institute should recognize that Latin American nations will continue to expand their relations—political and economic—with the rest of the world. The institute and its policies should not attempt to thwart this expansion but to be a trustworthy and helpful partner in that development.

Assuming that U.S. policy toward Latin America will reflect long-term interests and objectives, the United States can capitalize on its assets and minimize the effect of current liabilities. Three such stabilizing actions illustrate this point.

- The United States should support multilateral efforts by regional powers, such as Mex-

o and Venezuela, to resolve conflicts. The Contadora process is a good example.

- The United States should reapproach Cuba with economic carrots and avoid confrontational approaches to other regimes (for example, Nicaragua). This policy, consistently followed, will allow the United States to develop more normal economic and political relations with Cuba and, in capitalizing on Cuban nationalism, reduce the island's need for strong Soviet ties.

- U.S. force deployment should reflect and support the aims established through the aforementioned Foreign Policy Institute, which should include maintaining the USSOUTHCOM structure, expanding efforts to ensure that military facilities (namely, ports, airfields,

and operating areas) are available for contingency use, and conducting joint training exercises throughout Latin America to the maximum extent feasible. These efforts would create an environment for better understanding and, possibly, a degree of standardization between indigenous and U.S. military services, while the interface between the U.S. Southern Command structure and augmenting forces from the CONUS (as well as airlift and sealift capabilities) would also be exercised.

THE decades of change immediately ahead for Latin America will offer many challenges for the entire hemisphere. The United States must be prepared to participate positively in order to meet those challenges successfully.

Travis AFB, California

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AS THE PEOPLES STRIVE
TO DEFEND THEIR RIGHT
TO INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY
AND JUSTICE
ON THE VERY THRESHOLD
OF IMPERIALISM"



UPDATING U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY: CONTAINMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

DR. HOWARD J. WIARDA

L ATIN AMERICA has long been of peripheral interest in terms of a global U.S. foreign policy. Historically, our concerns have been centered chiefly on the European countries, the European military and strategic theater, and—since World War II—particularly the Soviet Union. In terms of priorities as well as temporally, we have not paid Latin America much attention: the area ranks behind Soviet relations, Western Europe and NATO, the Middle East, Japan and China, and the broader Pacific Basin in the rank-ordering of our foreign policy concerns. However, as we have become aware of the impact of the crisis in Central America and in the broader circum-Caribbean (that is, “close to home,” right in our own backyard,” to use the familiar metaphors), plus the fact that we ourselves are becoming something of a Caribbean nation, our historic disinterest has begun to change. Latin America and our Latin American policy are now being taken seriously really for the first time; the area is coming under increased scrutiny from scholars, the think tanks, strategic analysts, and policymakers.¹

In confronting the current and future facets of Latin America, our problem is not simply that we may have devoted insufficient attention to the region but that the fundamental assumptions of the policy we have followed may themselves be flawed. Personally, I am a firm believer in a strong defense and have been generally supportive of U.S. policy in Central America. At the same time, in a series of research projects and reports carried out at the American Enterprise Institute, we have been reex-

amining the bases of U.S. policy toward Latin America in the political, economic, and foreign assistance areas.² It is perhaps time now also, within the context of support for the overall goals of U.S. foreign policy, to reexamine some of the strategic assumptions as well. The question we need to address is whether the historic assumptions and fundamentals of U.S. policy in the Caribbean Basin are still relevant and appropriate in the altered circumstances of today. The United States and the nations of Latin America have changed significantly during the last twenty years, as has the nature of the relations among us. These changes prompt us to ask, hence, whether U.S. policy must be adjusted to these new realities.

Historic U.S. Policy in Latin America

Historic U.S. policy in Latin America, together with the strategic thinking and assumptions undergirding it, has not changed greatly since Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (and, with him, Teddy Roosevelt) first articulated a coherent and integrated policy for the region almost exactly 100 years ago.³ In fact, strategic policy has not changed much since the days of President James Monroe and the famous Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, the fundamentals of the policy have been remarkably consistent and continuous over this long history, regardless of the party or administration in power in Washington. Only the means judged best to achieve these agreed-on goals have varied.⁴

The basic bedrocks of U.S. policy in the Ca-

ribbean Basin, the historical record shows, include the following:

- Protect the "soft underbelly" of the United States. Since we have thousands of miles of oceans on our east and west coasts, as well as a friendly and fellow-English-speaking (for the most part) nation to our north, our primary strategic concern in this hemisphere has been with the small, unstable nations to our south. Indeed, it is their very smallness, weakness, and chronic instability that gives rise to the fear in the United States that a hostile foreign power will take advantage of their debility and establish a base in the circum-Caribbean from which to launch offensives against the United States itself. Hence—and particularly since the building of the Panama Canal—the string of bases, radar-tracking stations, and the like that the United States has maintained throughout the Caribbean.

- Maintain access to the area's raw materials, primary products, markets, and, now, labor supply. This bedrock implies supporting a policy of free trade, open markets, and easy and direct U.S. investments. U.S. economic activity in the area is viewed also as a way to maintain stability and discourage potential competitors.

- Keep out hostile foreign powers, or maybe any foreign powers, from an area thought of as lying within our sphere of influence. That meant action directed against Russia, Spain, France, Britain, and Germany in the past; since World War II, it has meant excluding the Soviet Union from the area.

- Maintain stability in ways that are supportive of these bedrock interests. In general, this means support of whatever government friendly to our interests happens to be in power, while also keeping lines of communication open to the moderate opposition. Maintaining stability does not necessarily mean defending the status quo but includes sufficient support of change and reform to head off the possibility of instability arising out of popular dissatisfaction.⁵

From these "basic bedrocks" of U.S. policy in Latin America, which is, in fact, a long-term and historic strategy of exclusion and containment, a number of corollaries follow:

- U.S. policy has consistently been more concerned with those countries in Central America and the Caribbean that are "close to home" than with those more distant in South America.

- U.S. policy in the area has historically been crisis-oriented. Because ours is essentially a defensive policy in an area that we have not thought of as very important, we have responded to crises after they occur rather than developing a positive, mature, long-term, and anticipatory policy.

- Democracy and human rights have been accorded only secondary importance. To the degree that democracy and a strong human rights policy help secure stability and protect our other bedrock interests, we have been for them but not usually for their own sake or as a fundamental aspect of U.S. policy.

- The same goes for economic and social development. We tend to emphasize these programs as a means to preserve stability when the nations of the area are threatened by Castro-like revolutions. In noncrisis times, however, our attitude is generally one of "benign neglect."

Our basic policy in Latin America, therefore, has been one of hegemony, containment, and balance of power. The question is whether these historic bases of policy, which still undergird a great deal of policy thinking today, continue to be useful and relevant under the changed conditions in which we and the Latin Americans now find ourselves.

New Realities

Three areas of change need to be analyzed: changes in the United States, changes in Latin America, and changes in the inter-American system.⁶ All three impact strongly on the ques-

tion of the continuity, relevance, and utility of U.S. containment policy vis-à-vis Latin America.

Among many basic changes in the United States during the last twenty years, the following may be of special importance in the context of this discussion.

- The United States since its Vietnam experience is a considerably chastised nation, wary of foreign entanglements. We do not wish to be involved deeply in Central America, and we certainly do not want to commit U.S. ground forces.

- The public and Congress will not countenance new large foreign aid programs for Latin America. As a result, we have fewer levers of influence in Latin America.

- The Department of Defense is wary of new interventions in countries where our goals are unclear, public opinion is divided, a prolonged war may result, and discredit is likely to reflect on the military institution. We want no more Vietnams."

- The U.S. foreign policymaking process is now more fragmented, chaotic, and paralyzed than in the past. It is difficult for us to carry out long-term, coherent, bipartisan foreign policy.⁷

- Isolationist sentiment is strong. We want no more "second Cubas" in the Caribbean, yet we are unwilling to provide the funds or programs to ensure that such outcomes do not occur.

- The United States is a weaker presence in Latin America than it was before. Our political, military, diplomatic, cultural, and economic leverage has been lessened substantially. Our capacity to act in the region has thereby been reduced.

In Latin America, also, some important changes have occurred:

- Latin America is more developed, modern, and sophisticated than in previous times. We cannot treat its nations as "banana republics"

anymore, amenable to "quick fixes."

- The Latin American nations are much more assertive and nationalistic; they now listen to the United States reluctantly, if at all. We can no longer or easily simply impose our will.

- Latin America is now much more socially and politically differentiated and pluralistic. We must deal with these new complexities.

- Latin American nations are now pursuing much more independent (if not nonaligned) foreign policies than before. They wish to distance themselves from the United States while not losing in the process our assistance programs.

- Latin America's priorities are now quite different from those of the United States. While our concerns are overwhelmingly strategic, theirs are centered primarily on trade and economic development.

- Latin America is going through both a period of crisis and a period of experimentation with new forms. While its governments and leaders plead for patience, we frequently confuse the two tendencies.

In the realm of the inter-American system, the United States must adjust to new realities also. The structure of the inter-American relationship has been badly damaged through neglect, inattention, and failures to live up to its obligations—as in Central America, the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, and numerous other cases. In addition, by comparison with twenty years ago, the larger or more militarily powerful Latin American states (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba) are far stronger and are pursuing more independent foreign policies at the level of middle-ranking powers. In recent years, furthermore, Latin America has greatly diversified its international ties, opening up new relations with Eastern Europe, China, and the Soviet Union, among others. Finally, a number of new outside powers—West Germany, France, Spain, Japan, and others—have begun to play a much larger role

in the area. Thus, the United States no longer has the monopoly in the area that it once had.

Simultaneously, the United States has become more dependent on Latin America for manufactured as well as primary goods, rendering our relationship one of far more complex interdependence than in the past. Also, new issues—drugs, debt, human rights, democracy, protectionism, trade, and migration—have begun to replace the historic strategic ones. Latin American priorities in these matters are often quite different from U.S. priorities.

All these trends must be factored into the new equations of inter-American relations and into our assessment of the adequacy of traditional U.S. containment policy. To these must be added the rising presence of the Soviet Union and of its proxy Cuba throughout the area.

The Soviet Presence in Latin America

Containment policy was aimed at excluding the Soviet Union from the Western Hemisphere, and, up until the late 1950s, the policy worked quite well. There were small Communist parties in most countries of the hemisphere, but they lacked popular support or a strong organizational base, and the notion of Stalinist troops disembarking on Latin America's shores was—as it deserved to be—dismissed as ludicrous. In 1954, the United States intervened in Guatemala to help oust a populist-leftist government in which some Communists held key posts; but the walls that excluded the Soviets from Latin America remained essentially unbreachable through most of the 1950s.⁸

The Cuban revolution of 1959, Fidel Castro's declaration of Marxism-Leninism, and the incorporation of Cuba into the Soviet camp changed all that. From this point on, the Soviets would have a base in the Western Hemisphere for political as well as military operations. During the 1960s, the Cubans tried, with Soviet assistance, to export their revolution to quite a number of other Latin American countries.





The United States responded with what came to be called the "no second Cuba" doctrine: vigorous steps to prevent what happened in Cuba from happening in other countries.

In 1962, with the installation of offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba pointed at the United States, a new element was added to the equation. In a tense confrontation, the United States forced the Soviet Union to remove the missiles from Cuba, while itself agreeing tacitly not to continue seeking the overthrow of the Castro regime. With this showdown, the "no second Cuba" doctrine acquired a double meaning for the United States: the prevention of Castro-like revolutions throughout the hemisphere *and*

During the Second World War, German subs operating thousands of miles from their bases proved a serious threat to shipping along the Atlantic coast and in the Gulf of Mexico. How much more of a threat would enemy subs be operating out of Cuba? . . . Soviet warships (below) commonly churn the Caribbean and operate in the Gulf of Mexico.



the insistence that no Latin American country be used as a base for the implantation of sophisticated Soviet military hardware with an offensive capability that might threaten the United States. (It remained unclear where precisely the lines would be drawn, but certainly the United States has shown itself unwilling to accept the presence of MiG fighter planes in Nicaragua in recent years.)

The response from the United States to the Cuban revolution was massive. For the first time, we began paying serious attention to Latin America. We quarantined Cuba, broke relations, and imposed a trade embargo on the island. We launched the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress, as well as a host of other development-related programs, as a way of heading off the growth of revolutionary sentiment. We initiated training programs in civic action and counterinsurgency for the Latin American militaries, and we assisted several countries in defeating their Cuba-inspired and -assisted guerrilla movements. The United States itself, when these other measures failed, intervened militarily in the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent what it thought was a Cuba-like revolution from succeeding.

These efforts were remarkably successful in medium-range terms. The embargo on Cuba kept that country isolated and economically unsuccessful, which meant that Cuba never became an attractive model for the other Latin American countries. By the late 1960s, especially with the death of Ché Guevara in Bolivia, the Cuba-like guerrilla movements had been all but eliminated in most countries. Even though all its assumptions were wrong concerning the Latin American middle class and the capacity of the United States to bring democracy to Latin America, the Alliance for Progress bought us some time (not a glorious basis for policy, but for the United States a useful and pragmatic one) and helped enable the United States to avoid more Cubas.⁹ By the end of the 1960s, the threat seemed sufficiently minimal and Latin America sufficiently "safe"

that the United States reverted to its traditional policy of "benign neglect."

The inattention devoted to Latin America in the early-to-mid-1970s was understandable but ultimately mistaken in long-range terms. Preoccupied by Vietnam and Watergate, we virtually ignored Latin America for most of the decade. We thus missed the opportunities in the early 1970s to influence the course of events in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua that would have prevented those countries from becoming such problem cases later on. Our foreign assistance went way down. The number of U.S. personnel and programs in Latin America was greatly reduced. In not paying attention to the area, we sacrificed most of the levers of influence that we had once had. Meanwhile those "new realities" discussed earlier became accomplished facts, rendering obsolete quite a number of our traditional security doctrines. Hence, when Latin America blew up again in the late 1970s (particularly in Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador), we were quite unprepared for the situation.¹⁰

In the meantime, some new ingredients—some other "new realities," had been added. Principally, these involved the rising Soviet presence in Latin America. During the 1970s the Soviet Union had become a major actor in Latin America. Its normal state-to-state relations with almost all the countries of the area increased enormously. The Soviet Union, using Cuba as its "aircraft carrier," became a significant military presence in the Caribbean and remains so today. Soviet trade and commercial relations have grown enormously; the Soviet Union is, for example, Argentina's largest export customer. In Peru, the Soviets have military equipment, military training programs and a significant presence. As Soviet cultural and diplomatic activities have increased, so have Soviet political and subversion efforts. The Soviet Union is by no means an equal of the United States in Latin America, but its influence and presence are clearly on the rise.¹¹

Not only is the Soviet Union an increasing

presence, but its tactics and strategies have become far more sophisticated. It is less heavy-handed and more subtle. It is playing for the long term while not ignoring possibilities for the short term. It ingratiates itself with the democratic regimes while simultaneously seeking to push them toward nonalignment (and, in some cases, continues to aid their opposition forces). It uses aid, scholarships, military programs, and trade all rather deftly. It has a different strategy for different kinds of countries, following a flexible course rather than some rigid ideological formula. Simultaneously, it has imposed order, coherence, and unity of direction on otherwise disparate guerrilla groups. It cleverly uses Cuba and now Nicaragua as its proxies while also directing and overseeing a sophisticated division of labor among its fellow Communist-bloc countries. In addition, the Soviets have become increasingly adept at manipulating opinion in Western Europe and the United States.¹²

Quite finite limits also exist on the Soviet role in Latin America. The Soviets still do not function especially well in that context, and Latin America is not particularly sympathetic to a Communist system. Where the Soviets have been successful, however, is in attaching themselves to popular revolutionary movements ostensibly designed to promote national independence and social justice throughout Latin America and in playing upon and taking advantage of Latin America's rising nationalism and anti-Americanism. The Soviets do not wish to challenge the United States unnecessarily in a part of the world where the United States enjoys overwhelming local advantage and which is only of peripheral importance to the Soviet Union. Within these limits, nonetheless, the Soviet gains in the last fifteen years have been impressive.¹³

The U.S. response to the new Soviet initiatives has been a resurrection of the older containment policy. We have "rolled back" the revolution in Grenada through military intervention, and we have put immense pressures—

military, political, economic, and diplomatic—on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, though our exact goals there remain ambiguous. We threatened to "go to the source" by, presumably, eliminating Cuba as a root cause of the troubles in Latin America. We proclaimed, at least in the early months of the Reagan administration, that the conflict in El Salvador was an East-West struggle; and there were some hints, almost certainly exaggerated, that the cold war might be decided or turned around there. Our military/strategic buildup in the region has been immense.¹⁴

A strong case can be made that this military buildup was necessary, and it is certainly to be preferred to the hand-wringing, piety, blame-it-on-ourselves afterthoughts, and do-nothingness of the previous administration. The question that needs answering, however, is whether the kind of traditional containment policy we have followed is any longer adequate in the changed circumstances, in the "new realities," of today. The answer is that it is not; that it badly needs updating and greater sophistication; that we need to go, as in the title of one of the better books on the subject, *Beyond Containment*;¹⁵ and that the U.S. administration recognizes this fact and has begun to move in the new directions that are absolutely necessary if our policies in Latin America are to be successful.

"Economy of Force": Containment Policy in Latin America

An important part of U.S. strategic policy in Latin America is based on the notion of what strategic planners call "economy of force." The strategy assumes, of course, that the Soviet Union is the country with whom the United States is most likely to be engaged in any future conflict. It further assumes that such a conflict, were it to break out, would most likely occur in Central Europe or perhaps the Middle East. In such an eventuality, the United States would want to rush all its resources to the locus of the conflict as soon as possible. It would not want

to have its forces tied down, paralyzed, or bottled up in some peripheral arena of conflict by some "third-rate" power—e.g., Cuba. That is how the circum-Caribbean is viewed: as an area in which the United States would not want to have its forces preoccupied with some local skirmish or tied up by a local adversary when the more vital needs strategically lay elsewhere. Hence if the circum-Caribbean could be kept free of Communist regimes and revolutions, if only a minimal force need be used to pacify that area, then U.S. resources could be concentrated where the real conflict was occurring, presumably on the plains of Central Europe.¹⁶

The economy-of-force strategy has been fairly successful in the past. We have managed to isolate Cuba to a considerable extent and keep the Cubans from meddling in the internal affairs of other nations. We limited Cuba's capacity to export its revolution to other countries. On a small island, Grenada, a "quick and easy" intervention got rid of the local Marxist-Leninist regime and replaced it with one that would not muck around in sowing revolutions in the other small islands. In Nicaragua, through our support of and assistance to the resistance forces (the so-called *contras*), we have tied down the Nicaraguan armed forces that had been enormously built up since the revolution, put pressure on the Sandinista regime and stymied its greater consolidation, kept Nicaragua from spreading its revolution to its neighbors, and employed a mercenary army as a way of avoiding any commitment of U.S. ground forces.

But the economy-of-force strategy has a number of problems and conceptual flaws. For one thing, it continues to treat Latin America as a side show, peripheral to the main action. Many analysts, however, are convinced that continuing to ignore Latin America or treating it as if it were of only peripheral importance is precisely what helps give rise to revolutions and anti-Americanism in Latin America and that this attitude is at the root of our policy difficulties there. Second, it underestimates the political

difficulties of sustaining a long-term proxy war in Central America or of carrying out coherent policy over time, given the play of domestic interest groups and opposition forces; and it overestimates the capacity of the United States to intervene with military force when necessary.¹⁷ Third, it assumes that Europe will be the main theater and that the type of war to be fought will be rather like the last one there involving tank and ground forces, plus perhaps some limited tactical nuclear weapons, in the heartland of the continent. (One hates to resurrect that old saw about generals always fighting the last great war, but in this instance that seems again to be the case.) However, a strong argument can be made that such a high technology but conventional war in the European center is the *least likely* kind of war that we will be called on to fight. Far more likely are murky guerrilla struggles of the kind that we are now witnessing in Central America or that we have seen previously in Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, it is these more irregular wars that the United States, even with all its verbal commitments to counterinsurgency training and preparation over the last twenty years, is the least well equipped and trained to deal with.¹⁸

The Evolution of Administration Policy

The administration of President Reagan got off to a rather shaky start in dealing with Latin America, in part because of its efforts to resurrect the rather unrefined containment policy of the past. For example, the administration saw Cuba and the Soviet Union as the prime cause of the insurrection in Central America, pictured conflict in the region in exclusively East-West terms, and tended to view the problem and its solution in a purely military way. One recalls not only the early and sometimes unfortunate statements of administration spokesmen to this effect but also their denigrating remarks about other related aspects of the prob-

em. President Duarte of El Salvador, for example, was once told by a National Security Council official that the United States was not very interested in agrarian reform in El Salvador and in fact thought of it as damaging to the economy. And the administration's first nominee to the post of assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs suggested that, if confirmed, he intended to abolish the job and office for which he was being considered. Those are not prudent and politically viable ways to conduct a successful foreign policy in this country.

Since those early weeks, the administration has come a long distance and fashioned a much more sophisticated and multifaceted approach. To some extent, the changes are due to opposition to the administration's earlier policies from the Congress, the media, our allies, and public opinion, which have forced the administration to compromise and temper its policies. In part, the changes are due to bureaucratic politics and rivalries within the government and to the reassertion over time of State Department and foreign policy professionals of their expertise and more moderate views. And, at least to some extent, the alterations are due to a learning process that has occurred within the administration itself, stimulated by the polls as well as by the more middle-of-the-road views and expertise found in the think tanks and other bodies that have generally been supportive of the administration. These and other influences have led the administration in more moderate and prudent directions toward a more mainstream foreign policy position.¹⁹

The administration has now evolved to a position where it sees Central America as both an East-West *and* a North-South issue. It understands the indigenous roots of revolution in the area, as well as the capacity of the Cubans and Soviets to fan the flames of revolution, to exacerbate a crisis that already exists, and to take maximum advantage of the situation to embarrass the United States in its own backyard and score gains for themselves. U.S. policies are

now multifaceted rather than unidimensional. These new tactics are both more tempered and moderate *and* more refined than the older, sometimes heavy-handed orientation, which led to too many policy gaffes and was thereby often self-defeating of the purposes it sought to accomplish.

The administration's response has similarly been increasingly pragmatic. It now understands the need to balance its military/strategic emphasis with a clear concern for democracy and human rights. It sees the requirement of pouring in social and economic assistance as well as military aid. It supports agrarian reform and other programs of change as a way of securing long-term stability in the area and diminishing the appeals of communism. It has learned to work indirectly, behind the scenes, and through third parties rather than by means of the either-or confrontational strategies of the past. It has built up the U.S. military presence in the area but also recognizes the dire need of these countries for economic recovery. It has put enormous political, economic, and military pressures on the Sandinista regime; but it has also kept open the possibilities for diplomatic negotiations. The policy now is far more sophisticated and nuanced than in the administration's early days.

The concrete manifestation of these more sophisticated strategies may be found in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and in the Kissinger Commission recommendations. The CBI is a forward-looking assistance program combining public foreign aid with the encouragement of private investment that is not very much different from Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. The Kissinger Commission recommendations contain similar recommendations for a judicious blend of public and private assistance, economic and military aid, and strategic and democratic/human rights concerns. It is a complex, multifaceted package that reflects the new, more moderate, and sophisticated stance of the administration, and the commission itself was an instrument in forging

a more tempered and balanced strategy. The Kissinger Commission Report is, in fact, now administration policy in Central America even though not all of its recommendations have been formally enacted into law by Congress.²⁰

Toward an Updated Containment Strategy

The containment strategy and its companion economy-of-force doctrine would seem in the present, more complex circumstances to be woefully outdated—at least as they were practiced in their traditional forms.²¹ The containment strategy was based on an earlier conception of the global conflict as exclusively bipolar, grounded on mutual “spheres of influence” understandings, derived from the idea that both superpowers could and would police their own backyards, organized exclusively around an East-West axis, and based on the principle that whatever disruptions occurred in the first power’s own backyard must be due to the machinations of the other power. There are considerable elements of truth yet in all of these assertions, but as a complete and sufficient explanation for the recent upheavals in Central America, these assumptions are quite inadequate.

In Central America, the problems have proved to be far more complex, deep-rooted, and intractable than the administration first thought. It is clear that quite a number of these cannot be resolved as easily, quickly, or cheaply as originally envisaged. The fundamental problem, however, in dealing with Central America, I believe, is conceptual.²² We are still relying on policies and strategies having to do with great power tactics, containment, geopolitical position, spheres of influence, balance of power, etc., which, in regard to Latin America, need to be rethought and updated. Some of these strategies are anachronistic, while others need to be reconceived. The fact is that they were designed for an earlier and simpler era; they no longer have the same relevance in today’s Latin America. For the new conditions in Latin

America, the “new realities”—a changed and generally weaker U.S. role, a new assertiveness and independence on the part of the Latin American nations, a desperate desire on the part of their peoples for development and social justice, the presence of other outside actors in the area, the changed inter-American system, and so on—all imply the need for a fundamental reevaluation of policy.

I cannot provide here a complete analysis of the policy package that ought to be pursued, but I can offer at least some guidelines.²³ To begin, we need to be *engaged* in Latin America with empathy and understanding, not just view it as a side show. We need to normalize and regularize our relations with the region and put them on a mature basis, not simply pay Latin America fleeting attention in times of crisis. We need a sophisticated and multifaceted program for the area, such as that proposed by the Kissinger Commission (which has been only partially implemented to date). We need a policy that incorporates expanded cultural and student exchanges, economic and debt aid, a vigorous human rights program, investment and trade programs, assistance for social modernization, support for democratization, and greater contacts between U.S. and Latin American groups—as well as attention to the strategic and military aspects. We need to be flexible in meeting the challenges of the area, including far more capability and training in responding to guerrilla war. And we require a reassessment of strategic thinking and tactics in the area to reflect the changed conditions and new realities of the region and our position there. On this basis, a prudent, realistic, and more sophisticated policy can be developed for the area.

In terms of specific recommendations, we need to do the following: we need far more training in limited and irregular war capacity and counterinsurgency, in both rural and urban settings. We need to examine and understand thoroughly the changed conditions of Latin America outlined here and their implica-

ions for foreign policy. We need to develop our capacities to understand Latin America in its own terms and context rather than through our own biased and often ethnocentric lenses.²⁴ We certainly need better language and area studies programs in our foreign policymaking agencies, not just in Spanish and Portuguese but also in such native Indian languages as Quechua and Aymará. We need to understand and come to grips realistically with the increasing Soviet/Cuban presence in the area and the new, more sophisticated tactics that the Soviets and Cubans are employing. And we need to develop programs, such as the med-vac ones, to deal

with Latin America's problems on the ground, close to the people, in terms that the Latin Americans will both know and appreciate. In these ways we need to update and modernize our containment strategy, which is still a viable policy for the United States in Latin America but is badly in need of a new formulation.

Washington, D.C.

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H.J.W.

Notes

1. These themes are elaborated in Howard J. Wiarda, *In Search of Policy: The United States and Latin America* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984).
2. Howard J. Wiarda, editor, *Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbrolio* (1984), *The Crisis in Latin America: Strategic, Economic and Political Dimensions* (1984), *The Alternative Futures of Latin America* (1985), *Human Rights and U.S. Human Rights Policy* (1982), and *The Crisis in Central America* (1982), all published by the American Enterprise Institute. See, also, Wiarda, "At the Root of the Problem: Conceptual Failures in U.S.-Central American Relations," in *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict*, edited by Robert Leiken (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), pp. 59-78.
3. See especially Alfred T. Mahan, *The Interest of American Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1898).
4. J. Lloyd Mehan, *A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).
5. From Howard J. Wiarda, "The United States and Latin America: Change and Continuity," in *Confrontation in the Caribbean Basin*, edited by Alan Adelman and Reid Reading (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Center for International Studies of the University of Pittsburgh, 1984), pp. 211-26.
6. A more complete discussion is found in Howard J. Wiarda, *Latin America at the Crossroads: Debt and Development Strategies for the 1990s* (Washington: A Report Prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank, 1985), chapter 5.
7. I have treated this subject in more detail in "The Paralysis of Policy: Current Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy-Making" (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, Occasional Paper, 1985).
8. Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983).
9. We need a reassessment of both the successes and the failures of the alliance in this light.
10. See the discussion in *Rift and Revolution*, especially the introduction, op. cit.
11. Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Soviet Policies and Strategies in the Caribbean Basin," in *Rift and Revolution*. An updated version is forthcoming in Mark Falcoff and Howard J. Wiarda, *The Communist Challenge in Latin America* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1986).

12. Ernest Evans, "Revolutionary Movements in Central America: The Development of a New Strategy," in *Rift and Revolution* and, in revised form, in *The Communist Challenge*.
13. Howard J. Wiarda, "Soviet Policy in the Caribbean and Central America: Opportunities and Constraints," in *The Communist Challenge*, op. cit.
14. For an assessment, see Howard J. Wiarda, "Aftermath of Grenada: The Impact of the U.S. Action on Revolution Prospects in Central America," in *Grenada and Soviet-Cuban Policy, Internal Crisis and U.S. Intervention*, edited by Herbert Ellison and Jiri Valenta (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985).
15. Aaron Wildavsky, editor, *Beyond Containment: Alternative American Policies toward the Soviet Union* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983).
16. Robert Kennedy and Gabriel Marcella, "U.S. Security on the Southern Flank: Interests, Challenges, Responses," in *Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin*, edited by James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, for the Atlantic Council, 1984) pp. 187-242.
17. For a full discussion, see "The Paralysis of Policy," op. cit.
18. See the discussion of the former American commander in El Salvador, Colonel John Waghstein, in "Post Vietnam Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Military Review*, May 1985.
19. These changes are analyzed in my forthcoming book, tentatively titled *Finding Our Way? Toward Maturity in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1986).
20. See the *Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), as well as Howard J. Wiarda, editor, "U.S. Policy in Central America: Consultant Papers for the Kissinger Commission," Special issue of the *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, vol. V, no. 1, 1984.
21. For discussion, see George F. Kennan ("X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, pp. 566-82; John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1977, pp. 873-87; Eduard Mark, "The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978, pp. 430-40; Charles R. Wolf, Jr., "Beyond Containment: Redesigning American Policies," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1982, pp. 107-17; Louisa S. Hulett, "Containment Revisited: U.S.-

Soviet Relations in the 1980s," *Parameters*, Autumn 1984, pp. 51-63; Barry R. Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," *International Security*, Summer 1983, pp. 3-45; Robert W. Tucker, "In Defense of Containment," *Journal of Contemporary Studies*, Spring 1983, pp. 29-49; and K. N. Lewis, *Reorganizing U.S. Defense Planning to Deal with New Contingencies: U.S.-Soviet Conflict in the Third World* (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1982).

22. The analysis in this paragraph follows closely the similar conclusion of G. Pope Atkins, "U.S. Policy in Central America: International Conditions and Conceptual Limitations," paper

presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 8 March 1985.

23. Further details on what I have termed a "prudence model" of U.S. policy in Latin America are presented in *In Search of Policy* chapter 8. For an analytic discussion that places this strategy in the context of other alternative views, see Harold Molineu, "Latin American Politics and the U.S. Connection," *Polity*, Fall 1985, pp. 167-75.

24. For a full discussion, see Howard J. Wiarda, *Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World?* (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1985).

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CENTRAL AMERICA: A MICROCOSM OF U.S. COLD WAR POLICY

DR. THOMAS M. LEONARD

TODAY, Central America is at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. We are told by the current administration that the region is of primary importance to U.S. vital interests and that it is currently threatened by communist aggression. Central America has become a pawn in the Cold War.

Cold War Strategy

The Cold War was born as a result of different approaches to the needs of the post-World War II world as held by the United States and the Soviet Union. Each of the two nations saw the other, in mirror-image, as the world's

bully. Owing to its possession of the atomic bomb and economic wealth, the United States maintained that world peace and order depended on the existence of prosperity and political democracy. Each became the handmaiden of the other and caused the Americans to conclude that poverty and economic depression bred totalitarianism, revolution and communism, and possibly war. For the United States, continued liberty and prosperity were linked to a free world. On the other hand, the Soviets were motivated by traditional Russian nationalism, the communist ideology, and a craving for security against a revived Germany.¹

Against this backdrop, the first area of con-



frontation was Europe. Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe, German reunification, and the United Nations contributed to the stiffening U.S. attitude toward Moscow. The American attitude change was reflected in policy implementation from postwar reconstruction programs for individual countries to the European Recovery Program (or the Marshall Plan, as it was popularly known) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Essentially, through economic revitalization of wartorn European nations, the Truman administration wanted to prevent communist subversive inroads into Western Europe; it also wanted to secure the region from military attack.²

Truman's containment policy may have prevented communism from capturing Western Europe, but it did not prevent the Soviets from strengthening their hold on Eastern Europe and developing the atomic bomb, the Chinese Communists from toppling Chiang Kai-shek, or the North Koreans from crossing the 38th parallel. These events, coupled with the anticommunist emotional hysteria at home, contributed significantly to the 1952 presidential election of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The Republicans promised a "New Look" in foreign policy, as best espoused by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Characterized as a rigid moralist, Dulles advocated massive retaliation and support for wars of national liberation to turn back the communist tide. Despite this bold rhetoric, the Eisenhower administration did not resort to massive retaliation in Indochina in 1954, nor did it intervene to support the Hungarian freedom fighters in 1956. Instead, containment continued, predicated on the increased fear of a global communist conspiracy, if not overt, then through subversion. The communist conspiracy thesis caused confusion for Americans in the rising tide of Third World nationalism, which demanded the ouster of oligarchs and implementation of government socialism to meet the needs of less fortunate masses.

The efforts to strengthen NATO, the estab-

lishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, support for the Shah of Iran, Eisenhower's Middle Eastern Doctrine, and the 1958 Formosan and Berlin crises illustrate the policy application of continued containment. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that Eisenhower concluded in his farewell address on 17 January 1961 that "we face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method."³

Compared to the quiet and sometimes complacent, fatherly image of Eisenhower, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson came across as bold and aggressive individuals during the 1960s. Kennedy came to Washington in 1961 committed to winning the Cold War. Both he and Johnson had shared the early Cold War experiences, and Johnson had witnessed those events leading to World War II. So had their advisors. Both presidents were confident of U.S. superiority and the nation's ability to lead its allies, but they arrived on the scene when a diffusion of world power was taking place: NATO was demanding greater independence from Washington, and Third World nationalism commanded more autonomy. Both leaders, however, clung to the past, still thinking that the United States could direct events through the execution of arms and aid. Each exhibited a growing tendency toward military solutions. This last point is best illustrated by the continued arms buildup supposedly to deter nuclear conflicts, creation of the special forces to conduct counterinsurgency wars, and reliance on conventional forces to handle limited wars. The confrontation between changing world realities and the presidents clinging to tradition, caused Senator J. William Fulbright (D.-Arkansas) to conclude that this "arrogance of power" left the United States a "crippled giant" by the end of the 1960s. The experience in Vietnam proved Fulbright's point all too well.⁴

The presidency of Richard Nixon witnessed striking diplomatic changes, described by at least one historian as the "great Nixon turn-

ground." Nixon's view of the world was similar to that of his National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, and was adhered to by President Gerald R. Ford after Nixon resigned. Accordingly, there were five power centers in the world: the Soviet Union, the United States, China, Japan, and the Common Market countries of Western Europe. Each had responsibilities to maintain order in its sphere and not intrude in the areas dominated by the others. Thus, small nations could no longer play off the major powers against one another or count on outside help. The policy also permitted the United States to contain both the Soviet Union and China by having them contain each other. Détente made common sense. The Cold War proved too expensive, and because of the U.S. participation in Vietnam, Congress demanded that the United States play a more limited role in the world. Détente, however, was premised on shaky grounds: that the major powers would remain in their own spheres and that violent nationalism in the Third World would subside. Neither premise proved correct.⁵

At its start, the Carter administration was divided by conflicting interpretations of Soviet intentions and capabilities. While Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the State Department thought that the Soviets were adversaries with whom the United States could negotiate, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and his White House staff feared continuing Soviet expansion. In retrospect, Carter came to adopt Brzezinski's recommendation that U.S. policy read as "a challenge to [Soviet] legitimacy and thus to their very existence." The Soviets were denounced for supporting a proxy war in Ethiopia, using Cubans to battle Somalia, supporting the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and, finally, invading Afghanistan. Diminished trade relations with the Soviet Union, human rights proclamations against the Soviets, enhanced trade with the People's Republic of China, the Carter Doctrine proclamation, and the boycott of the 1980 Olympics


illustrate the Cold War mentality of the Carter presidency.⁶

Despite Carter's apparent continuation of the containment policy, Ronald Reagan came to the White House, in January 1981, convinced that the U.S. standing in the world had diminished significantly in the recent past. Carter's foreign policy was considered too soft on communism. Reagan was determined to change course and restore the United States to its primary world position. Reagan's bold declarations reminded many observers of the Eisenhower-Dulles years. During the next four years, the aggressive tone continued in bilateral relations with the Soviets and about such issues as Afghanistan, Poland, the trans-European gas pipeline, and the Middle East. The administration also appeared as Taiwan's close ally. The operational policy, however, did not match the rhetoric, and a clear case could be made that the containment policies of the preceding presidents continued.⁷

This brief synopsis of U.S. foreign policy from 1945 to 1984 illustrates the primacy of relations with the Soviet Union. Despite changes in rhetoric and strategy, U.S. policy continually sought the containment of Soviet communism.

U.S. Policy toward Latin America

U.S. policy toward Latin America from 1945 to 1984 followed the contours of global strategy. First, the inter-American system was brought into the struggle against external aggression. By the Act of Chapultepec adopted in 1945 at Mexico City, the American republics agreed to consult before taking action against acts of aggression by any hemispheric nation. Two years later at Rio de Janeiro, at which time the United States had more sharply defined the Soviet threat, participants agreed to provide for assistance against aggressors prior to consultation. When the threat to hemispheric security was other than direct aggression, the American states agreed to joint action following consultation. At Bogotá in 1948, the Inter-American



Defense Board was charged with developing hemispheric defense plans. Finally, in 1951, after six years of debate, the U.S. Congress approved the Mutual Security Act, initially providing \$38 million for direct military assistance to Latin American nations whose participation in hemispheric defense was determined essentially by the president.⁸



During the same time period, 1945-51, administration spokesmen—Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and George C. Marshall, together with Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Edward G. Miller—continued to utter traditional themes regarding inter-American relations: pleas for political stability, faith in democracy, and promises of nonintervention in the internal affairs of its southern neighbors.⁹ The statements contradicted the policy actions, which also ignored the demands of many Latin Americans for an end to dictatorships and an improvement in

While socioeconomic problems in Central and South America continue, the military factor in the equation grows increasingly important. In a recent exercise, Cuban commandos deploy from a Soviet-built transport.

the quality of life for the less fortunate. Communism was not yet a threat to the hemisphere.

The Eisenhower-Dulles rhetoric regarding Latin America was no less bold than the statements regarding the Soviet Union. Truman was castigated for ignoring the hemisphere's economic and social needs. Milton Eisenhower's *Report on Latin America* and a similar report by the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, both issued in 1953, gave hope for new directions in U.S. policy toward Latin America. Both argued for a more liberal trade policy featuring tariff reductions and increased trade with Eastern Europe.¹⁰

These recommendations were in sharp con-



The Soviets began deploying Mi-8 helicopters to Nicaragua in 1981. Since then, more helicopters, including gunships, along with transports and Soviet-piloted reconnaissance planes reportedly have arrived.

trast to Eisenhower's closest advisors, businessmen who looked on the world as something that could be managed and who were advocates of private enterprise in a world increasingly turning toward revolutions and socialism. Assistant Secretaries of State for Latin American Affairs—John M. Cabot, Henry F. Holland, and Roy R. Rubottom—consistently echoed similar thoughts. Thus, rather than following through on the Milton Eisenhower and Randall Commission reports, the United States advised Latin American countries to create an environment conducive to private investment and, if that was accomplished, federal monies would be used to support the necessary infrastructures.¹¹

Compatible with this approach, Secretary of State Dulles's strident anticommunist campaign applied to Latin America. According to Dulles, communism, or anything that resembled it, was a threat to U.S. interests. Communists, however

identified, were considered agents of the Soviet Union and therefore linked to the international conspiracy against the United States. At the tenth Inter-American Conference of American States, which met in Caracas in March 1954, Dulles warned that the hemisphere was imperiled by international communism. After spirited debate, the conference adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution asserting that any American nation subjected to communist political control was considered foreign intervention and a threat to the peace of the Americas. As such, decisive collective action was called for, presumably under the 1947 Rio Treaty.¹²

Comparable to continuing Truman's global containment policy, the Eisenhower-Dulles team brought no appreciable change in U.S. policy toward Latin America. There was an increase in North-South trade during the decade, but so too was there an increase in the amount of military assistance flowing southward. The net result was the entrenchment of anticommunist dictatorships in Latin America. The illusion of stability was shattered in 1958 with the near loss of life of then-Vice-President Richard Nixon during a Latin American tour, as well as a subsequent visit by Milton Eisenhower that resulted in his *The Wine Is Bitter*. The portents of revolution caused incoming President John F. Kennedy to warn that it was "one minute to midnight" in Latin America.

Kennedy personally—and through his spokesmen, Adolf A. Berle, Adlai Stevenson, and Edward M. Martin—expressed a willingness to accept moderately leftist governments that were meeting the "revolution of rising expectations" by sponsoring constructive change. In fact, the new administration was intolerant of military coups against such governments, as evidenced by U.S. action regarding Peru in 1962 and the Dominican Republic a year later. Avoiding direct intervention, the United States used its leverage to keep liberal regimes in power.¹³

In contrast, Lyndon Johnson gave support to those governments in sympathy with U.S.

policies, which meant governments of the right and extreme right. This tendency was more pronounced after the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis and the appointment of Thomas C. Mann as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. Mann was emphatic: communism in the Western Hemisphere was intolerable because it threatened U.S. national security.¹⁴

The communist issue intensified as a result of Fidel Castro's rise to power in Cuba which generated fear that his revolution would spread throughout the hemisphere. For its part, the United States forced the isolation of Cuba from hemispheric affairs, supported anti-Castro forces, and even sponsored assassination plots. In response to this new communist threat, the United States implemented the Alliance for Progress in 1961. In return for financial support, Latin American governments pledged themselves to agrarian and tax reforms—measures not welcomed by Latin elites. However little significant progress was made in tearing down the vestiges of traditional society. Moreover, because of civil disruptions at home, the agony of Vietnam, and the perceived lessened threat of Fidel Castro by mid-decade, the United States lost interest in the Alliance for Progress which passed quietly in 1971.¹⁵

The drift away from Latin America continued under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Inter-American affairs were relegated to a veritable limbo. Trade, not aid, was the guidepost. Agreements with the Soviet Union, the misadventures of Ché Guevara, and Castro's growing dependence on the détente-minded Soviet Union lessened the threat to security and, coupled with the 1973 U.S.-supported overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, lessened the communist threat to the hemisphere. Cambodia, China, and the Middle East in global affairs, plus Watergate on the domestic scene, were more important than Latin America. "Benign neglect" best described U.S. policy toward Latin America during the first half of the 1970s. Without pressure from the north, right-wing military dictatorships

became commonplace in the south.

The energy crisis focused new attention on Latin America. Rich in natural resources, including oil, Latin America became more important to the United States. Henry Kissinger recognized this fact in 1976 and began a new dialogue with Latin American nations. President Jimmy Carter recognized the new realities too. He accepted the report by the Center for Inter-American Relations (commonly known as the Linowitz Report) that Latin America had achieved a degree of independence from the United States and that the outmoded policies of domination and paternalism should be rejected. The 1977 Panama Canal treaties were evidence of this change in U.S. thinking.¹⁶

Admitting that the region had been ignored since the Alliance for Progress, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence A. Toddman and his deputy William H. Leurs promised new programs to meet the economic and social needs of Latin America. Aid, however, was contingent on improvement in human rights. Use of human rights criteria was not new to U.S. foreign policy. Provisions in the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act, 1975 Food Assistance Act, and 1976 Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act provided for withholding aid where there were human rights violations. The idealistic Carter, however, promised new emphasis, but more than rhetoric was needed to persuade military governments. Despite promises by various Latin leaders, there was minimal improvement in human rights or in meeting the social and economic needs of many of Latin America's traditionally impoverished citizens.¹⁷

Reagan's Latin American policy altered Carter's direction. Latin America was now placed within the context of East-West relations, not North-South. In application, human rights were to be promoted through quiet diplomacy, not through public denunciations and aid cut-offs. Because Soviet expansion, rather than economic development, was emphasized, military solutions were given first consideration.

Reagan's first foreign policy team—Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs Thomas O. Enders, and U.S. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick—reflected these views. By the time that George Shultz replaced Haig and Langhorne H. Motley succeeded Enders, the policy was in place.¹⁸

Thus, since 1945, Latin America was not of prime importance in U.S. policy. Only when the threat of communism—real or imagined—appeared did the United States respond. And then only briefly. Rather, U.S. failure to pursue constructive policies to match the rhetoric of democratic and social change only strengthened the position of oligarchical governments.

U.S. Policy Focused on Central America

Central America was a microcosm of both Latin America and the world at large. U.S. policy toward the region reflected the broader Cold War policies of each presidential administration and, at the same time, the failure to respond to the inherent problems of political dictatorship and social reform.

The "revolution of rising expectations" first surfaced in Central America at the end of World War II. Material contributions to the Allied war effort caused the lower socio-economic groups to experience a degree of prosperity hitherto unknown, and the middle-sector groups were encouraged by the idealistic goals of the Allies. The middle sector, in particular, was responsible for the overthrow of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in El Salvador and Jorge Ubico in Guatemala in 1944, the stepping aside of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in 1947, and the 1948 Costa Rican civil war. Their success was short-lived, however, as dictatorships continued in Honduras and returned to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Efforts for reform, particularly for labor, became nothing more than paper promises.

Until 1947, the United States perceived no threat of international communism to the re-





Because of the expense of fighting the insurgents, the government of El Salvador has not been able to implement health and education programs to any degree. School children, like these receiving a meager ration of food (facing page), have to suffer while the war continues. . . . The citizens of El Salvador are willing to pay the price for freedom. Salvadorans defied guerrilla threats to proclaim their commitment to the democratic process by voting in the 1984 presidential elections.

gion. Diplomats in Central America, analysts in the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that the region was of scant use to the Soviets as allies or sources of supplies. As a result, the National Security Council saw no need for a unified anticommunist policy because the Soviet threat was only remotely potential and not "immediately serious." The initial Military Assistance Program to Central America stressed security of the Panama Canal, Mexico, and Venezuelan oil, not concern about an international communist threat. At the same time, however, U.S. diplomats in Central America warned that poverty was a breeding ground for communism. (Although lacking concrete evidence, they also speculated that Moscow's agents were in the region.) The existing order would soon be seriously threatened they cautioned.

After 1948, policymakers in Washington echoed these opinions. Secretaries Marshall and Acheson and Assistant Secretary Miller recognized the need for social reform from 1949 to 1952, but the promises of aid from the European Recovery and Point Four programs brought little to Central America.¹⁹ From 1952 to 1961, total aid to all Latin America was \$2.6 billion, a drastic increase over the \$437 million during the Truman years, but the total for the five Central American countries was only \$336 million (7.5 percent of the total). The terms under which the aid flowed reflected the management concepts of Eisenhower's advisors. Although the United States assumed high initial costs for technical assistance, the host countries agreed to assume 66 percent of the cost. For the Central American nations, providing sufficient funds proved a difficult task; the amount of

money lost to high administrative costs and possible corruption only complicated their ability to meet financial obligations. The major exports of the region were agricultural and were dependent not only on fluctuating world market prices but on the mercy of U.S. tariffs. Significant measurable improvement in the regional economy or social conditions was lacking.²⁰

Communism, however, became the overriding consideration of the Eisenhower administration's policy toward Central America. Although not explicitly identified by Secretary Dulles at Caracas in May 1954, Guatemala was the chief worry. Communists or Marxists became influential in the administration of Juan José Arévalo from 1945 to 1950 and increased their presence after 1950 in the administration of Jacobo Arbenz. The United States had no evidence of a link to Moscow, but the legislative program of both presidents threatened the existing order, including the United Fruit Company. Given Dulles's conspiracy thesis, the United States was able to justify its support of Carlos Castillo Armas to invade the country from Honduras and eliminate communism from the hemisphere. Thanks to the Caracas resolution, the issue was kept within hemispheric bounds. Subsequent military agreements with Guatemala and El Salvador only contributed to the façade of stability in Central America. The issues of constitutional government, disparity of wealth, and social deprivations remained.²¹

Those issues, plus the fear of Castroism, contributed to John K. Kennedy's warning that it was "one minute to midnight" in Latin America. Kennedy's tolerance of moderately leftist governments and his opposition to military coups was evident in 1963 in Honduras. The United States delayed recognition of Air Force Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano until he made promises to continue the reform programs of deposed President Villeda Morales.²² Meanwhile, the Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps, and Food for Peace programs promised

new hope for the region. Coupled with increased grants from the Inter-American Development Bank and Export-Import Bank, the five Central American countries received \$644 million in aid from the United States. This amount included assistance to begin the Central American Common Market.²³

However, like the rest of the hemisphere, Central America was lost in U.S. policy by the mid-1960s because of Vietnam and the U.S. domestic crisis. The Central American economies were never considered important to the United States, and the threat of communism was viewed as minimal. After 1964, the Communist party was outlawed in all five countries, and the small clandestine groups advocating insurgency were controllable through the efforts of the local militias and civil authorities—all of whom supported U.S. foreign policy. Thus Lyndon Johnson's visit to Central America in 1968 was only window dressing.²⁴

Thereafter, until Jimmy Carter was inaugurated as President in January 1977, the United States gave minimal attention to Central America. Foreign aid to the region decreased by nearly 50 percent. Political dictatorships, except in Costa Rica, with concomitant loss of human rights were prevalent. The economic and social conditions that served as breeding grounds for communism after World War II remained.²⁵ President Carter criticized the Central American dictators for their human rights violations, however, and, in March 1977, renounced military aid to Guatemala and El Salvador for their actions before Congress could single out these countries for aid reduction as it did Uruguay, Chile, and South Korea. But the withdrawal of aid had little impact on human rights: by 1980, for example, Guatemalan violations had actually increased by extremist groups, both left and right, and by the government. The United States has gained little leverage in Guatemalan politics.²⁶

Conditions in Guatemala were soon overshadowed by events in Nicaragua and El Salvador, which caused concern that history would

be repeated by soon engulfing the region in conflict. The forty-six-year Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua crumbled in July 1979 to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). From the start, the United States had chosen to deal with the middle-sector groups, which could be traced to the immediate post-World War II era. Identified as the Committee of Twelve, they fell into disarray after the assassination of their leader, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, in January 1978. Subsequently, the United States failed to mediate a settlement between the committee's successor, the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), and Somoza. Thus, this attempt—the first post-war effort by the United States to deal with a Central American middle sector—was short-lived. In the meantime, the Sandinistas seized the initiative, increased the violence, and gained widespread support after September 1978. During the following June, the Sandinistas began their final offensive and, after refusing U.S. mediation efforts, caused Somoza to flee the country on 17 July 1979. In Washington, a sense of optimism briefly followed. The Sandinistas gave the governments of Costa Rica, Panama, and Venezuela assurances of pluralism, meaning continuance of the private economic sector in Nicaragua, along with promises of free elections. The Carter administration advanced \$8 million in emergency relief and requested \$75 million more from Congress for reconstruction.

The reconstruction aid to Nicaragua was never to come. To U.S. observers, the Sandinistas were moving farther left, restricting the private sector significantly, violating the human rights of the opposition, and postponing elections. Events in El Salvador were influencing U.S. policy.²⁷

El Salvador had endured military dictatorships since 1932. As the economy expanded after World War II, so did the middle sector, which, by 1972, was centered in the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). The PDC won the presidential elections in 1972 and 1977 but was denied office by the military. In essence, this

center-left group was crushed by the military-landowner alliance. The guerrilla and "popular organizations" that emerged during the 1970s were subjected to the military's repressive measures also. These human rights violations caused Carter to cut military assistance, slash economic aid in half to \$10 million, and veto a \$90-million aid package through the Inter-American Development Bank. But to no avail. As in Guatemala, violence continued and increased by late 1980. With El Salvador on the verge of civil war, the United States tried in vain to find a communist responsible for El Salvador's problems.²⁸

As Carter left office, he appeared to be willing to accept moderately leftist governments, provided there was no Cuban influence, private property and human rights were protected, and the Central American states agreed not to interfere in one another's internal affairs. At the same time, Congress admitted the bankruptcy of previous policies, yet solutions and a clear policy were not in sight.

President Reagan's bold words were matched by action in Central America. Reagan believed that U.S. power and prestige in the region had dwindled during Carter's administration in the face of Soviet-Cuban expansion. In addition, the Department of Defense and the intelligence community were convinced that U.S. supremacy in the region must be reasserted. Failure to act close to home would only encourage the Soviets to become aggressive elsewhere. New ambassadors, Dean Hinton to El Salvador and John Negroponte to Honduras, reflected these policies. During the next four years, the administration's public statements consistently reflected these views.²⁹

Quick to implement the President's policies, the Reagan administration reasoned that the loss of El Salvador would cause havoc throughout the region. A suggested negotiated settlement, caused by the failure of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) January 1981 offensive, was rejected by the United States because it would have provided for the



When Comandante Daniel Ortega, with raised clenched fist, was inaugurated as president of Nicaragua in 1985, Fidel Castro was the only head of state to attend.

leftists' entry into the government. The administration reasoned that this result would have encouraged other regional leftists. Thus, the United States continued to support the Salvadoran government and its plans for agrarian and constitutional reform, while seeking a military solution. For 1981, an additional \$25



million in military assistance was provided, the number of U.S. training personnel increased from nineteen to forty-five, and \$63 million in economic aid extended. During the following year, Salvadoran troops trained in the United States. However, the assistance did not stem the tide. By late 1983, the FMLN claimed control of most of Chalatenango and Morazán provinces, as well as portions of La Unión and Usulután provinces. At the same time, human rights violations in El Salvador increased, rather than abated.



El Salvador soon became entwined with U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, which was accused of supplying arms to the FMLN. In addition, the Sandinistas became more restrictive at home, militating against labor organizations and curtailing the press and free speech. Such actions violated congressional requirements for lifting economic sanctions and contributed to Reagan's perception of a Nicaraguan dictatorial regime. Expansion by the Sandinista government into the private sector, increased trade with Communist bloc countries, and the

Mules provide a low-tech answer to an age-old logistical problem. Ideally suited to the rugged terrain, mules carry supplies for both sides in the fighting in El Salvador. Here guerrilla soldiers unload a U.S.-manufactured machine gun from their hairy but reliable transportation vehicle. . . . The Salvadoran rebels seek to undermine the people's confidence in the government by blowing up bridges, attacking schools, and otherwise striking at economic and social targets.

presence of foreign (particularly Cuban) advisors reaffirmed Washington's judgment that Central America was falling under the um-

brella of an East-West confrontation.

The United States acted quickly to undermine the Sandinistas. Through the CIA, covert assistance was provided to Nicaraguan exiles known as *contras*, who were mostly ex-Somocistas. Based principally in Honduras, the *contras* carried out military forays into northern Nicaragua and subsequently undertook the mining of harbors, burning of crops, and destruction of oil depots. The Reagan administration also tightened the economic noose on the government in Managua. An embargo was placed on Nicaraguan imports, and pressure was placed on international financial institutions not to extend credit.

Honduras did not escape the drift of events. As host to the *contras* and because its Salvadoran and Guatemalan border areas were havens for guerrillas operating in those countries, Honduras was under the threat of constant military intervention. To secure the country, the United States advanced \$253 million in economic assistance by 1983, sent some 400 military advisors, and brought Honduran troops to the United States for training. Beginning in 1983, U.S. military presence in the country increased with the construction of a Green Beret camp at Trujillo, military exercises along the Nicaraguan border, and the use of 5000 troops in the "Big Pine" military maneuvers. All of these activities were designed to impress the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

Guatemala and Costa Rica received new consideration. By 1983, the administration moved toward the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on Guatemala in 1977. Costa Rica received increased economic and military defense assistance, as the United States sought to move it from its traditional neutral stance in regional affairs.³⁰

Reagan's policies were not without opposition. Critics charged that the Soviets had no designs on Central America, that U.S. economic sanctions forced Nicaragua to seek trade with the Soviet bloc nations, that military assistance to El Salvador contributed to the in-

crease in human rights violations, that the *contras* were incapable of dislodging the Sandinistas, and that the administration was ignoring the Contadora peace process. At least one scholar argued that the Central American crisis viewed from its historical perspective, is a contemporary version of the long struggle for a singular nation comprised of the five republics.³¹

The debate over policy pitted the White House against Congress. In piecemeal fashion the legislature chipped away at the administration's approach. On the eve of the 1984 presidential election, Congress finally cut military aid to the *contras*. The crisis continues, however, and so too, the debate over U.S. policy.

U.S. policy toward Central America mirrors the larger policy issues. Since 1945, the United States has responded to communist advances, real or perceived, largely by military means. The notable exception among U.S. responses was the European Recovery Program.

The Truman administration initiated this policy toward Latin America at Mexico City in 1945, Rio de Janeiro in 1947, and Bogotá in 1948. In each instance, the primary concern was potential external communist aggression. President Eisenhower continued this policy but added a new dimension, the potential danger of internal communist subversion, as illustrated by the 1954 Caracas resolution and the CIA-engineered overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala that same year. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, while not a military program, was a response to Fidel Castro in Cuba. Nothing, in documents currently available to researchers in the United States, however, substantiates the charge that international communism threatened the region. As late as 1980, the Carter administration failed to find international communism a threat to Central America.

In Central America, as elsewhere, communism and Marxism were intertwined with local nationalism. Diplomats stationed in the region

after World War II understood this when reporting that any threat to the established order was labeled communistic by local leaders. Oligarchical regimes ever since continued to suppress alleged communists, and as U.S. interest in hemispheric affairs dwindled after 1966, the façade of stability was acceptable. Communism did not threaten the regime.

Diplomats based in the region after World War II, down through the intelligence analysis of the 1960s, repeatedly warned that the long-term suffering of the masses posed potential danger to the established order. But the Mutual Security Program, Food for Peace, and Alliance for Progress programs did little to improve the quality of life in Central America.

Only recently, first in Nicaragua and later in El Salvador, did the United States attempt to deal with the demands of the broad-based middle sector, that group concerned largely with constitutional and democratic government. This group, along with spokesmen for the under-

privileged, had been pressing their legitimate demands since immediately after World War II and had been the leading advocates of nationalism during the 1950s, only to be suppressed by military regimes.

Although Central America undoubtedly has strategic, political, and economic significance to the United States, U.S. policy since 1945 does not substantiate that fact—a factor contributing to the lack of general public attention to the contemporary crisis.

Thus, current policy toward Central America repeats, although more emphatically, the policies of the past. Accordingly, we are told, the world is threatened by international communist aggression, and Latin America in general—and currently Central America, in particular—must be protected. Meanwhile, the demands for social and economic reform and for constitutional and democratic government receive little more than verbal assurances.

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Call for Papers and Session Proposals

The Air Force Historical Foundation (AFHF) will be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Military Institute in April 1987 at Richmond, Virginia. The tentative topic for the AFHF session is Historical Perspectives on Aircraft Structures, but other suggestions are invited. Proposals for papers and complete sessions are invited for this 1987 annual meeting.

Proposals, including an abstract of proposed papers and curriculum vitae for each proposed participant, should be addressed to:

Professor I. B. Holley, Chairman
AFHF Program Committee
Department of History
Duke University
Durham NC 27706



TWO DECADES OF BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICAL INITIATIVES AND MILITARY GROWTH

DR. ARMIN K. LUDWIG

THE military assumed control of the Brazilian government in 1964, and, in the ensuing twenty years, it revived the nation's faltering economy and foreign policy and expanded its military establishment. These developments provided alternatives never be



ore available to Brazilian policymakers and created a whole new set of international relationships. The development of a huge economy and a sizable domestic arms industry, the creation of a large and effective military establishment, and the defeat of terrorism in the country brought Brazil a newly achieved power status that not only has had effects on Brazil's Latin American neighbors and the rest of the Third World but also has produced reactions among the world's major power blocs.

Brazil's Geopolitical Blueprint

The term *geopolitics* is, in some parts of the world, synonymous with *geopolitik*, the German school of political geography that under General Karl Haushofer rationalized Nazi expansion. It was rooted in the writings of the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, who conceived a Darwinian model of an organic state that had to expand or die.¹ In Brazil, the subject had no such ominous overtones, and the writings of General Golbery do Couto e Silva offered a blueprint of sorts for geopolitical action.² His roles as professor at Brazil's National War College and as a member of the military government led to the incorporation of many of his ideas into the country's internal development schemes and foreign policy initiatives. Brazil's geopolitical imperative, he wrote, is the establishment of a strong nation that has, through internal expansion, gained complete control of its own national territory. A corollary is the development of a strong maritime arm to protect the nation's long coastline and to keep open the Atlantic Narrows that give the country access to the United States, Europe, and Africa. (See map.) Brazil must then peacefully project its power on the continent through collaboration with other Latin American nations. Finally, the country must continue to defend Western values, create strong relationships with underdeveloped nations, and develop a geostrategy relatively independent of the two great powers.


Factors in Geopolitical Implementation

The new government's economic development and geopolitical plans were fueled by growth rates in the gross domestic product that averaged 11.2 percent from 1968 through 1974 and made Brazil's economy the eighth largest in the world.³ Given the nation's reliance on foreign sources for more than two-thirds of its petroleum requirements, the price increases of 1973 brought this period of double-digit growth rates to a close. Brazil sought to reduce its vulnerability in this area by domestic changes and by foreign initiatives with geopolitical overtones. It intensified exploration for domestic supplies and substituted alcohol, produced from renewable sugar cane, for gasoline. In the foreign area, the nation sought oil from other Latin American countries, particularly from those contiguous-producing nations over whom Brazil might exercise influence.

Operating in the knowledge that many countries like Brazil have coffee and iron ore to sell but not military arms and recognizing that Third World oil producers want arms without political strings, the government, together with private capital, stimulated development of an armaments industry. This expanding sector of the economy not only supported the Brazilian military and saved billions in foreign exchange but also provided the nation with an income. In 1983, Brazil sold \$2.0 billion in arms to foreign customers to become the largest arms supplier in the Third World and the fifth in the world.⁴

EMBRAER and its wholly owned subsidiary, Neiva, account for nearly all of Brazil's aircraft production. Established in 1969, this typical mixed corporation—51 percent federal and 49 percent private capital—had produced more than 3000 airplanes by 1984.⁵ More than 400 of these were Bandeirante EMB-110 twin-engine turboprop aircraft that are highly versatile in both their military and commercial configurations. Half of these planes have been sold

Brazil's Major Geopolitical Contacts, 1964-84



to operators in twenty-six countries. EMBRAER also produced several hundred Tucano EMB-312 military trainers, popular with air arms in both industrialized and underdeveloped countries. EMBRAER's other models, some of which have been exported, include the Xingu EMB-121 and Brasília EMB-120 twin turboprop transports (the former with reconnaissance capabilities), the Xavante EMB-326GB jet trainer/ground attack craft produced in cooperation with Aermacchi of Italy, the Tangará trainer, and Neiva's Universal trainer.

Another mixed Brazilian corporation produces a variety of armored vehicles, including the Cascavel armored reconnaissance vehicle,

the Urutu armored personnel carrier, and the Osório 40-ton main battle tank. The Sucur tank destroyer and the Jararaca armored jeep are also domestically produced. Most of the Brazilian-made ordnance and naval vessels are destined for the nation's military; however, as production rises, exports will follow.

Brazilian military hardware is simple, well built, relatively inexpensive, and, having been developed for Brazil's tough environment, well adapted to Third World conditions. It comes with a minimum of financial red tape and no end-user certificate. Only shipments to Cuba and South Africa are embargoed. Brazil's Latin American neighbors, most prominently Vene

uela and Paraguay, have purchased small numbers of Bandeirantes. This plane and the Brasília are now in the fleets of two commercial feeder airlines in the United States. The British Royal Air Force bought 150 Tucano trainers. The largest total sales are in North Africa and the Mideast, where, since 1973, Brazil has sold 5000 Urutus and Cascavéis as well as several hundred Bandeirantes.⁶ Libya is the big purchaser there, and rumors persist that most of the armored vehicles were transhipped to Iran. Meantime, Iraq has taken direct delivery of 600 Brazilian armored vehicles. Prospects for the future appear undiminished. Saudi Arabia seeks to buy 1000 Osório tanks, Turkey wants 100 Tucanos, and the People's Republic of China is negotiating for 3200 armored vehicles and 500 Tucanos.

The Military Establishment

Brazil has created the largest military force in Latin America. Maintaining it required a 1984 defense budget of \$US 1.055 billion, which amounted to about six-tenths of one percent of the gross domestic product that year.⁷ This amount supported 276,000 military personnel and a considerable array of modern arms and equipment, many of them Brazilian in design and manufacture.

The Regular Army has two primary missions: to defend the country and to maintain internal security. In addition, it is continually involved in civic action projects. Its authorized strength is 183,000 personnel, of whom 138,000 are twelve-month draftees.⁸ The conscript system works well, discipline is good, and esprit high. Officers constitute 8 percent of the total personnel and are generally well educated. Improvement in leadership capabilities among noncommissioned officers, who comprise approximately 20 percent of Army personnel, is constantly being stressed.

The Army's weaponry is supplied by a large number of Western countries, and, indeed, this variety of weapons poses some efficiency prob-

lems. The Brazilian arms industry supplies an ever-increasing proportion of the armored vehicle requirements. Most of the artillery was purchased from the United States and West Germany, but this expanding arsenal now includes the Cobra antitank missile, a 90-millimeter cannon with various projectiles, and small arms and ammunition that are produced in Brazilian plants in cooperation with European firms.⁹

Three-quarters of Brazil's Army is located in the central and southern parts of the country. This disposition reflects not only the concentration of Brazil's population but also proximity to Argentina. Argentina is the only Latin American country to rival Brazil. It is also the one which, in 1828 with British help, forced Brazil to give up its occupation of Uruguay so that Uruguay could become an independent buffer state. Not surprisingly, the southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul contains nearly 10 percent of all Brazilian Army installations. In the north, the Amazônia Command is small but has special missions and training. It is comprised of eight jungle infantry brigades and battalions. Its frontier commands, some more heavily armed than others, are engaged in civic action programs that include settling pioneers, building roads, and delineating international frontiers. Recently, the Army has requested the establishment of an air arm to meet its operational requirements in the Amazon region. If the proposal is accepted, this air arm will probably be composed of rotary-wing aircraft.¹⁰

The second part of the Army's primary mission is to provide internal security. To this end, small units trained in urban guerrilla tactics are attached to regular Army elements. Larger independent units deal with larger-scale threats. In addition, each of the twenty-two states supports a militia that has a strong liaison with the Army. In peacetime, each militia is under control of the state governor. The Army considers these units a reserve force.

The Air Force is comprised of 45,000 person-

nel and 625 aircraft. Most of these craft are Brazilian-designed and -manufactured, but a sizable number were purchased from the United States. Great Britain, France, and Canada supplied the remainder. The Air Force is divided into five major commands. Thirteen mach 2.2 Mirage III French fighters make up the core of the Air Defense Command. (See Table I.) Tactical Command's 104 combat aircraft include Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II ground-attack aircraft and Xavante AT-26 ground attack jets. The command's reconnaissance planes are the highly adaptable Bandeirante EMB-110 and the Xavante in reconnaissance configuration. Maritime Command employs the California-made S-2E/A antisubmarine reconnaissance and training aircraft. These two-seat, enclosed-

cockpit biplanes are very stable in rough weather. The air search and rescue squadron utilize the American Hercules Lockheed 130, the Bandeirante 110 and the Bandeirante 111, a bottle-nosed maritime surveillance version of the 110.¹¹

Transport Command's aircraft include Bandeirante 110 and Canadian Buffalo twin turboprop transports, as well as Hercules and British Hawker Siddeley transports, while Training Command's aircraft are nearly all Brazilian-made and include the Xavante AT-26 and the Universal T-25 and Tucano T-27 trainers. Most of the Brazilian Air Force helicopters are U.S.-made Bell craft, but a few are French Pumas. The service has about 200 aircraft on order. Most significant is the AMX, a

Table I. Aircraft types, numbers, and origins in Brazilian Air Force Commands, 1985

Aircraft Name	Manufacturer & Designations	Brazilian AF Designations	No. In Use by Command	Country of Manufacture				
				Brazil	US	UK	France	Canada
Mirage III	Dessault D & EBR	same	AD 13	—	—	—	13	—
Tiger II	Northrop F-5E/F	same	TA 35	—	35	—	—	—
Xavante	EMBRAER EMB-326GB	AT-26/RT-26	TA 61/TG 50	111	—	—	—	—
Bandeirante	EMBRAER EMB-110	EC-95/RC-95/C-95	TA 08/MA 05 TS 80/TG 06	99	—	—	—	—
Regente	Neiva	C-42/U-42	TA 27/TG 05	32	—	—	—	—
Helicopters	Bell 47 & UH-1H/ Puma SA 330L	same	TA 35/MA 02/ TG 24	—	55	—	6	—
S-2E & A	Christen Ind's	same	MA 15	—	15	—	—	—
Hercules	Lockheed C-130 E&H	C-130E&H/RC-130E/ KC-130H	MA 05/TS 12	—	17	—	—	—
Bandeirante	EMBRAER EMB-111	P-95	MA 15	15	—	—	—	—
-----	Hawker Siddeley 748	C-91	TS 12	—	—	12	—	—
Buffalo	de Havilland Canada DHC 5	C-115	TS 19	—	—	—	—	19
-----	Boeing 737	VC-96	TS 02	—	2	—	—	—
Viscount	Vickers VC-2	VC-91	TS 01	—	—	1	—	—
-----	Hawker Siddeley 125	EC-93/U-93/ VC & VU-93	TS 11/TG 02	—	—	13	—	—
Xingu	EMBRAER EMB-121	VU-9	TS 02	2	—	—	—	—
Universal	Neiva N-621	T-25/T-25A	TG 80	80	—	—	—	—
Tucano	EMBRAER EMB-312	same	TG 88	88	—	—	—	—
Total Aircraft in the Brazilian Air Force			624	436	124	26	19	19
Percent			100.0	70.0	20.0	4.0	3.0	3.0

Command Abbreviations: AD = Air Defense Command, TA = Tactical Command, MA = Maritime Command, TS = Transport Command, TG = Training Command

Sources: *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*, 1974-75, 1976-77, 1977-78, 1981-82, 1983-84, 1984-85. *Air Force*, February 1986, p. 96.

nach 0.9 jet fighter/ground support airplane built in Brazil by EMBRAER in collaboration with Aermacchi of Italy.¹²

The Brazilian naval arm totals 48,000 personnel, of which only 2200 are draftees. The Naval Air Force numbers 600, and the Marine complement has 14,500. Responsible for a 1000-mile coastline and a 200-mile territorial limit, the service concerns itself with keeping both the Atlantic Narrows and the Amazon waterway system open.

The Navy's modern combat fleet is either Brazilian-built or constructed in foreign shipyards to Brazilian specifications. The latter include three British-built Oberon-class submarines, nine corvettes constructed in the Netherlands, and six German-made minesweepers.¹³ Brazilian shipyards have delivered six frigates and twelve river and light patrol craft. The remaining ships, some of them in reserve, were all built in the 1940s and purchased from foreign navies. Brazil bought the 17,000-ton *Cossus*-class aircraft carrier, now the *Minas Gerais*, from Great Britain in 1956. All ten Gearing-letcher- and Sumner-class destroyers were purchased from the United States Navy, as were the four Guppy-class submarines. The Navy has on order three submarines. The first is being built in Kiel, West Germany, and the next two will be constructed in Brazil under German supervision.

Government forces during the period of the economic Miracle were challenged by severe internal disturbances conducted by a small group of terrorists whose aim was not only the overthrow of the military-controlled government but also the destruction of Brazil's Western institutions. Terrorist activities—murder, kidnapping, and bank robbing—focused principally in large urban centers. However, the terrorists did attempt to establish rural bases in Arará state, at Marabá in the state of Pará, and Xambioá in the state of Goiás, on the eastern fringe of the Amazon Basin. (The last two bases were located to take advantage of the new highway system in the area and growing ten-

sions over newly opened lands.) All of these rural bases were quickly destroyed by government forces, who handled themselves well. Nevertheless, the specter of guerrillas in the vastness of the Amazon stimulated implementation of General Golbery's principle of national territorial control through internal expansion.

Peaceful Projection of Power on the Continent

In 1966, President Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco pushed Operation Amazônia through Brazil's Congress. Project planners saw the Amazon's development as a grand patriotic endeavor that would address what Mahan calls the geopolitical imperative of human occupation.¹⁴ The frontier cities of Porto Velho and Boa Vista (in the state of Rondônia and the territory of Roraima, respectively) and the metropolis of Manaus became "growth poles" where immigrants, enticed by planned developments and financial incentives, were to create stable and self-sustaining settlements. President Medici's National Integration Plan implemented the Amazon highway system and facilitated land acquisition in the region.

By 1980, these programs had begun to bear fruit. Amazônia had registered a 76 percent increase in population during the decade since 1970. The new state of Rondônia and the territory of Roraima increased 103 and 749 percent, respectively. Manaus more than doubled in size to 635,000 inhabitants.¹⁵ Nevertheless, this huge area, two-thirds the size of the contiguous United States, was still home to fewer than six and one-half million people. Brazil, however, had made clear its intentions regarding the region, and its neighbors began responding to Brazilian initiatives.

In 1978, the Brazilian-proposed Amazon Cooperation Treaty (*Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica*) was signed by Brazil and seven of its neighbor states.¹⁶ It guaranteed freedom of navigation on the Amazon River system and committed the eight countries to cooperate in

building roads to link the Amazon River mouth in Brazil with points in their territories. Within these signatory nations, the Amazon is a frontier area undergoing incipient exploitation and occupancy. Much of the oil in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia is located on the Amazon-facing flanks of the Andes Mountains; the new Brazilian highway network will offer access to Brazilian markets and transshipment ports for oil and other commodities when the highway links are completed. Bolivia's oil-producing province of Santa Cruz, where Ernesto "Ché" Guevara's group was destroyed in 1967, is a particular target for Brazil. Golbery views this area as the "heartland" of Latin America, the "continental weld," as he calls it, over which Brazil must exercise as much control as possible.¹⁷ All seven nations that agreed with Brazil about developing transportation links in the Amazon region have been concerned about Brazil's physical, cultural, and economic encroachment of their frontiers.

Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina share common borders with Brazil and the waters of the long-disputed Paraná-Rio de la Plata river systems, as well. The development of these waters under Brazilian initiative has been the capstone of a rapprochement among them. Uruguay and Paraguay are virtual client states of Brazil.¹⁸ The latter joined in the development of Itaipu, the largest hydroelectric complex in the world when it was completed in 1982. Paraguay's institutions, however, were simply unable to sustain any long-term growth based on the Itaipu stimulus. Its economy is in shambles and political instability threatens—scarcely the conditions Brazil hoped to create on its borders when it proposed the massive project.¹⁹

Brazil and Argentina have been at odds for centuries. Argentina expected to lead in Latin America, resisted U.S. interests at home, and resented them in Brazil. In World War II, Brazil not only declared war on the Axis powers but also sent the First Brazilian Squadron with its P-47s and the Brazilian Expeditionary Forces

(FEB) to fight alongside American units in northern Italy. Argentina openly sympathized with the Axis but did declare war in 1945. It was threatened by the strong U.S. arms commitment to Brazil that was intended to supply the FEB and to protect the northeast hump from which American bombers were ferried across the Atlantic Narrows to Africa.

Recently, the two nations' differences have been drawing Brazil and Argentina together. Brazil's tropical crops and iron ore complement Argentina's wheat, creating trade. Cultural differences and sharp currency fluctuations create tourism. Brazil's new less-U.S.-oriented foreign policy has allowed relations to warm. In 1980, the two nations agreed to develop hydropower on the upper Uruguay River, to share peaceful development of nuclear energy, and to prepare to integrate their economies.

Projecting Power Eastward

Brazil's most exposed frontier is its 5000-mile Atlantic coastline, which, after 1970, has included an additional 200-mile-wide strip of "oceanic territory." The South Atlantic Ocean has not always served Brazil well. It was a route for French and Dutch invasion fleets and, during World War II, was a fruitful hunting ground for German submarines trying to cut Brazil's supply lines to its northern allies. In fact, Brazil perceived the 1500-mile Atlantic Narrows as a possible invasion route if the Nazis gained control of France's fleet and West African colonies. Instead, Brazil turned the Atlantic Narrows to its advantage as the ferrying route. Today, Brazil's modern navy is coastal and antisubmarine in orientation.

As an extension of its eastern flank, Brazil reestablished some of its oldest ties, those to black Africa. By 1985, Brazil was Nigeria's second-largest trading partner, exchanging Brazilian-made Volkswagens and military hardware for oil, and it had also become a major trading partner of Angola.²⁰ Brazil now seeks special political relationship with Portuguese

speaking Angola and Mozambique. In addition, it has proposed cooperative economic and technical ventures with seven other Central and West African nations. In Islamic Africa and the Mideast, Brazil's primary interests have been in trading arms for oil.

Steering a Middle Course

The United States remained Brazil's largest trading partner over the past twenty years, and the two nations continued to sustain a great deal of good will toward one another. The period was marked diplomatically by U.S. benign neglect, coolness, and then warmth again. Brazil's desire to steer a course in world political and economic spheres less attuned to U.S. requirements was abetted by the superpower's attention to Vietnam and the Mideast, as well as the geopolitics of Brazil's distance and isolation. The Nixon administration did not want to rock the Brazilian boat. With the bilateral accords signed during Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Brasília in 1973, the United States virtually conferred the mantle of Latin American leadership on Brazil as a reflection of *Realpolitik*, or the acceptance of a reality.²¹ Coolness pervaded Brazil's relations with the Carter administration, which focused on Brazil's human rights record. At this time, Brazil was emerging from a period of terrorist chaos, its basic Western institutions intact and ready for an eventual (1984) return to electoral democracy. The Reagan administration's attempt to help Brazil meet its foreign debts has warmed relations between the two governments.

Brazil's ties to Western Europe continue to be strong and multifaceted. Its economic and cultural links to France and Great Britain in recent history have been as strong as those to America. A steady exchange of commodities, technology, credits, and people takes place with all the other Common Market countries, particularly with West Germany and the Netherlands. The same holds true for Japan, whose emotional ties to Brazil match trade and

financial ties. One of Brazil's largest minorities has its roots among the nearly 200,000 Japanese who emigrated to Brazil in the 1920s and 1930s under government-to-government agreements. Brazil is still the Japanese public's first choice as a place to live outside Japan.

Brazil's geopolitical view of the world also includes the Eastern bloc. In 1973, the government established formal diplomatic ties to East Germany. Brazil carries on a small but steady trade with the Soviet Union. Because Brazil is a major world soybean producer, this trade pattern is often punctuated by larger deals of this agricultural commodity for Soviet oil. The People's Republic of China has bought steel and oil exploration skills and technology from Brazil and seeks to sell more goods in Brazil to redress the heavy trade imbalance.

BRAZIL is not an imperialistic state. Its attempt to occupy the Amazon region is an internal rather than an external geopolitical thrust, the prerequisite for which is a well-developed national core. The policy's most significant result, however, is not likely to be a populated *Amazônia* but rather a tighter integration of the nation's political and economic core with this weakly developed periphery. The population of the Amazon states today accounts for just 5.3 percent of the national total, a figure only slightly higher than the region's 4.0 percent share in 1808. The early Amazon initiatives, such as the creation of a highway network and growth poles, channel the energy emanating from the core as it grows and articulates. The core's population, industrial and military capacity, sophisticated technology, and decision-making systems overcome the distance to Brazil's borders and the under-occupancy of the land between. This extension of power will deter any large-scale hostile actions by contiguous states or by terrorists in *Amazônia*. Brazil's internal geopolitical structure today does not resemble that of an expan-

sive United States trying to populate a continent in the nineteenth century. Instead, Brazil resembles Australia, China, Canada, and the Soviet Union (the former two, developing links between their strong cores and dry interiors; the latter two, between their well-established cores and arctic regions).

Brazil is a regional power not only because of its dealings with contiguous states and its development of the huge Amazon region but because its powerful economy allows it to project well beyond its immediate frontiers. Utilizing a vast array of available resources ranging from iron ore to both military and nonmilitary technology and hardware, Brazil is making itself a hemispheric power. Brazil has achieved a considerable degree of independence in its political liaisons. It still cleaves to the West emotionally and in trade matters, but it is relatively free of major U.S. and European constraints. The nation maintains diplomatic or trade relations

with nearly every country in the world that desires them, except Cuba. (Signs point to the possibility that Brazil's relations with Cuba may be restored in the near future.)

There is more than a little irony in the fact that Brazil—whose borders have not been in continual turmoil, whose internal upheavals have usually been bloodless, and whose people do not take easily to organized violence—should find itself one of the largest arms dealers in the world. This circumstance, however, is simply another kind of complementarity, in which resource differences generate trade. Brazil now has for sale commodities generally not available elsewhere without tight ideological or diplomatic strings. One might even make the case that Brazil's traditional role as a "good citizen" of the world is made even easier as the nation's power grows.

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
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THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE AND WORLD WAR II

COLONEL FORD G. DAAB

THE Brazilian Air Force has not always been a separate and coequal member of the country's defense establishment. Like the United States Air Force, it had its beginnings in the Army, and it was World War II that provided the impetus for its separation and independence. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, U.S. leaders watched events unfolding in Europe and looked southward as they considered possible threats to national security. Hemispheric defense was the watchword of the day, and Brazil figured significantly in the calculations of that defense. The United States needed to deny possible hostile nations a foothold in

this hemisphere and to have secure bases for its own forces. U.S. efforts to accomplish those two goals, along with some provocation from the German submarine forces, brought Brazil into the war on the Allies' side. Tied up in these events of 1938-42 was the creation of the Brazilian Air Force.

Brazilian military aviation began on 13 January 1913, when the Brazilian School of Aviation was founded.¹ On 2 February 1914, the school began operations at Campo dos Afonsos near Rio de Janeiro with three Farman biplanes and five Blériot monoplanes that it had purchased from Italy. Organized under the

Minister of War, the school was to train aviators for the Army and Navy.

The Brazilian Navy, apparently not happy with this attempt at joint operations, established the Naval School of Aviation in August 1916. No longer a "joint service school," the Brazilian School of Aviation became the Military School of Aviation on 11 July 1919. For the next two decades, Brazilian military aviation would follow an Army/Navy dual track.²

Military aviation in Brazil remained a rather low-key operation for several years. No aviation units were formed, and the majority of aeronautical activities centered around the school at Campo dos Afonsos. On 13 January 1927, the Directorate of Military Aviation was formed. The director reported to the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, the Military School of Aviation came under his authority, and officers in the grades of lieutenant, captain, and major were transferred from other branches of the Army to the Aviation Directorate. It is interesting to note that this reorganization of Brazilian Army aviation came less than a year after the United States' Air Corps Act of 1926 and contained several similarities; however, any direct correlation is only speculative.

Organizationally, Brazilian Army aviation remained concentrated at the Campos dos Afonsos school. On 21 May 1931, the first operational unit was formed, drawing equipment and personnel from the aviation school. Designated the Mixed Aviation Group, its commander was Major Eduardo Gomes.

In early 1933, reorganization and expansion of military aviation was begun when the Mixed Aviation Group became the First Aviation Regiment. On 29 March 1933, three Military Aviation Zones were formed. The headquarters for the 1st Zone was located in Rio de Janeiro and consisted of the First Aviation Regiment at Rio, the Sixth at Recife, and the Seventh at Belém. The 2d Aviation Zone, with headquarters at São Paulo, contained the Second Aviation Regiment at São Paulo and the Fourth at Belo

Horizonte. The 3rd Aviation Zone had its headquarters at Porto Alegre in the southern part of the country and included the Third Regiment at Porto Alegre and the Fifth at Curitiba.

Through the 1930s, the Brazilian Army aviation units concentrated on training and expanding their capabilities. Like their U.S. Army counterparts, they also participated in the air mail service, but the results were decidedly different. In fact, carrying the mail became a principal function of Brazilian Army aviation, and the mission was accomplished safely, efficiently, and effectively.³

Brazil is a huge country, larger than the continental United States. At the beginning of the 1930s, transportation posed a real problem as Brazilians sought to tie together their large and diverse nation. Rail and ship transportation were available but inadequate: railways were few and not interconnected, and ships were slow and insufficient to the country's needs. Especially vexing was the problem of communications with the interior. Major Eduardo Gomes, the Mixed Aviation Group commander, approached the War Minister in 1931 with a possible solution: use the military aircraft to link the various parts of the country with an air mail system.

The first flight occurred on 12 June 1931 when a Curtiss "Fledgling" piloted by Lieutenants Casimiro Montenegro Filho and Nelson Freire Lavenère-Wanderley carried two letters from Campos dos Afonsos to São Paulo. By July, thrice-weekly service between Rio and São Paulo was established and the Military Air Postal Service was in business. Shortly thereafter, the name of the system was changed to the Military Air Mail.

On 12 October 1931, an unsuccessful attempt was made to open service to Goiás in the interior when Lieutenant Montenegro crash-landed his Curtiss shortly after takeoff, due to bad weather. However, on 19 October, Lieutenant Lavenère-Wanderley launched the second attempt and successfully completed the mission.

in the twenty-first. Expansion of the aviation organization into the three air zones in the spring of 1933 provided the necessary infrastructure, and equipment began to be improved in 1934 with the arrival of several Waco EGC-7 aircraft in the inventory. Also, in 1934, the Brazilian Navy initiated an air mail route from Rio de Janeiro south to Florianópolis. Other routes were established by both the Army and Navy so that, by 1938, the services were delivering mail to more than seventy cities throughout the country. In January 1941, with the creation of the Air Ministry, the Army and Navy systems were combined into the National Air Mail—a system that exists to the present—utilizing military and civilian aircraft to provide mail and cargo service to every part of the country.

Brazilian Army aviators may have been proud of their achievements, but—like their U.S. counterparts—they believed aviation should be separate and independent from the surface components. A “campaign” for the creation of an air ministry and a separate air force began in the 1920s. On 11 November 1928, the Sunday edition of the Rio de Janeiro newspaper *O Jornal* published an article by Major Lysias that outlined the need for a new and separate Ministry of Aviation. Two weeks later, a follow-up article by Major Lysias expanded on the ideas presented. These articles launched what was to be a continuing, albeit low-level, campaign for component “independence.” Never reaching the level of the furor in the United States, the advocacy for a separate Air Ministry continued until, on 20 January 1941, the Brazilian Air Ministry was created. Six years “senior” to the U.S. Air Force, the Brazilian Air Force incorporated not only Army aviation but Brazilian naval aviation as well. Indeed, the Decree-Law No. 2961 of 20 January 1941 specified that the Air Ministry would include the Military Air Army, the Fleet Air Arm, and the Department of Civil Aviation. Initially known as the National Air Forces, the Brazilian Air Force per se came into being on 22 May 1941.

No doubt internal “agitation” played a part in the creation of a separate and independent air arm, but external events (particularly U.S. moves linked to security concerns about hemispheric defense) certainly had an impact on the Brazilian government and military. By 1938, the United States, particularly within the Air Corps, had begun to look toward the defense of the nation in real and practical ways as the events in Europe became more ominous. In October of that year, the Air Corps Board produced a study titled “Air Corps Mission under the Monroe Doctrine.”⁴ Primarily designed to show the importance of aviation in providing defense, the report nevertheless made it quite clear that hostile occupation and resultant operational capability from some Caribbean islands or the northeast area of Brazil would present a serious danger to the Panama Canal and the southern United States.

As early as January 1938, President Roosevelt, in making a request for additional money for the Army and Navy, included a warning that any potential enemy must be kept “many hundreds of miles from our continental limits.”⁵ Subsequently, late in 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull pushed for a declaration of “hemispheric foreign policy” at the Inter-American Conference of Lima, Peru.⁶

In the United States during late 1938, the Joint Planning Committee studied what the United States might do in case of a German or Italian attempt to secure bases in Latin America. In February 1939, General George C. Marshall, the Assistant Chief of Staff, directed the Army War College to examine in secret what force would be necessary to make Brazil (and Venezuela) safe against assumed German designs to take them over.⁷ Thus, by the spring of 1939, the United States not only was worried about possible hostile intentions but was taking the first steps in planning counter or preventive moves.

Meanwhile, in December 1938, the German Army had extended an invitation to the Brazilian Chief of Staff to visit Berlin. Given the U.S.

concern over possible hostile moves in the area, this overture must surely have been "unwelcome" news in Washington. Apparently, there were those in Rio de Janeiro who felt the same way, for, in January 1939, in an effort to forestall the Berlin visit, Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha proposed that the U.S. Chief of Staff come to Brazil and then reciprocate with an invitation for the Brazilian Chief of Staff to visit the United States.⁸

When General Marshall's appointment as the new Chief of Staff was announced at the end of April, it was decided that Marshall would make the trip.⁹ He and his party departed New York on 10 May 1939 aboard the USS *Nashville* and arrived in Rio on the twenty-fifth. Their itinerary for twelve days included visits, dinners, receptions, and discussions with the Brazilians. On 6 June, the *Nashville* departed for the United States with the Brazilian Chief of Staff General Góes Monteiro and his party aboard. General Góes Monteiro was given an extensive tour of the United States, which must have impressed him, for he never made the visit to Berlin. The process of bringing the Brazilians "into the fold" had begun.

Beginning in 1940, the United States made military equipment and assistance available to the Brazilians. A United States Military Mission was established in Brazil, surplus coast defense material was sold to Brazil at bargain prices, and training aircraft, light tanks, scout cars, and various other types of vehicles were supplied.¹⁰ All of this generosity was designed not only to enhance Brazilian capability but also to draw the Brazilians into a confidential relationship and onto the "side" opposing the Axis powers. What the United States really needed was access to air bases in northeastern Brazil that would allow its forces to cover the South Atlantic shipping lanes and concurrently deny the area to the Germans or Italians.

Getting U.S. military personnel actually into Brazil and acquiring base rights were not easy matters. There was a large German and

Italian population in Brazil, authority for stationing U.S. troops in Brazil did not exist unless "specifically requested" by the Brazilian government,¹¹ and Brazilian officials felt that their government would not survive if it did "invite" the Americans.¹² In any event, stationing of significant U.S. combat forces did not become necessary, and the bases in the north east were acquired by a bit of sleight of hand.

Pan American Airways was operating throughout Latin America, and its subsidiary Panair do Brasil, had been granted rights to construct and improve airfields in Brazil. A secret contract (W1097-eng-2321) between Pan American and the War Department provided funds for the facility construction. The War Department obtained the funds from the President's special fund and transferred them through the Export-Import Bank after certification of Pan American's vouchers by a representative of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. In return, all privileges enjoyed by Panair do Brasil were extended to U.S. military aircraft—extended by Pan American, that is. The rights granted by the Brazilian government to Panair do Brasil contained no provisions for military use of the airfields. However, in July 1940 General Robert Olds and Brigadier Eduard Gomes (the former commander of the Mixed Aviation Group at Campo dos Afonsos and then commander of the Northeast Air Zone) negotiated an agreement whereby the Brazilian government permitted military use of the airfields, construction of military housing, and occupancy by USAAF technicians.¹³ As a result, airfields and facilities were improved or enhanced at Amapá, Belém, São Luis, Fortaleza, Natal, Recife, Maceió, Salvador, and Caravelas.¹⁴ Thus, the United States acquired a base facilities from which it could provide a cover over the South Atlantic. More important, access to this strategic region was effectively denied to the Axis. Additionally, the string of airfields from the northern Amazon basin to just north of Rio de Janeiro provided a vital link in the eventual South Atlantic air-route.

etween the United States, North Africa, and Southern Europe. On 23 May 1941, a political-military agreement between the United States and Brazil was signed, but it was broad and general in nature: no specific permission was granted for any particular installations. Practically all negotiations and agreements continued to be verbal between USAAF/USN personnel and Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, the Northeast Air Zone commander.¹⁵ Finally, in June 1941, a formal agreement for U.S. bases in Brazil was signed by the two nations.¹⁶

Stationing of large contingents of U.S. forces never occurred, but in 1941 and early 1942 there was serious consideration to implement the idea. On 13 June 1941, the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War forwarded to the President a report of the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Army and Navy Board recommending that immediate consent of the Brazilian government be obtained to move Army and Navy security forces to northeast Brazil. The Army contingent would consist of one "triangular division" and an air force of two bomb groups, one pursuit group, one transport group, one observation squadron, and two reconnaissance squadrons. This air force component would comprise some 10,000 personnel and 226 aircraft.¹⁷ On 7 January 1942, Air War Plans Division recommended to the Chief of the Air Staff that this force be sent—prepared, if not invited, to seize the installations "by force at once."¹⁸

The German Navy provided the impetus to preclude direct U.S. combat entry "by force" when it stepped up submarine activity in the South Atlantic and attacked several Brazilian ships. On 28 January 1942, Brazil broke diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan. By the second half of 1942, U.S. Navy PBY-5 Catalinas and PV-1 Hudsons were operating from Brazilian bases, and Brazilian Air Force crews were actively training to take over the mission. In April 1944, the U.S. Navy began to withdraw, and by the end of that year the Brazilians assumed the mission. Until the end

of the war, the Brazilians carried out maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare operations, using B-25 bombers, PBYs, and Lockheed Hudsons and Venturas.¹⁹

In the meantime, Brazil had declared war on the Axis. On 18 December 1943, its military established the First Fighter Group to accompany a Brazilian infantry division to Italy.²⁰ Training initially on P-40s in Florida and Panama, the group moved in June 1944 to Suffolk Air Base, Long Island, New York, to transition into the P-47. On 10 September 1944, the First Fighter Group departed Newport, Virginia, on the French ship *Colombie* and traveled in convoy to Livorno, Italy, arriving 6 October 1944. Its first mission was flown eight days later.

The Brazilian unit was assigned to the 350th Fighter Group, USAAF. Beginning combat operations on 31 October, the Brazilians flew initially with USAAF squadrons in order to gain combat experience. On 11 November, they began operating in formations that were exclusively Brazilian. Employed as fighter-bombers, the Brazilian P-47s provided close air support and flew interdiction missions. By the time the war ended in May 1945, the First Fighter Group had flown 2546 sorties and 5465 combat hours. The group destroyed 1304 motor vehicles of various types, 13 railway engines, 250 railcars, 8 armored cars, 25 rail and highway bridges, and 31 fuel and munitions depots, shooting down 2 aircraft and damaging 9 others en route.

The combat achievements of the Brazilians did not come without losses. Of the forty-eight pilots who flew with the First Fighter Group, there were twenty-two casualties. Five pilots were killed by anti-aircraft fire, eight were shot down but bailed out successfully over enemy territory, three died in flying accidents not related directly to combat operations, and six were "grounded" due to "combat fatigue." Those killed were buried initially in the Brazilian cemetery at Pistoia, Italy. Subsequently, their remains were returned to Brazil and interred in a crypt in the Monument of the Dead

of the Second World War, located in Rio de Janeiro.

Two months after the war ended, the First Fighter Group returned to Brazil. Thus ended the Brazilian Air Force's combat operations. From its meager beginnings at Campo dos Afonsos in 1913, the Brazilian Air Force achieved independence from the Army (and Navy) and

became an equal partner in its nation's defense organization. Born of the necessities of impending war in the early 1940s, the Brazilian Air Force "won its spurs" in World War II. It continues today as a well-organized, competent member of Brazil's armed forces.

Key West Naval Air Station, Florida

Notes

1. *Correio Aéreo Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro: Air Force Public Relations Center, 1976).

2. Nelson Freire Lavenère-Wanderley, *História da Força Aérea Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Ministry of Aviation Department of National News, 1976).

3. *Correio Aéreo Nacional*. This book provides a good description of the Brazilian air mail system and the role of the Brazilian military.

4. Air Corps Board Study, October 1938 (in USAF Historical Center, File 167.5-44).

5. Forest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General* (New York: Viking, 1963), p. 337.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 338.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-42; also, DeWitt S. Copp, *A Few Great Captains* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1980).

10. Letter from Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 30 August 1941 (in USAF Historical Center, File 145.81-11).

11. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Brigadier General Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, 6 November 1941 (in USAF Historical Center, File 145.81-87).

12. Letter from Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 30 August 1941 (in USAF Historical Center, File 145.81-11).

13. Unsigned Memorandum for the Record, 10 January 1944 (in USAF Historical Center, File 145.81-87).

14. Nelson Freire Lavenère-Wanderley, *The Brazilian Air Force in the Second World War* (Rio de Janeiro: Air Force Public Relations Center, 1976).

15. Memo of 10 January 1941 (in USAF Historical Center, File 145.81-87).

16. Memorandum for General Giles from the Advisory Council 15 June 1944 (in USAF Historical Center, File 145.81-87).

17. Memo to Chief of Staff from General Spaatz, 6 November 1941 (in USAF Historical Center, File 145.81-11).

18. Memorandum for General Spaatz from AWPD Chief, Lt. Col. H. L. George, 7 January 1942 (in USAF Historical Center, File 145.81-11).

19. Lavenère-Wanderley, *The Brazilian Air Force in the Second World War*.

20. The account of the First Fighter Group presented here has been extracted and translated from Wanderley's books *The Brazilian Air Force in the Second World War* and *História da Força Aérea Brasileira*.

FROM FOCO TO INSURRECTION: SANDINISTA STRATEGIES OF REVOLUTION

DAVID NOLAN

IN 1895, Frederick Engels announced that "the rebellion of the old style, the street fighting behind barricades, which up to 1848 gave the final decision, has become antiquated."¹ Improvements in the mobility and firepower of

government forces, combined with the lure of parliamentary representation for the workers, had ended the era in which revolutionaries could hope to seize power through urban insurrection. In the twentieth century, those seek-



ing power for the purpose of radically transforming society have generally turned to rural-based guerrilla warfare as a means of overthrowing the existing order. The theories of Mao, Giap, and Guevara proposed the initiation of internal war in the countryside not only for military reasons but also because of an identification of the cities as ideologically impure bastions of counterrevolution.

The image of the guerrilla as the necessary centerpiece of revolutionary war was passed on to the young Nicaraguan followers of Marxism-Leninism who founded the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) in 1961.² Burdened with this inheritance, the Sandinistas labored for two decades to produce a strategic doctrine capable of winning state power through military action. The search led them to model their strategy first on the Cuban experience and later on the Vietnamese. In the end, however, the dynastic dictatorship of the Somozas was brought down in July 1979 by a new synthesis of mobile partisan operations with urban insurrectionist and general-strike patterns of the sort that Engels had declared dead a century before. Although the ultimate reasons for the downfall of Anastasio Somoza and the Nicaraguan National Guard lie in the dynamics of popular revolution from below, it was the insurrectional strategy of Humberto Ortega, Nicaragua's present defense minister, and the *Tercerista* (Third) faction of the FSLN that enabled a self-styled vanguard elite to harness the power of the revolt for their own ends.³

The Sandinista Foco

When Carlos Fonseca and Tomás Borge, former law students from the University of Nicaragua, decided in the late 1950s to quit the Moscow-line Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) and follow the path of armed revolt, they turned to the recent Cuban experiences of Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Ché" Guevara for a theoretical framework. The first FSLN *foco* (guerrilla operations zone) on the Río Coco in 1963

was predicated on Ché's three lessons of the Cuban Revolution:

- Irregular forces starting from scratch can militarily defeat a regular army.
- There is no need to wait for the proper Marxian conditions since the insurgency itself will create a positive environment.
- The vulnerability of urban revolutionaries to repression requires the insurgents to seek the mobility and security of the countryside, preferably in the "wild places of small population."⁴

The emphasis of the *foco* theory, reinforced by Régis Debray's 1967 elaboration, was on the independence of the rural military arm from (and predominance over) the Leninist party. In its extreme form, *foquismo* saw the guerrillas as a secret military force almost totally "independent of the civilian population."⁵ Tactically, Guevara counseled the use of mobility, surprise, and covering terrain to make up for the *foco's* lack of arms and numbers. Ambush was the preferred means of making contact with the enemy. The primary operational objectives were to disrupt the regime's communications and transport networks and to capture supplies. The strategic objective was survival—"no battle, combat or skirmish is to be fought unless it will be won."⁶

Ironically, one of the pioneers of the basic tactical principles of twentieth-century guerrilla warfare was Augusto César Sandino, the Nicaraguan leader in the 1927-33 fight against U.S. intervention, whose memory the FSLN honored. Sandino's guerrilla movement was part of the great transition in irregular warfare that occurred when the machine gun and the airplane ended the viability of the mounted raiders long familiar on the steppes of Central Asia, the Middle East, and North America. While Mao was developing the people's war concept in China, Sandino was successfully combating U.S. Marines through the use of jungle cover and ambushes by small numbers of foot-mobile guerrillas armed with submachine guns and backed by a peasant support

network.⁷ The Sandinistas were influenced by the Sandino experience both directly and through Guevara.

As it turned out, the FSLN's 1963 campaign was a classic case study in the failings of the *foco* theory. In June 1963, approximately sixty minimally trained students-turned-guerrillas, led by Sandino's old comrade Colonel Santos Lopez and the thirty-three-year-old Tomás Borge, crossed the Rio Coco from Honduras to occupy the village of Raití. No effort had been made to establish a secure supply line or to familiarize the militants with the mountainous jungle of the border region. The few attempts made to politicize the local Miskito Indian farmers and fishermen failed in the face of communications barriers and the general lack of peasant discontent. In October, after a few unsuccessful attacks on local National Guard detachments, the survivors retreated to Hondu-

ras, where most were arrested. Clearly, more than guerrilla voluntarism was needed to overthrow the Somozas.

Pancasán

For the next few years, the Sandinista Front for National Liberation confined itself to unarmed proselytizing among students, the urban poor, and the peasantry of the Department of Matagalpa in the central mountains. (See map.) In January 1965, Carlos Fonseca was deported to Guatemala, where he met Luís Turcios Lima of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), a Castroist offshoot of the Guatemalan Communist Party. At the time, Turcios Lima was attempting to overcome his own bad experiences with *foquismo* through the application of the concept of protracted people's war advocated by Asian guerrilla theorists Mao Zedong and Vo

Nicaraguan Geographic Regions

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>Pacific Lowlands
urban centers
latifundia
export crops
(cotton and sugar)</p> <p>Eastern Mountains
sparse peasant
population
mining</p> | <p>Northern Highlands
peasant farming
coffee
cattle ranching</p> <p>Atlantic Coast
sparsely
inhabited
Miskito Indians
shifting agriculture
fishing</p> |
|--|--|



Nguyen Giap.⁸ During the next year, an FSLN contingent under Oscar Turcios went to fight with the Rebel Armed Forces on the Zacapa Front. Armed with this practical experience, the beginnings of a new theory, three years of preparatory work in rural Matagalpa, and the ideological inspiration of the January 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, the FSLN returned to the mountains.

The Pancasán guerrilla movement (named after a local mountain) marked a transition from Cuban *foquismo* to Asian people's war in Nicaragua. Casimiro Sotelo, the FSLN representative in Cuba, described the Sandinista effort in *foquista* terms as a mobile guerrilla insurgency using exemplary armed action to garner peasant support and provoke U.S. military intervention as a part of Guevara's "one, two, many Vietnams" strategy.⁹ Back in Nicaragua, however, the three Sandinista columns—under Fonseca, Borge, and Silvio Mayorga—were more interested in organizing a viable peasant support network than in provoking firefights with the National Guard. Nevertheless, in May 1967, after five months of silent work, the *foco's* existence was discovered. Peasant informers and the Guard's helicopter mobility led to the destruction of the Mayorga column in August. The loss of one-third of the organization's strength sent the survivors fleeing first to the cities and then into Cuban or Costa Rican exile when the urban underground collapsed in November.

The Prolonged Popular War

In the aftermath of Pancasán, the FSLN was subjected to a major organizational and ideological overhaul. Fonseca was made secretary-general, but actual power was decentralized among the seven members of the National Directorate. Although the collective leadership system encouraged factionalism during the mid-1970s, it also enabled the organization to survive a decade of repression that claimed the lives of eight of the fourteen directors who

served during the period. A definitive break with *foco* theory was achieved with the adoption of "Prolonged Popular War" (*Guerra Popular Prolongada*—GPP) as the FSLN's strategic doctrine. Loosely based on a reading of the revolutions in Vietnam and China, the GPP line called for a period of "accumulation of forces in silence."¹⁰ While the urban organization recruited on the university campuses and collected funds through bank holdups, the main cadres were to go permanently to the north central mountain zone. There they would build a grassroots peasant support base in preparation for renewed rural guerrilla warfare.¹¹ Flirtations with urban terrorism along the lines of the Uruguayan Tupamaros were abandoned after the killings of commando leaders Julio Buitrago in July 1969 and Leonel Rugama in January 1970. In addition to the military problems of weak security and insufficient room to maneuver, the GPP theorists took a pessimistic view of the prospects of building a popular base for the revolution in the urban stronghold of the bourgeois mentality. With no chance of a popular uprising, urban revolutionaries could never hope to move beyond terrorism to challenge state power seriously.

The GPP departed from *foquismo* by insisting that the "masses" be mobilized and indoctrinated through the seizure of power rather than afterward. Militarily, this meant that the peasants would be incorporated into the guerrilla forces. Following Mao, the Sandinistas identified (U.S.) imperialism, not the Somoza regime, as the immediate enemy and prepared to fight a protracted war to wear down, over a matter of decades, any nonsocialist regime, dictatorial or democratic, that should come to power.¹² Operationally, the GPP resurrected the Asian people's war concepts of armed propaganda carried out by small squads dispersed over a wide area and the construction of liberated zones, both of which had been rejected by the *foco* theorists.¹³ In addition to the strategic concerns, the GPP had a strong ideological and

spiritual attraction for the FSLN's middle-class student membership. The mountains were seen as the "crucible" where a petty bourgeois could be freed from his "vain desires" and forged into a cadre of the proletarian revolution.¹⁴ Ideological dogma permeated the GPP, making the movement less a military strategy and more of a faith unable to adapt to a changing political environment.

In accordance with the new approach, FSLN cadres began returning to the mountains in 1969. In February 1970, an FSLN-led force of peasants got into a firefight with the National Guard near Zinica and escaped—a considerable accomplishment, considering past Sandinista experience. The next five years were the "period of silence" in which the rural cadres under Moscow-trained Henry Ruíz (*Comandante Modesto*) avoided contact with the Guard and tried to build a peasant support network. The urban organization worked through intermediate groups, such as the Revolutionary Student Front (FER) and the Christian Revolutionary Movement (MCR), to free Sandinista prisoners, propagandize in the *barrios*, and gather supplies for the guerrillas. The silence was broken on 27 December 1974 when the Managua home of a prominent Somoza supporter was seized during a Christmas party. Although President Anastasio Somoza gave in to the Sandinistas' demands, he retaliated by declaring martial law and unleashing a reign of terror in the mountains where the guerrillas had begun to assassinate local officials. For a while, the guerrillas were able to fight back, but the Guard's campaign of executions and resettlement undermined the GPP's limited peasant base. The main guerrilla force, Henry Ruíz's *Pablo Ubeda* column, was cut off from its urban supporters and forced to retreat into the sparsely populated jungles of eastern Nicaragua. Four major commanders, including Carlos Fonseca, were killed; and Tomás Borge was captured. By 1977, the GPP guerrilla movement was no longer a credible threat to the Somoza regime.¹⁵

The Proletarian Digression

During the mid-1970s, a group within the FSLN's urban mobilization arm began to question the viability of the GPP. In the view of the young orthodox Marxist intellectuals, such as Jaime Wheelock, economic development had turned Nicaragua into a nation of factory workers and wage-earning farm laborers.¹⁶ Writing off the peasantry as a thing of the past, the Proletarian Tendency (TP) proposed to build a Leninist working-class party and to organize unions in the cities and commercial farms. In theory, the TP subscribed to the FSLN's traditional commitment to violence. The rural guerrilla strategy was rejected in favor of self-defense and urban commando actions by armed union members. This military strategy was rather similar to the Trotskyist idea of armed unions preparing for a general strike and an immediate transition to socialism. In practice, however, TP leaders believed that the struggle would be so prolonged that they virtually abandoned military action altogether.

Because Wheelock and the TP had forsaken violence and the mountains, traditional foundation principles of the FSLN, they were purged by the GPP-dominated National Directorate in October 1975. While the TP did succeed in organizing some urban cells, its ranks remained small and were of little military consequence.

The Insurrectional Strategy

Circa 1975, Humberto Ortega, a junior member of the FSLN's National Directorate living in exile, came to the same conclusion that the prolonged popular war idea was not going to work. During the GPP-TP debate about armed rural struggle versus urban mass organizing, Ortega attempted to integrate both approaches into a new strategic concept of insurrectionalism. Where both Wheelock's *Proletarios* and the GPP under Borge and Ruíz felt that the low level of revolutionary consciousness among the people and the threat of U.S.

The Emergence of the Urban Insurrection

On 10 January 1978, the tense political situation exploded when someone assassinated Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the popular editor of the opposition newspaper *La Prensa* and leader of a reformist political movement. Spontaneous riots followed in several cities, while the business community organized a general strike demanding Somoza's resignation. The *Terceristas* joined the turmoil in early February with attacks in Granada, Rivas, Corinto, and Santa Clara. In each case, the Sandinistas inflicted a few casualties and successfully withdrew. Then, on 21 February, suddenly the urban insurrection that Ortega had been talking about became a reality when Monimbó (the Indian district of Masaya) rose in revolt. Armed with hunting rifles, shotguns, pistols, and homemade explosives, the local population held out behind makeshift barricade lines for a week before being overrun by the Guard. Although the FSLN tried to infiltrate guerrillas into the city after the insurrection began, the Monimbó revolt was an indigenously organized response to Guard attacks on earlier demonstrations.

In Ortega's view, the Monimbó incident had been a premature revolt lacking vanguard direction (i.e., FSLN control). Its isolation had allowed the Guard to concentrate against it. Of much greater importance, however, was its demonstration effect. After Monimbó, the *Terceristas* shifted their military strategy away from what had been conceived

more in terms of [the urban population] supporting the guerrillas, so that the guerrillas as such could defeat the National Guard. This isn't what actually happened. What happened was that it was the guerrillas who provided the support for the masses so that they could defeat the enemy by means of insurrection.²⁹

The operational columns were temporarily disbanded so that the cadres could start organizing militias in the cities. Guerrilla activity declined as the focus shifted to unarmed strikes and rioting by labor and student groups coor-

inated by the FSLN's United People's Movement (MPU).

In August, the *Terceristas* decided to stage a spectacular hostage-taking in order to preempt a general strike planned by the democratic Broad Opposition Front (FAO) and to head off a possible National Guard coup aimed at installing a civilian-military regime in power that might "put a damper on the revolutionary struggle."³⁰ Twenty-five *Tercerista* commandos led by Edén Pastora seized the entire Nicaraguan congress. Somoza gave in to their demands for money, release of prisoners (including GPP chief Tomás Borge), and the broadcast of the FSLN's call for general insurrection.

A few days later, armed youths, joined by a few GPP cadres, took over the highland city of Matagalpa. Like Monimbó, the Matagalpa revolt was largely a spontaneous affair of barricades and small arms pitted against the heavily equipped, but poorly motivated National Guard. After almost a week of skirmishing and aerial bombardment, a final assault by armor-backed units of the Basic Infantry Training School (EEBI) finally dispersed the 400 lightly armed teenagers that constituted the resistance. At first, the ill-prepared *Terceristas* hesitated until Ortega decided that the FSLN had to take the lead to establish its hold on the insurrection. The plan was to disperse the Guard's forces by hitting everywhere at once.

On 9 September, 150 *Tercerista* cadres attacked Guard posts in Managua, Masaya, León, Chinandega, and Estelí. Large numbers of semiarmed civilians joined the revolt and put the Guard garrisons of the latter four cities under siege. Somoza responded by concentrating his mobile EEBI troops against each city in turn. On 12 September, a cross-border invasion by 150 fighters of the Southern Front under Pastora tried to relieve the pressure but was repulsed. By the twentieth, all four rebel cities had been subdued at the cost of several thousand, mostly civilian casualties.

The September Insurrection of 1978 demonstrated the soundness of Humberto Ortega's

theory of active accumulation of forces. Although, by retaining the initiative, the Guard was able to defeat the urban militias piecemeal, the Sandinistas made gains that would have a major impact on the eventual outcome of the war. The FSLN emerged from the September battles with substantial increases in combat experience, urban mobilization skills, recruits, and captured equipment. Furthermore, the arbitrary postrebellion massacres of urban youths by the Guard brought the level of state repression to the point of counterproductivity. Where once the death of a Sandinista sympathizer might have frightened others into submission, the revolutionary climate in Nicaragua had matured to the point that one boy's death was likely to convince his friends and relatives that they had no alternative to joining the armed opposition. On the international front, the outbreak of full-scale civil war in the cities convinced most observers that the Somoza regime was politically, if not yet militarily, finished.

While the United States tried unsuccessfully to mediate a compromise solution, the Sandinistas prepared for an all-out final offensive based on the proven willingness of the Nicaraguan people to take up arms against the regime. In November 1978, the *Terceristas* resumed rural combat operations in the northern highlands and along the Costa Rican border. In a letter to Northern Front Commander Francisco Rivera, Humberto Ortega outlined a partisan war strategy designed to keep pressure on the regime while the urban resistance was being reorganized.³¹ The Northern Front's mission was to wear down and disperse the government's forces with small-scale attacks and ambushes. The main tactical objective of these operations, in keeping with the active accumulation of forces doctrine, was to obtain weapons and ammunition while providing recruits training under fire. Ortega directed the Northern Front to operate in the Ocotol Valley and the Estelí Plateau, where protective topography and dense population allowed the for-

mation of large columns. The guerrillas' usefulness lay in their ability to support uprisings in the population centers. Ortega distinguished this partisan style of rural war from the self-contained people's war attempts to organize liberated zones among isolated peasants. The GPP cadres were wasting their time "far from Nicaragua's present political and military problems," Ortega wrote, because off in the mountains they could "only combat the mosquitoes and the hardships there."³²

Between March and May 1979, Francisco Rivera and German Pomares roamed the north with columns several hundred strong, briefly occupying El Jicaró, Estelí, and Jinotega in an effort to draw the Guard away from the central urban centers. However, a similar attempt to divert some of the 3000 Guardsmen away from the Costa Rican border failed when a 140-person column was wiped out in the Nueva Guinea region of southeast Nicaragua. By themselves, the rural columns were inadequate to win the war, but they made a valuable contribution to the coming decisive campaign by increasing the FSLN's fighting strength and keeping the Guard from concentrating on other threats.

The Final Offensive

In May-July 1979, the Sandinistas finally succeeded in deploying all of their resources to bring about a military decision. First, the FAO and the MPU launched an open-ended general strike to weaken the regime's economic base. Second, the FSLN led popular uprisings in the six largest cities, where the militias besieged the local garrisons, disrupted the Guard's supply system, and impeded the movement of government reserve forces by blocking the main transportation routes. Third, partisan operations by the Northern and Western fronts inhibited the Guard's freedom of movement and consolidated Sandinista control over the northern countryside. Finally, the conventional military forces of the FSLN's Southern Front brought the regime's elite EEBI troops to battle

on the Costa Rican frontier, preventing them from acting as a mobile strike force.

Each element of the Final Offensive had occurred before but had failed to bring about the defeat of the government's forces. The missing element of coordination was provided in March 1979 with the reunification of the FSLN and the establishment of Radio Sandino in Costa Rica. Under Cuban pressure, the Prolonged Popular War and Proletarian tendencies finally agreed to unite with the *Terceristas* behind the insurrectional strategy, thus ending the infighting that had divided the FSLN's resources since 1975. Humberto Ortega continued in his role as de facto commander in chief of the Sandinista Army. Radio broadcasts allowed Ortega's headquarters in Costa Rica to mount nationwide operations and respond to developments instead of planning a campaign destined to fail as the initiatives passed to the Guard.

The major remaining problem was the lack of firepower. By late spring, the Southern Front began to overcome this weakness with the arrival of light artillery to supplement its stocks of assault rifles. Supplies from Venezuela and increasingly from Cuba were funneled through Panama into the Costa Rican base area.³³ Costa Rican tolerance of the FSLN presence was due mainly to the moderate image that the *Terceristas* had cultivated through their alliance with the democratic opposition and armed social democrats such as Pastora.

The strategic goal of the Final Offensive was the division of the enemy's forces. Urban insurrection was the crucial element because the FSLN could never hope to achieve simple superiority in men and firepower over the National Guard. As Ortega described it,

the mass movement did not allow the enemy to concentrate all its military force against the columns, and at the same time the columns' operations forced the enemy to go out in search of them. This, in turn, made the mass struggle in the cities a little easier.³⁴

The mobilized population was a military asset

that could disperse the 14,000 National Guardsmen and restrict their mobility to the point where the Sandinista Army could meet them on equal terms. The Guard would be unable to concentrate on one threat without letting the others get out of hand.

The campaign opened on 29 May when Edén Pastora and 350 fighters of the Southern Front crossed the Costa Rican border at El Naranjo. After eleven days of fighting, the rebels withdrew to reorganize. On 15 June, Pastora resumed the offensive, provoking a bloody positional war along the Panamerican Highway. His 1500 well-armed combatants were never able to break through but succeeded in tying down more than 2000 of the regime's best troops. Meanwhile, on 3 June, the northwestern city of León, backed by 180 cadres of the Western Front under Dora María Téllez and Leticia Herrera, led the wave of urban uprisings that soon included Matagalpa, Masaya, Diriamba, and Estelí. Although heavy street fighting continued in most cities for several weeks, by mid-June many of the Guard units had been reduced to static defense of their barracks.

The war came to the capital on 9 June, when the Internal Front of Managua under Carlos Nuñez and Joaquín Cuadra organized a civilian insurrection in the poor districts that surrounded the sprawling city.³⁵ For Somoza, the pacification of Managua took top priority because of the rebels' control of the road to the airport and the accessibility of the area to foreign journalists. For eighteen days, 1200 militia members, backed by 300 FSLN regulars, withstood aerial bombardment and sporadic Guard ground attacks until a lack of ammunition forced the Internal Front to evacuate the city and retreat to Masaya on 27 June. For a short while after the clearing of Managua, Somoza held the initiative, but having already secretly agreed in principle to U.S. demands for his resignation, he failed to exploit his temporary advantage.

Meanwhile, 300 veterans of the Internal Front, reorganized as the Mobile Battalion,

scored a major victory by seizing control of the central Department of Carazo and routing Guard garrisons in Jinotepe, San Marcos, and Masatepe. By 6 July, the Mobile Battalion had cut road communications between Managua and the Guard forces fighting the Southern Front. The next day, the last Guard stronghold in León fell, and preparations began there to set up a provisional revolutionary government. The Guard made a halfhearted attempt on 10 July to retake the road junction at Sebaco—the necessary first step to any move to relieve the beleaguered garrisons of Estelí and Matagalpa—but was repulsed. The last Guard position in Estelí fell on 16 July, and the Guard fort outside Matagalpa was evacuated the following day. On the seventeenth, the Mobile Battalion began its attack on Granada. Only Managua, the northern hill town of Jinotega, and the southern city of Rivas remained in Somoquista hands.

After 10 July, the only questions remaining were whether the Sandinistas would have to mount an assault on Managua and whether the Guard, particularly the elite troops facing the Southern Front, would maintain an institutional existence. However, when Somoza finally quit Nicaragua on 17 July, his army disintegrated on its own. On the following day, Guardsmen dropped their weapons, discarded their uniforms, and abandoned their remaining strongholds. Even the EEBI troops rushed in mass to flee the country via the port of San Juan del Sur. On 19 July, Sandinista units entered Managua unopposed.

Lessons from the Nicaraguan Revolutionary War

The fundamental military objective of an insurgent force is to destroy the ruling regime. In a revolutionary situation, the relationship between war and politics often goes beyond the Clausewitzian concept of war as an extension of politics to the point that the military and the political are nearly indistinguishable. Never-

theless, the final overthrow of the Nicaraguan government in the summer of 1979 was essentially a military accomplishment made possible by the FSLN's insurrectional political-military strategy. The Sandinistas opted for the armed road to power in the early 1960s because armed seizure of the state offered the prospect of absolute political power of the sort necessary to the accomplishment of their radical ideological objectives. It was not until 1978, however, that a significant number of Nicaraguans came to concur with the FSLN's call for revolt, if not its ultimate ideological objectives. Once popular support was forthcoming, the FSLN was able to organize and lead an uprising from below that defeated the state's security apparatus in open battle. Only after rebel forces had won control of most of the country and immobilized the Guard did political and diplomatic efforts to remove Somoza succeed.

The problem in achieving revolution through force of arms is how to acquire the means to challenge the regime. The debate on this point within Latin American leftist circles has revolved around whether the focus should be on the countryside or the cities and whether the first priority should be to organize the masses or to build up the military strength of the vanguard. For decades, the traditional Communist Party strategy for revolution had been to infiltrate urban trade unions and wait for an opportunity to expand one's influence over the state as the leftists did in Chile as part of Allende's 1970-73 Popular Unity coalition. In Chile, however, the left failed to establish the military dominance necessary to keep power. In the FSLN experience, the tactics of the Proletarian Tendency represented a return to traditional nonmilitary organizing in the cities, with the added disadvantage that, unlike the Communists, the TP was hostile toward alliances with democratic groups.

The *foco* theory rejected the Communists' urban popular front strategy in favor of building a military vanguard in isolated rural areas to demonstrate quickly, through moral as

much as military force, the incapacity of the regime's forces. To the extent that the *foco* theory had any validity at all, it was in a situation such as the Cuba of 1958, where a corrupt government's political collapse created a temporary vacuum in which a small armed band could pick up power rather than having to seize it. When the *foco* alternative was tried against stronger regimes during the 1960s in Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, it invariably resulted in military disaster. In the late 1960s and 1970s, urban terrorist organizations (such as the Uruguayan *Tupamaros* and the Argentine *Montoneros*) tried to transfer the militarist voluntarism of *foquismo* to the urban environment, with similarly unfortunate consequences for the isolated cadres. The Sandinistas made successful use of urban commando tactics—as in the 1974 Christmas Party kidnapping and the 1978 Palace Raid—but never made the mistake of looking on terrorism as a strategy for victory.

The people's war doctrine shifted emphasis to a mobilization of the rural population, the transformation of peasants into a guerrilla army, and the slow strangulation of the regime's urban base. During the 1970s, people's war became established as a viable strategy for guerrilla survival (though not necessarily as a means of seizing power) in Guatemala by the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and in El Salvador by Salvador Cayetano Carpio's Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL). In Nicaragua, however, the Prolonged Popular War faction of the FSLN was never able to build enough of a peasant social base to emerge as a serious threat.

The insurrectional strategy combined *foquista* direct military action and the people's war's conception of the masses as a military asset with traditional Communism's readiness to seek tactical alliances and identification of the city as the key to winning power. In a military sense, the triumph of the Nicaraguan Revolution was based on the following four principles.

First, Humberto Ortega and the *Tercerista* faction of the FSLN developed a war-winning strategy through what revolutionaries call the unification of theory and practice—gaining knowledge through action. The Sandinistas see themselves as agents ordained by history to construct a collectivist society and create a "New Nicaraguan Man." This determinist mentality easily leads, as it did during the era of GPP dominance, to dogmatic approaches to problem-solving. The unity of theory and practice provides a way for revolutionaries to exercise what might seem to be pragmatic flexibility while preserving their ideological vision. It allows them to maintain contact with reality and to learn from their mistakes without weakening their faith in the cause. The insurrectional strategy rejected the dogmas on the dangers of popular alliances and the need to concentrate on the countryside, without compromising the long-term goal of authoritarian social transformation. The *Terceristas* were thus able to react to Nicaragua's political dynamics and mold their tactics to the situation.

Second, the *Terceristas* were able to mobilize broad popular support and translate it into a military asset. They understood the truth of the Maoist dictum

Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.³⁶

The *Terceristas* were able to tap real sources of alienation in Nicaraguan society and offer a role in the broad-front alliance for the many Nicaraguans who had no use for the FSLN's Marxist-Leninist ideology. By catering to popular aspirations, the *Terceristas* achieved the mass participation that tipped the military balance. They had to focus on the cities because that was where Nicaragua's alienated population was. In the isolation of the countryside, almost any guerrilla force can survive by substituting terror for popular appeal. But an urban insurrection that turns the masses into a

military force is impossible without exploitable conditions of unrest. Extensive popular support based on a false democratic program, however, can present an obstacle to the realization of narrow ideological goals. The Sandinistas solved the problem through a postwar monopoly on military and police power that allowed them to carry out their version of the revolution "independent of the support of those who participated in the movement that opposed the established order."³⁷

Third, the *Terceristas* used the dynamic of the war itself as a source of military power. What Ortega described as the active accumulation of forces was the application of the principle of the unity of theory and practice to the problems of mobilization and logistics. FSLN actions provoked government repression, which, in turn, generated support and recruits for the FSLN. With aggressive small-scale attacks on the Guard, the guerrillas captured ammunition and provided training for new recruits. Strategic offensives gave the FSLN high-command experience in planning and in coordinating execution.

Fourth, during the Final Offensive, the FSLN overcame its conventional military inferiority by dividing the enemy's forces through combined operations. Urban militias, rural partisans, and cross-border incursions mutually supported one another by forcing the Guard to deal with numerous threats simultaneously. Without the ability to concentrate his forces, Somoza could not retain control of the country.

As often happens with successful revolutionary enterprises, the Sandinista victory was hailed as a new model for the seizure of power. For a short time, insurrectionalism stood on the pedestal previously occupied in Latin America by the *foquismo* of Ché, the people's war of Mao, and the electoral road of Allende. *Foquismo* died in 1967 with Guevara in the Bolivian jungle. The electoral road to social-

ism hit a dead end in the Santiago football stadium in 1973. Insurrectionalism as a panacea was shattered by the mass apathy displayed by the people of El Salvador in response to appeals by the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) to join their "final offensive" in January 1981 and by the large turnouts for the series of Salvadoran elections beginning in March 1982. Dissatisfied as they may have been with the status quo, most Salvadorans were not prepared to take up arms to support the FMLN alternative.

As for the Prolonged Popular War, it continues today in the northern borderlands of El Salvador, in the Indian highlands of Guatemala, and ironically in the mountains and jungles of northern and eastern Nicaragua, where the *contra* armies of the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN), the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), and Miskito Indian groups have been able to mobilize far greater numbers of peasants against Sandinista rule than the GPP was ever able to rouse against Somoza.

RURAL insurgency is most likely to plague the region for years to come. Even so, today's Central American guerrillas still face the old dilemma of the GPP—the mountains may offer survival and mystique, but the objective of the insurgency is in the city. In order to win control of the state, the guerrillas must eventually convince a significant part of the urban population that the uncertainties of revolution are preferable to the trials of the status quo. As long as a government can hold the passive support of the cities and keep the rebels on the run in the hills, it need not fear military defeat. However, as long as the guerrillas continue to exist, they offer a potential catalyst that can turn an emerging wave of urban discontent into a successful revolution.

Gaborone, Botswana

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SANDINO AGAINST THE MARINES

*the development of air power for
conducting counterinsurgency
operations in Central America*

CAPTAIN KENNETH A. JENNINGS

ALTHOUGH Project Warrior studies often concentrate on the role of Army Air Corps, the U.S. Marine occupation of Nicaragua during the late 1920s and early 1930s made significant contributions to the development of air power. After Marine Corps units had occupied Nicaragua for more than a decade and were withdrawn in 1925, U.S. adventurers flew in the Nicaraguan Civil War in 1926, and Marine aviators participated in the counterinsurgency campaign against Augusto Sandino when Marines were redeployed to the troubled nation.

As one examines Marine air activities and the legacy of ironies that the Marines left behind when they finally departed in 1933, two important lessons emerge from the Nicaraguan counterinsurgency experience: air power should be used with sufficient ground forces and a comprehensive effort to "win the hearts and minds" of the people, and air power must be used selectively to avoid generating support for the insurgents. These lessons remain applicable to today's Central American insurgencies.

1926-27: Free-Lancing in the Liberal-Conservative Civil War

The first major use of the airplane as an instrument of war in Central America took place during the mid-1920s in Nicaragua as a result of internal political strife. The roots of this conflict went back to the 1800s when Liberal and Conservative Party factions engaged in civil wars and rebellions against each other.



In response to this turmoil, the United States sent in the Marines to protect its political and economic interests. The longest period of occupation lasted from 1912 until 1925 and involved as many as 2700 Marines.¹

When the Marines left in 1925, the United States helped to establish a Nicaraguan constabulary (under a retired U.S. Army major) in an attempt to promote stability. The United States provided arms to the constabulary and hoped that it would remain a nonpartisan military force serving the coalition government agreed on by the Liberals and Conservatives. Soon the Conservatives seized power, however, and the constabulary became an instrument for the Conservatives. The Liberals resorted to arms in 1926 to oppose the Conservatives and obtained support from Mexico.²

Former U.S. aviators received commissions in the Nicaraguan Military Air Service and started flying a variety of missions in support of the Conservative forces, including seaborne interdiction missions against Mexican gun-running vessels. Their best-remembered air operation took place in February 1927 in Chinandega, located about sixty miles northwest of the capital of Managua. The pilots bombed Liberal positions to support a Conservative attack to regain possession of the city. When the Conservatives recaptured the city, more than ten blocks of the town had been destroyed by a fire. The pilots were criticized for setting off the blaze with their bombs, but the fire had probably been started by the Liberal forces.³

These early pilots were often forced to improvise. Because there were no bombs in Managua for the Chinandega operation, the pilots made three homemade devices. The four-foot-long, eighteen-pound bombs consisted of "dynamite and percussion caps set in containers and weighted with metal."⁴ In addition to this type of homemade bomb, the pilots used assorted kinds of bombs for other operations, including shrapnel shells and homemade incendiary bombs made out of noxious-smelling ant poison, iron balls, and explosive powder.

According to one of the pilots, "it looks bad and falls awry but makes lots of noise, dust, and odors when it goes off."⁵

These early air operations demonstrated that the airplane was an especially valuable asset in Nicaragua for conducting reconnaissance, sending messages, and disrupting enemy concentrations through air support and interdiction operations. The effectiveness of the airplane was further demonstrated by the U.S. Marines when they returned for their second occupation in 1927.

U.S. Marines in Nicaragua, 1927-33: The Second Time Around

The Marines increased their troop strength in Nicaragua throughout January 1927; by late February, there were more than 5400 Marines occupying all the principal cities.⁶ While the Marines deployed throughout Nicaragua and the United States provided massive aid to the Conservative government and Nicaraguan National Guard, the United States did not intend to enter the fighting directly. In May 1927, the United States negotiated an end to the hostilities, reportedly threatening the Liberals that the Marines would take to the field against them if the Liberals did not come to terms.⁷

Although this agreement ended the Liberal-Conservative conflict, one of the Liberal leaders, Augusto Sandino, felt that the Liberals had sold out to the Americans. He vowed to continue to fight against the U.S. occupation. On 16 July 1927, Sandino and his forces attacked the Marine garrison at Ocotal.

the battle for Ocotal: first dive bombing in history


Sandino's attack against Ocotal in mid-July would no doubt have been successful, were it not for Marine air power. The Marines had started organizing their air assets in February 1927 when they received their first aircraft under the command of Major Ross Rowell. Six

two-seater de Havilland biplanes arrived, as well as four two-seater scouting planes. The de Havillands could carry twenty-five-pound bombs and were equipped with both a forward fixed machine gun fired by the pilot and a rear swivel machine gun controlled by the observer.⁸

Ocotal, approximately 110 miles north of

In the struggle against Sandino and his rebels, air power played an important, if inconclusive role. Throughout the war, Marine planes flew from each of the fields indicated in the map below.

Managua, was defended by forty-one Marines and forty-eight Nicaraguan National Guardsmen when Sandino's attack began at 0115 on 16 July. A Marine sentry discovered the attack, as approximately 300 of Sandino's men in three columns were closing in on the Marine's position under the cover of darkness. The Marines beat back several attacks during the night and refused several summons by Sandino to surrender during the morning. By mid-morning, two Marine reconnaissance planes arrived on their daily patrol and read an aerial panel mes-



sage laid out by the Ocotol garrison requesting help. One pilot strafed the rebel positions, while the other landed briefly outside of town to get an assessment of the situation from a local peasant.⁹

The pilots departed for Managua to obtain reinforcements, and the first major Marine air operation in Nicaragua began when five de Havilland bombers under the command of Major Rowell arrived at 1435 hours.¹⁰ After conducting reconnaissance flights to locate the concentrations of Sandino's forces, "one after the other, the planes peeled out of formations at 1500 feet, fixed machine guns blazing as they dived to 300 feet, where they dropped their bombs."¹¹ The observers used the rear swivel machine guns to shoot additional Sandinistas as the planes climbed back up to altitude.¹² A ground observer of the air attack stated that it "was as if hell broke loose. Quick explosions, then a heavy thundering one, sometimes indescribable."¹³ During the forty-five-minute aerial attack, the aircraft strafed the rebels with 4000 rounds of ammunition and dropped twenty-seven bombs, killing more than 100 of Sandino's men.¹⁴

Most of the rebels fled from the bombing attack, but a small number continued to fight. The ground battle continued until after 1700 hours. When it was over, Sandino had lost as many as 300 of his estimated 400-500 men who participated in the battle; Marine and Guard losses were placed at one dead and five wounded.¹⁵

The battle at Ocotol proved significant for air power by introducing several innovations to air warfare. As Neill Macaulay, a historian and expert on Sandino, observes, the Marine aviators conducted "the first organized dive-bombing attack in history—long before the Nazi Luftwaffe was popularly credited with the 'innovation'."¹⁶ Another authority on the Marine campaign, Lejeune Cummins, adds that the battle marked "the first time in military annals that the relief of a beleaguered town was effected through the air."¹⁷

The battle at Ocotol made a definite impres-

sion on Sandino also. Before the battle, he reportedly belittled the airplanes and bombs and was quoted in the *New York Times* as telling his men that "they only made noise."¹⁸ Once the air attack began, his followers were concentrated in groups, making them better targets for the Marine pilots. Richard Millett, a historian on Central America, states that Sandino "admittedly, had completely omitted from his pre-battle calculations" the activity of the Marine aircraft.¹⁹ The defeat was costly, but Sandino learned from his mistakes; after Ocotol, Sandino "concentrated on ambushes and sudden raids instead of open attacks on a strong and fortified enemy."²⁰

the siege of El Chipote: broadening the scope of air operations

As demonstrated at Ocotol, the airplanes conducted air support operations for the ground forces and "performed the functions of artillery with their concentrated bomb attacks."²¹ In November 1927, the concept of air operations broadened from just supporting ground forces to independent air actions. On 23 November, Marine aircraft located Sandino's mountain headquarters of El Chipote in northern Nicaragua and started bombing it almost daily. In January, the bombing campaign became more effective when the de Havilland planes were replaced with new Vought Corsairs and Curtiss Falcons having greater bomb-carrying capabilities.²² The bombing campaign against El Chipote reached the conclusive stage on 14 January 1928 when Major Rowell led an air attack with four of the new two-seater Vought Corsair planes. Each plane was armed with machine guns, and together they bombed El Chipote with eighteen seventeen-pound and four fifty-pound demolition bombs.²³ The aviators, as Major Rowell stated in an interview, "finished the party up with [eighteen] infantry [white phosphorous] hand grenades."²⁴

This operation proved to be significant in the development of air power. *Jane's All the*

World's Aircraft, acknowledged for its expertise on military affairs, stated in its 1928 edition that the independent air attack against El Chipote was believed to be "the first aeroplane attack, unsupported by ground troops, ever made against a fortified position."²⁵ While it succeeded in driving Sandino and his force of 1000 to 1500 combatants out of the base, they escaped before U.S. ground forces could engage them.²⁶

*expanding air power:
observation and reconnaissance missions*

By 1928, the Marine aircraft inventory included twelve Falcon and Corsair observation-bombers, as well as seven Loening amphibian observation-bombers. Five trimotor Fokker transports also supported Marine operations. All of these were based at Managua initially, but several of the Loenings were later transferred to an airfield at Puerto Cabezas on the east coast.²⁷

This aircraft inventory played several vital roles throughout the occupation. In addition to ground-attack operations, the pilots also conducted observation, communication, and transportation missions. Observation, or aerial reconnaissance, missions met with some difficulty as a result of the terrain and Sandino's guerrilla tactics. Many of the Marine operations were conducted in the northern Department of Nueva Segovia, along the Honduran border. Cover and concealment provided opportunities for Sandino's forces to move or set up ambushes without being noticed from the air. A *New York Times* correspondent flew over the area in 1928 and described the terrain as "thickly wooded mountains . . . tortured into a patternless wilderness of peaks, ridges, and rock-strewn cliffs. . . . Its infrequent trails are almost invisible from the air."²⁸

Sandino's new tactics added to the terrain problems for those conducting observation missions. Bernard Nalty, author of the U.S. Marine Corps historical study on the Nicaraguan campaign, points out that "Sandino's

men were adept at camouflage. Seldom did they move in large groups, and, if at all possible, they marched at night."²⁹ Carleton Beals, a correspondent visiting Sandino's forces in March 1928, made similar comments. Beals noticed that Sandino's forces traveled in the early morning before the planes made their patrols or late in the afternoon/evenings after the planes returned to base. Sandino's troops learned the habit patterns of the Marine aerial reconnaissance flights and took advantage of them; when his forces moved at other times during the day, they used the jungles for concealment.³⁰

The Marine aviators refined their techniques of reconnaissance to achieve the best possible results. Usually flying patrols with two planes, the pilots would "throttle their engines and glide in over suspicious places from behind hills or mountains, flying low enough to look into windows and doors." The Marines looked for signs of Sandino's forces, "taking into account the proportion of men to women visible, the amount of wash on clotheslines, the number of animals present, and the general bearing of the people."³¹

Air observation missions provided essential support for both ground patrols and isolated outposts. Marine aircraft could sometimes detect ambushes for ground patrols, but the planes also alerted the Sandinistas to the possibility of Marine patrols in the area. In addition, the planes flew over every outpost almost daily. Since Sandino's forces would not expose themselves to air attack in a prolonged siege of one of these outposts, if "a garrison could hold out for twenty-four hours, it was usually safe."³²

Combat aerial patrols for supply trains made up of bull carts also played an important role. For example, in February 1928 officials in Ocotal sent supply trains (one consisting of 185 ox carts) to support Marine operations farther to the north in Nueva Segovia. The airplanes accompanied them until nightfall to watch out for ambushes after the trains cleared the outskirts of the city everyday.³³

At times, these patrols were dangerous. On 8 October 1927, two planes were patrolling near Quilali when they discovered and attacked one of Sandino's pack trains. The rebels returned fire with rifles and hit one of the planes. It crashed, but the pilot and gunner survived and the other plane dropped them a map and notified several garrisons to send help. Search parties looked for the two men, but they were too late. Sandinista forces had captured and shot the aviators the same day of the crash. The rebels had also hanged the body of the pilot from a tree and photographed it; the picture was later published in Mexican and Honduran newspapers.³⁴

communication missions: "on the fly"

The airplanes also played an important role in facilitating communication between dispersed units and headquarters. During the early phases of the occupation, when an aircraft was unable to land, air-to-ground communication usually consisted of messages that pilots dropped from their airplanes. Ground-to-air communication involved several methods. White cloth signal panels laid out on the ground indicated the status of the unit or requests for supplies, air support, or medical assistance. Hand semaphore and catching messages "on the fly" were also used. "On the fly" meant that an airplane with a line suspended from its fuselage would pick up a message that was suspended in a pouch on a wire or string between two poles. Later in the occupation, both the amphibian and transport planes used radios, but radios were not used in the observation-bombers because of their unreliability.³⁵

*transportation missions:
the first air ambulance and "autogiro" tests*

Aviation made the difference in transportation as well. The rough terrain, dense brush, and possibility of ambush made transportation and supply difficult in "this impenetrable jungle

where bull carts, the normal means of transportation, often make three to six miles a day."³⁶ Initially, the pilots were unable to provide much help in transport missions because their de Havillands were not big enough. In December 1927, however, they received a trimotor Fokker transport that was capable of carrying either two thousand pounds of cargo or eight fully equipped soldiers. By August 1928, the Marines were flying five Fokkers on supply and transport missions. According to Bernard Nalty, "everything from cigarettes to mules was delivered by air; in fact, some remote outposts received payrolls by airdrop."³⁷

Another "first" in aviation occurred in the field of airborne transportation in January 1928. Never before had a pilot used his aircraft as an air ambulance in combat. First Lieutenant Christian Schilt became one of the aviation heroes of the Nicaraguan campaign and was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his air evacuation of wounded men under fire from a makeshift airfield in Quilali. After an attack by Sandino's forces, the Marine commander at Quilali requested an airplane to evacuate the wounded. Quilali had no airfield, however, so the necessary tools had to be air-dropped in. In three days, the Marines constructed a landing field 200 yards long in Quilali by cutting down trees and burning some of the Nicaraguan residents' houses.³⁸

Between 6 and 8 January, Lieutenant Schilt made ten trips in a Vought Corsair to bring in medicine and supplies and pick up the wounded, while another plane acted as an escort, flying figure eights to suppress rebel fire. The landings were risky because Schilt's plane had been reequipped with wheels from a de Havilland and had no brakes. Each time the plane landed, the Marines ran forward to seize the wings and slow the plane down with their weight to prevent it from crashing off the runway. For takeoffs, the Marines would hold the plane in place until Schilt reached full throttle and then let go, enabling him to achieve short takeoffs.³⁹

By 1931, the Nicaraguan National Guard had replaced the Marines throughout the country, but the Guard still relied on Marine aviation for supplies and transporting troops, especially when Sandino intensified his operations. Entire units were occasionally moved by air. In 1931, for example, the entire cadet corps of the Nicaraguan Military Academy was airlifted from Managua to reinforce Estelí.⁴⁰

A basic problem for aerial transportation in Nicaragua was that adequate landing strips were not always available where they were needed. Recognizing this problem, the Marines started field-testing the predecessor to the helicopter in Managua in 1932. The "autogiro" had short wings and a forward propeller in addition to the rotor. On takeoff, the pilot would switch the engine from the rotor to the forward propeller after the rotor was spinning. While the takeoff was not vertical, it used much less runway than conventional aircraft. When the pilot disengaged the forward propeller, the rotor would autorotate and the pilot would land. The Marines were disappointed, however, because the aircraft could carry only two people and fifty pounds of cargo efficiently.⁴¹

*special operations missions:
long-range patrols and leaflets*

The role of aviation in assisting transportation and supply overlapped into what can be called special operations missions. In 1928, First Lieutenant Merritt Edson conducted several long-range reconnaissance ground patrols from the east coast into central Nicaragua. His objective was to plan for an operation to catch Sandino's forces in a pincers movement. Edson and his patrol operated for several months behind enemy lines, with planes occasionally bringing him reinforcements, supplies, and the mail from their new east coast air base at Puerto Cabezas. Initially, some of Major Rowell's Corsairs operated from this base. In May, however, five amphibian planes arrived on station. Amphibian planes were preferable be-

cause sudden rain squalls were common in the northeast and these planes could land on one of the lakes or rivers in the region to ride out the storms. They could also use these waterways to evacuate the "sitting wounded."⁴²

In another aspect of special operations, the Marines conducted leaflet drops to influence the will of the Sandinistas. In November 1928, Marine aircraft dropped thousands of leaflets over the area of Sandino's headquarters. Some leaflets carried the message that preparations were under way to finish off the Sandinistas, while others were signed by Sandino's father and asked Sandino to go see his sick mother before she died.⁴³

End of the Occupation: A Legacy of Ironies

When the last contingent of Marine aviators left Nicaragua in January 1933, they left behind a legacy of ironies about the Marine occupation. The Marines had supervised the 1932 presidential election and the 1 January 1933 inauguration of Liberal President Juan Sacasa. Sacasa had been the popularly elected vice-president in the 1926 elections, whose opposition to the Conservative takeover of the government had sparked the civil war that provoked the second U.S. intervention. There is speculation that the entire civil war and Sandino's insurrection could have been avoided if the United States had supported Sacasa's efforts to prevent the Conservative takeover in 1926.⁴⁴

Another irony was the buildup of the National Guard to replace the Marines when they left, with the objective of making this military force a professional, nonpolitical institution. Since the U.S. ambassador pushed for Anastasio Somoza (who was also Sacasa's nephew) to be designated as the National Guard commander, President Sacasa appointed him as such after winning the election.⁴⁵ Somoza then subverted U.S. efforts to make the Guard nonpolitical. He developed the Guard as his power

base and, in 1936, consolidated his control over Nicaragua to begin the forty-three-year Somoza family dynasty.

The final irony is the legacy of Sandino. As Richard Millett has pointed out, after five years of fighting Sandino, the Marines left him "as great a threat in January 1933 as he had been at any previous point in his career."⁴⁶ A month after the Marines left, however, he met with Sacasa and agreed to end the insurrection. In February 1934, Sandino was killed by members of the National Guard, apparently acting under Somoza's orders.⁴⁷

Sandino's assassination and legacy served as inspiration to the new Sandinistas who fought Somoza's son and National Guard in the 1970s. The National Guard's indiscriminate use of air power against civilians increased popular support for the Sandinistas and played an important part in the July 1979 Sandinista victory. Today, the counterrevolutionary insurgents (contras) are confronting the Sandinista air and ground forces by using many of the same strategies and operating in the same areas as Sandino did.

benefits of Marine air activities: experience for World War II

What were the benefits of air power during the Nicaraguan intervention? Lejeune Cummins asserts a theme that several other observers echo: while there was a loss to U.S. military prestige in failing to catch Sandino, the armed forces received invaluable training in "such significant developments as the 'invention' of dive bombing and large-scale aerial logistical support."⁴⁸ Bernard Nalty concludes his Marine study on the same note, mentioning the importance of the Marines' gaining experience, but adding that more important ". . . was the fact that Marine aviators and infantrymen functioned smoothly as a unified team."⁴⁹ These observations, written some thirty years after the conflict, are interesting when compared to those of a correspondent writing in the *New*

York Times on 21 January 1928; he points out that, from a tactical standpoint, the operations "furnish the first practical laboratory for the development of postwar [World War I] aviation in coordination with ground troops."⁵⁰

results of Marine air power: impact on Sandino's strategy

What impact did air power have on Sandino's insurgency strategy? The airplane saved the day at Ocotol, but it also convinced Sandino to start using innovative tactics in the face of this new weapon. As a result, he initiated hit-and-run attacks, operating in small patrols, utilizing cover and concealment, and building support among the local populace.

In addition, the air attack on El Chipote demonstrated that "Sandino had learned at last the rudiments of anti-aircraft defense."⁵¹ During the El Chipote bombings, the pilots faced not only rifle and machine gun fire but also a "barrage of incendiary sky rockets," which Sandino's troops called dynamite rockets; these were probably launched from the iron pipes affixed to tripods they had reportedly been making. Realizing the folly of fighting the planes, Sandino ordered his men to gather piles of wood on his fortress so that large fires would cover their escape during the bombing.⁵² Several days after the air attack, aerial observers reported that there were no signs of life at the mountain stronghold "except two men and a mule, where formerly the place was swarming with men."⁵³ In a 1928 interview with Sandino after he escaped from El Chipote, Sandino asserted that his strategy was to sit and wait for the Marines to mobilize and come to him—and then to slip out of the trap into another part of the country.⁵⁴

Lessons Learned: Central America Today

What are the lessons to be learned about air power in the campaign against Sandino, and

how do they relate to today's counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua? The first lesson is that a combined effort of both sufficient air and ground forces, with a program designed to win the allegiance of the people, is required to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign.

Despite the fact that Sandino was still a threat, the United States reduced its ground forces during the latter stages of the occupation in an attempt to disengage from the prolonged conflict. By 1931, there was an overdependence on the Marine air assets to support the remaining U.S. and Nicaraguan ground forces. The result was a stalemate: the air assets restricted Sandino's activities, but there were not enough ground troops to defeat Sandino's insurgency. Critical of President Hoover's Nicaraguan policy, Senator Hiram Johnson from California asserted in 1931 that the United States "should pursue one of two courses: either withdraw the Marines entirely, or send enough there to do the job."⁵⁵

In addition to relying on air assets to make up for not employing sufficient ground forces, there was not enough done during the campaign to attract popular support to the Nicaraguan government. Sandino's major asset was popular support. Sandino recognized the value of good public relations early during his struggle: "The people of the countryside kept him supplied with provisions, sheltered his soldiers, and, most important of all, kept him informed of every move the Marines and Guard made." As a result, Sandino "proved to the world that a 'people's army' could resist every effort of the most modern military machine."⁵⁶ Sandino's effort of using old rifles, machetes, and even bombs made from discarded Marine sardine cans to confront U.S. machine guns and dive bombers was "one of the first modern examples of what a guerrilla army with mass popular support could do against a technologically superior army."⁵⁷

This lesson is still important, as demonstrated in the 1979 Sandinista Revolution.

Somoza's heavy emphasis on air assets, along with inadequate ground forces and few attempts to improve the legitimacy or popular appeal of his government, contributed to his downfall. Today the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are using air power to combat their insurgents, but as yet they have been unable to translate their superior firepower into a total victory. Additional ground forces and greater efforts to secure popular loyalty are required to consolidate the advantages that their air power provides them on the battlefield.

The second lesson learned from the campaign against Sandino is that air assets must be employed selectively to avoid creating popular support for the insurgents. Thomas Walker, a political scientist and authority on Nicaragua, illustrates this point: "Practices such as the aerial bombardment of 'hostile' towns and hamlets and the forced resettlement of peasant populations only intensified popular identification with the guerrilla cause."⁵⁸ George Black, an author on Nicaragua, follows Walker's line of reasoning and points out that Marine airstrikes "only served to swell Sandino's forces, by increasing peasant hostility to the U.S. presence and failing miserably in their military objectives." Black asserts that Sandino specialized in diversionary attacks to provoke useless bombing raids as "the only American response to the impotence of their ground forces, bogged down in unfamiliar territory."⁵⁹ As historian Richard Millett points out, in the final analysis, the counterinsurgency campaign against Sandino "clearly demonstrated that the *Guardia*, even with Marine air support, was hard pressed to contain, let alone destroy, Sandino's forces."⁶⁰

In recognition of the responsibility for protecting civilian populations, rules of engagement did exist as guidelines for the Marine aviators. Orders prevented the aviators from attacking groups unless they were carrying weapons, were located in the vicinity of a recent guerrilla action, or behaved suspiciously by

running for cover. Although under orders not to bomb towns, the aviators bombed and strafed houses and animals believed to be used by the Sandinistas. The "fog of war" no doubt caused some civilian casualties and created the basis for Sandinista charges of aerial atrocities. On the other hand, Major Rowell complained about the "restrictions of a political nature" that hurt the morale and efficiency of his air power forces, particularly given the fact that some towns were used as sanctuaries by the Sandinistas.⁶¹

Fifty years later, Somoza isolated himself from both domestic and international support by bombing his own cities during the Sandinista Revolution. Today's guerrillas in each country have been effective at either criticizing actual attacks against civilians or lying about them through propaganda. While the ability to distinguish between civilians and guerrillas is very difficult at times in a counterinsurgency conflict, the insurgents capitalize on excesses in the use of air power. They publicize each occurrence not only to build popular support at home for their cause but also to exploit the propaganda value abroad against their country's government.

THE U.S. Marine occupation of Nicaragua made significant contributions to the devel-

opment of air power. Marine aviators expanded the concepts of close air support and independent aerial bombardment. They refined other uses of air power by conducting reconnaissance, communication, transportation, and even special operations missions. In addition to these developments, the coordination between air and ground forces provided valuable experience prior to World War II. The Marine campaign against Sandino provided several lessons about the role of air power in counterinsurgency conflicts—lessons that are still applicable today to current and possible future turmoil in Central America. The governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua can improve their chances of defeating the insurgents if they follow these lessons and use their air power both selectively and in conjunction with an integrated ground force and popular support campaign. While these lessons cannot guarantee success, Nicaraguan history has demonstrated that refusing to follow these lessons can result in failure. The results of today's conflicts will be determined in large part by how well the lessons learned in the Nicaraguan counterinsurgency conflict more than fifty years ago are applied to today's insurgencies.

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Notes

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3. See "American Fliers Fight for Nicaragua, Two Bombing a Mexican Gun-Runner," *New York Times*, 27 August 1926, sec. 1, p. 3; "Says Chinandega Has Been Retaken," *New York Times*, 8 February 1927, sec. 1, p. 25; and Neill Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 33.

4. William S. Brooks, "Chinandega Battle as Seen from Plane," *New York Times*, 5 March 1927, sec. 1, p. 3.

5. William S. Brooks, "Bombing Liberals in Nicaraguan War," *New York Times*, 29 May 1927, sec. 1, p. 10.

6. Booth, p. 40.

7. "800 Marines Board Ships for Nicaragua," *New York Times*, 12 May 1927, sec. 1, p. 29.

8. See Bernard C. Nalty, *The United States Marines in Nicaragua*,

revised edition (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 14; "Our Marines Fired On," *New York Times*, 28 February 1927, sec. 1, p. 5; "Planes and Marines Sent to Nicaragua," *New York Times*, 17 February 1927, sec. 1, p. 6; and Macaulay, p. 80.

9. See Nalty, pp. 16-17; and Lejeune Cummins, *Quijote on a Burro: Sandino and the Marines*, subtitled *A Study in the Formulation of Foreign Policy* (Mexico, Distrito Federal: La Impresora Azteca, 1958), p. 53.

10. Nalty, p. 17.

11. Bernard Diederich, *Somoza: The Legacy of US Involvement in Central America* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981), p. 17.

12. Macaulay, p. 81.

13. Cummins, p. 54.

14. Oswald G. Villard, "Editorial Paragraphs," *The Nation*, 27 July 1927, p. 75.

15. See "Sandino in Hiding, 'Army' Deserts Him," *New York Times*, 20 July 1927, sec. 1, pp. 1-2; Richard Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S.-Created Guardia de Nacional*


- and the Somoza Family (New York: Orbis Books, 1977), p. 67; and Nalty, p. 17.
16. Macaulay, p. 81.
 17. Cummins, p. 55.
 18. "Sandino in Hiding," p. 2.
 19. Millett, p. 67.
 20. Ibid.
 21. Harold N. Denny, "Marines Push Drive in Nicaragua Wilds," *New York Times*, 21 January 1928, sec. 1, p. 3.
 22. Macaulay, pp. 96, 103.
 23. Nalty, p. 22.
 24. Russell Owen, "The Airplane Plays a Leading Part in Nicaragua," *New York Times*, 25 May 1928, sec. 9, p. 16.
 25. C. G. Grey, editor, *Jane's All the World's Aircraft of 1928* (London: Low and Martson, 1928), p. 30b, as cited in Cummins, p. 64.
 26. Owen, op. cit.
 27. Macaulay, p. 118.
 28. Denny, sec. 1, p. 1.
 29. Nalty, p. 19.
 30. Carleton Beals, "With Sandino in Nicaragua, Part V: Send the Bill to Mr. Coolidge," *The Nation*, 21 March 1928, p. 315.
 31. Macaulay, p. 117.
 32. Ibid., p. 153.
 33. Harold N. Denny, "New Marine Forces Begin Sandino Hunt," *New York Times*, 16 February 1928, sec. 1, p. 4.
 34. See Nalty, p. 19; "Marine Fliers Slain Fighting to the End," *New York Times*, 9 November 1927, sec. 1, p. 14; and Macaulay, pp. 93, 103.
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 36. Denny, "Marines Push Drive in Nicaragua Wilds," sec. 1, p. 3.
 37. See Nalty, p. 18; and Macaulay, p. 118.
 38. See Cummins, p. 62; and Harold N. Denny, "Plane Brings out Wounded Marines under Enemy Fire," *New York Times*, 8 January

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39. See Lauren D. Lyman, "Marines Use Planes as War Ambulances," *New York Times*, 15 January 1928, sec. 9, p. 9; Nalty, p. 21; and Macaulay, p. 101.
40. See Cummins, pp. 91-92; and Millett, p. 75.
41. Macaulay, pp. 227-28.
42. See Nalty, pp. 23, 24-25; Cummins, p. 72; and Macaulay, p. 124.
43. Macaulay, pp. 131-32.
44. Cummins, p. 95.
45. Booth, p. 46.
46. Millett, p. 98.
47. Booth, pp. 48, 51.
48. Cummins, p. 98.
49. Nalty, p. 34.
50. Denny, "Marines Push Drive in Nicaragua Wilds," sec. 1, p. 3.
51. Nalty, p. 22.
52. See Owen, sec. 9, p. 16; Harold N. Denny, "Sandino Directed Men from Fox Hole," *New York Times*, 10 January 1928, sec. 1, p. 33; Carleton Beals, "With Sandino in Nicaragua, Part VI: Sandino—Bandit or Patriot?" *The Nation*, 28 March 1928, p. 340; and Cummins, p. 64.
53. Harold N. Denny, "Sandino Reported Killed in Bombing by Marine Planes," *New York Times*, 19 January 1928, sec. 1, p. 1.
54. Beals, "With Sandino in Nicaragua, Part V: Send the Bill to Mr. Coolidge," p. 314.
55. "Johnson Condemns Policy on Nicaragua," *New York Times*, 30 April 1931, sec. 1, p. 3.
56. Diederich, op. cit.
57. Harry E. Vanden, "The Ideology of the Insurrection," in *Nicaragua in Revolution*, edited by Thomas W. Walker (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 45.
58. Thomas W. Walker, *Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1981), p. 22.
59. George Black, *Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua* (London: Zed Press, 1981), p. 19.
60. Millett, p. 97.
61. Macaulay, pp. 116, 228.



**military
affairs
abroad**



LA FUERZA AEREA ARGENTINA

COMODORO JOSÉ C. D'ODORICO, FAA (RET)



Aged A-1B Skyhawks, pictured at the left and below before decimation over the Malvinas, carried much of the fight to the British fleet.



ODDLY enough, the *Fuerza Aérea Argentina* (FAA)—Argentina's Air Force—is a military institution of essentially civilian origins, since the inception of the *Escuela Militar de Aviación* (Air Military School), which took place on 10 August 1912, was mainly the result of steps taken by a group of Argentine gentlemen who were fond of traveling by air.

With the enthusiastic encouragement of the engineer Jorge Alejandro Newbery (who was the son of a U.S. citizen) and the Baron Aarón de Anchorena, the Argentine Air Military School began to train pilots at a time when flying was still quite an adventure.

At that time, military aviation became a part of the *Ejército Argentino* (Argentine Army) as

one of its organic elements and remained so until 4 January 1945, when a presidential order (during the administration of General Edelmiro J. Farrell, whose Minister of Defense was General Juan D. Perón) instituted the FAA as an autonomous armed service like the Army and the Navy.

The FAA enjoyed times of great expansion, such as during the late 1940s when it had 100 Gloster Meteor Mk-4s; forty-five four-engined Avro Lincoln and Lancaster bombers; more than a hundred DL-22s training aircraft with wooden fuselages, based on an Argentine design and engine; seventeen DC-3 and six DC-4 cargo transports; thirteen Vickers Vikings; and other planes of foreign origin. The firepower that the FAA had available at that time was

quite unusual in South America, and the FAA's aircraft were some of the most modern that existed in the Western world. Later on, in the early 1950s, approximately one hundred Calquin IA-24s were added to the inventory. These two-engined attack aircraft were indigenously designed along lines similar to the British de Havilland 98 Mosquito but with radial engines.

To harass the British as they established their beachhead at San Carlos, the Argentines used Canberra Mk-62s (below) in night attacks. . . . Some IA-58A Pucará light attack planes (right) were stationed on the Malvinas. . . . The backbone of the FAA remains a handful of Israeli-built IAI Daggers (lower right).





On 9 August 1947, an Argentine jet prototype known as IA-27 Pulqui I flew for the first time—the fruit of an idea developed by a French-Argentine group headed by the engineer Emile Dewoitine and assisted by Argentine engineers Ignacio San Martín and Norberto Morcchio, who were working at the *Fábrica Militar de Aviones* (FMA) located in Córdoba. (The FMA is a manufacturing center belonging to the FAA.) Later on, on 27 June 1950, the IA-33 Pulqui II, a second Argentine jet prototype, made its maiden flight. This aircraft was the product of similar engineering teamwork, in this case led by the German engineer Kurt Tank. The Pulqui II was a completely metallic aircraft, powered by a Rolls-Royce Nene II with 2315 kg (5100 pounds) of thrust. Its wings had a 40° swept angle, and it was able to reach a maximum speed of 652 miles per hour. However, neither of these two models was ever manufactured in mass production. This omission frustrated a great hope to make the country reach a higher technological level.

Up to 1 May 1982, the FAA had carried out nothing but routine activities. It had never participated in any war against any foreign country. However, events cannot always be entirely controlled by men. Without even imagining that it would have to encounter one of the strongest military powers in the world, the FAA began, on that memorable date, its baptism of fire in defending the sacred interests of Argentina.

The Malvinas War

On 2 April 1982, Malvinas Islands were occupied by units from the three armed services of Argentina through an operation that was bloodless for the British side. The purpose of the occupation was to recover the Archipelago, seized in 1833 by the troops of a British navy ship. Throughout forty-four days of tenacious combat, the FAA carried out air operations in a manner that amazed its peers from other countries, including air forces very experienced in the art of defense.

When the decision to retake Malvinas, Georgias, and Sandwich del Sur islands was made, the FAA was organized with a Commander in Chief who headed a General Staff and five major

commands: Training Command, Air Regions Command, Material Command, Air Defense Command, and Air Operations Command. The last two commands included all of the flying units and the support units in Argentina that would participate in the combat that was to take place from 1 May through 13 June 1982.

Within the Air Defense Command were the VIII Air Wing, based at Mariano Moreno and whose Interceptor Air Group 8 had Mirage IIIEAs and IIIEBs; Air Control and Surveillance Groups 1 and 2, lodged in Merlo, equipped with mobile tridimensional radars; and the Mar del Plata Military Air Base, home of the AAA (anti-aircraft artillery) School Group 1, equipped with batteries of advanced 20- and 35-mm cannons.

The Air Operations Command had the remaining air units:

- the First Air Wing of El Palomar, whose Transport Air Group 1 had B-707-320s, F-27s, F-28s, C-130Hs, KC-130Hs and Argentine-made G-IIs in its inventory;
- the Second Air Wing at Paraná, with Bombing Air Group 2 equipped with twin-jet Canberra Mk-62s and Mk-64s, as well as Photo Reconnaissance Air Group 1, equipped with Learjet 35s and Argentine-made G-IIFs;
- the Third Air Wing, located at Reconquista, whose Air Strike Group 3 was equipped with IA-58A Pucará;
- the Fourth Air Wing, in Mendoza, with Fighter-Bomber Air Group 4, equipped with A-4C Skyhawks, F-86F Sabres, and MS-760s Paris;
- the Fifth Air Wing, at Villa Reynolds, with the Fighter-Bomber Air Group 5, equipped with A-4B Skyhawks;
- the Sixth Air Wing, at Tandil, with the Fighter-Bomber Air Group 6, equipped with IA1 Daggers;
- the Seventh Air Wing, located in Morón, whose Helicopter Air Group 7 was equipped with CH-47 Chinooks, Bell 212s and UH-1Hs, Hughes 369Ms and 500Ds, and one Sikorsky S-61; and
- the Ninth Air Wing, in Comodoro Rivadavia, with the transport Air Squadron 9, which had DHC-6s and F27s.



Many Argentine pilots earned their wings in the French Morane Saulnier 760 "Paris" advanced trainer (above). . . . Soon Argentine airmen will be training in the IA-63 Pampa (below), an indigenously designed advanced trainer.





During the South Atlantic War, Argentine Boeing 707-320s performed long-range reconnaissance missions, locating the British fleet and shadowing it soon after it entered the South Atlantic.

The FAA uses C-130Hs to keep its air base at Marambio in the Argentine Antarctic open all year round.



After the Malvinas War

After the war came to an end on 14 June 1982, a thorough analysis of the air units' performance was made. Some of the lost aircraft were replaced, and an initial internal rearrangement was carried out in order to achieve as much advantage as possible from the remaining aeronautical assets.

Presently, the Transport Air Group 1 (El Palomar) retains the same inventory that it had before the war. The Bombing Air Group 2 (Paraná) has been reduced because the two Can-

The G-II (below) is a twelve-seat transport, designed and built at the FMA.




berras shot down during the conflict were not replaced, and the Photo Reconnaissance Air Group 1 (Paraná) now has one Learjet 35A less for the same reason. In spite of a heavy attrition during wartime, the Air Strike Group 3 still flies the Pucará, although some aircraft were replaced by a new batch of the FMA-built planes. The Fighter-Bomber Air Group 4 (Mendoza) is flying Mirage IIICs, F-86Fs, and MS-760s. In the Fighter-Bomber Air Group 5 (V. Reynolds), the remaining Skyhawks (A-4Bs and Cs) have been regrouped. The Fighter-Bomber Air Group 6 (Tandil) continues with its Daggers, plus some Mirage-VPs. Air Groups 7 (Morón) and 8 (Mariano Moreno) and the Transport Air Squadron 9 (Comodoro Rivadavia) have the same aircraft as they had before the war, but the Ninth Wing has been reinforced with a strike air squadron equipped with IA-58As. After 1982, the Tenth

Air Wing, located in Rio Gallegos, was created. This unit presently has Fighter-Bomber Air Squadron 10, equipped with Mirage IIICs.

Although the FAA's old aircraft clearly need replacement, the economic state of the country has forced postponement. Recently, manufacture of the first series of sixty Argentine-designed basic-advanced trainer IA-63 Pampas has begun. Unfortunately, the many difficulties encountered to finance the effort delayed the program schedule for more than a year. Budgetary limitations also have caused a considerable re-

The FAA encourages space research. The Castor rocket, examples of which are shown below and on the facing page, has a two-stage, solid booster capable of hefting a small payload to a distance of 300 kilometers.





duction in the overall number of hours flown in the FAA. However, by locally carrying out both major overhauls and launchable weaponry manufacturing, not only is a great amount of money being saved, but new jobs have been generated.

Since the end of 1984, the FAA's Office of the Commander in Chief was restructured as the Air Force General Staff (the President of Argentina is the Commander in Chief of all of the nation's armed forces). On 1 December 1985, a wide program including organic changes was initiated. This reorganization is expected to be completed by 1988. During 1986, the Air Operations Command will be deactivated, but simultaneously the Northern Operations Command

will be created. The new command will have the ten air wings on duty now, plus four military air bases and three complementary groups. The Defense Air Command, decommissioned in 1984, will become operational again before 1988. Meanwhile, the Southern Air Operations Command will be created, plus four general directorates (Personnel, Logistics, Training, and Aeronautical Affairs) that will absorb the present Training, Material, and Air Regions commands, as well as other smaller organisms. With this new structure, the FAA expects to make its leadership more flexible and better coordinated while also making the service function more economically.

Buenos Aires, Argentina





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SIMON BOLIVAR AND THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN AMBIVALENCE

DR. DAVID BUSHNELL



THE Liberator Simón Bolívar, who has been claimed as a forerunner of almost every political movement from social revolutionary to stand-pat traditionalist, has likewise been touted both as the true founder of Pan Americanism and as the farsighted prophet who first warned Latin Americans to combat U.S. imperialism. In reality, just as his political thought contained elements that today both right-wing and left-wing ideologues can find congenial, his approach to inter-American relations exemplifies the ambivalence that has characterized Latin American attitudes toward the United States from the time of independence to the present. And since his words are so often cited—and cited, often as not, out of context—in discussions of United States-Latin American relations, there is much to be said for looking at exactly what he did think and do about Latin America's northern neighbor.

Bolívar's words carry weight with present-day Latin Americans because there was, after all, no one else whose contributions to the independence of the region spanned the entire period of the struggle, as well as so wide a swath of territory, and who was every bit as important in political nation-building as on the field of battle. No less than six Latin American nations claim him directly as one of their founders: Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador—all four of which initially came together in a single republic, retroactively dubbed Gran or "Great" Colombia, under his presidency—Peru, and Bolivia. Yet the decisive battle of Ayacucho, won in December 1824 in the highlands of southern Peru by Bolívar's favorite lieutenant, Antonio José Sucre, was celebrated on the banks of the Río de la Plata as sealing also the independence of Argentina; and, to one extent or another, Bolívar's political leadership was looked up to in all of Spain's former American colonies.

Precisely because his active career covered every phase of the independence struggle in such a wide theater, Bolívar had to deal at one time or another with problems of every variety.

And he sometimes dealt repeatedly, but in changing circumstances, with the same problem. Hence the addresses and decrees, public and private correspondence, and other writings of Bolívar seem much like the Bible or the works of Shakespeare: a diligent searcher can find something in them on almost any subject imaginable and can often find Bolívar at one time or another seeming to support every side of every argument. The apparent contradictions may represent, of course, only the application of the same fundamental principle in two quite distinct situations. Bolívar learned by experience and sometimes exercised the right of any intelligent person to change opinions. It is thus hardly any wonder that his words are quoted today with approval—albeit, selectively—in both Caracas and Havana, in Washington and Moscow.

As far as the United States specifically is concerned, Bolívar's views could rest at least in part on direct observation: Bolívar was one of the few Latin Americans of his day who actually visited the United States. He stopped for a period of four or five months on the return leg of one of his two trips to Europe.¹ He never made any detailed reference to this visit in his writings, and to what extent his stopover may have influenced his later attitudes must remain a matter of speculation. There is reason to assume, however, that the impressions he took away with him were generally positive. As he remarked years later to one U.S. diplomat, it was on this short visit that he first observed a condition of "rational liberty."²

Bolívar never again set foot in the United States, but as a leader of the independence movement in Spanish America, he inevitably met and had varied dealings with a great many U.S. citizens and governmental representatives. It has even been hinted, on the basis of rather scant evidence, that one of his lovers may have been Jeannette Hart of Connecticut, whom he came to know in Peru in 1824.³ In general, he made a highly favorable impression on the North Americans whom he encountered. The

naval officer Hiram Paulding, who visited Bolívar's camp in the Peruvian highlands during his 1824 campaign, later described him without qualification as having been "the most remarkable man of the age."⁴ Such praise, moreover, was quite in line with the treatment that he routinely received in the North American press as the "Washington of South America," particularly during the apogee of his political-military career, which may be very roughly defined as the period from the battle of Boyacá in 1819 that ensured the independence of Colombia to the founding in 1825 of Bolivia, the nation that even patterned its own name after his. It was only appropriate that the descendants of George Washington—the "Bolívar of North America," so to speak—were caught up in the general enthusiasm and presented Bolívar with a medallion and other mementos from Mount Vernon in a gesture that touched the Liberator more deeply, he said, than words could express.⁵

Good feeling among North Americans toward Bolívar never came to an end, but during the last few years of his life it was often overshadowed by a current of criticism that questioned the sincerity of his commitment to republican principles. In large measure, this reaction was the echo of mounting criticism of Bolívar's political initiatives in Latin America itself. There, as his panacea for the social and political unrest of the new nations, Bolívar in 1825 had unveiled the concept of a life-term president with the right to choose his successor, which was soon being assailed as a thinly disguised proposal of monarchy. A life president was the centerpiece of the constitution that he personally drafted for Bolivia and that he hoped would eventually become a model for other countries, including Gran Colombia; and it did not sit well with most liberal publicists.⁶ Neither was it favorably received by opinion in the United States, a nation that considered itself the natural bulwark of republicanism in a world still dominated by monarchies and that was particularly sensitive to real

or imaginary monarchist inroads in this hemisphere. U.S. concern was heightened by a tendency to attribute such designs in Latin America to the influence of Great Britain, at the time the principal political and economic rival of the United States.

For reasons of both political principle and national interest, then, U.S. representatives in Latin America grew increasingly wary of the Liberator. The consul in Lima, William Tudor, changed abruptly from admirer of Bolívar to almost pathological detractor, referring to him in his dispatches as a hypocritical usurper and "madman."⁷ Chargé Beaufort T. Watts in Bogotá still refused to believe that Bolívar had betrayed republicanism and even wrote an impassioned letter in March 1827, imploring him to return to the Colombian capital from Caracas, where he was tarrying, and reassume the presidency to "save" the country—a highly undiplomatic incursion into internal affairs that was sharply condemned by Bolívar's opponents.⁸ But the next man to represent North American interests in Bogotá, future President William Henry Harrison, meddled even more notoriously as U.S. minister and in the opposite political direction. Harrison was spared the embarrassment of being declared *persona non grata* for his open sympathizing and consorting with Bolívar's enemies only by his routine replacement in favor of a new political appointee after a change of administration in Washington.⁹ And it was during Harrison's tenure as minister that Bolívar penned the words that have become easily the favorite Bolívarian quotation among contemporary Latin American leftists: "The United States . . . seem[s] destined by Providence to plague America with torments in the name of freedom."¹⁰

Those who make much of that quotation seldom mention, if they are even aware, the context in which it was uttered. Instead, they commonly imply that Bolívar was foresightedly warning against the later machination of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile or the not-so-covert struggle of the Reagan adminis-

tration against revolutionary Nicaragua. In reality, Bolívar's statement is contained in a letter to the British chargé in Bogotá—Harrison's counterpart and diplomatic rival—whose favor Bolívar at the time was ardently seeking, and the principal "torment" involved was nothing but the conventional republicanism that U.S. agents throughout Latin America were then promoting in opposition both to the diplomatic and ideological influence of Great Britain and to the protomonarchist schemes associated with Bolívar and his supporters. (These agents' methods often entailed blunt and brazen meddling in Latin American affairs, but their immediate objectives were essentially innocuous.)

Another part of the context of Bolívar's words is, of course, his underlying attitude toward the United States, in which elements of admiration and distrust existed side by side. Under the heading of admiration, there are scattered in his writings any number of highly laudatory references to the United States, its people, and institutions, which receive little emphasis in anthologies published in Havana and, in other quarters, receive sometimes undue emphasis. As he declared in his Angostura Address of February 1819, one of the key documents of Bolívar's political thinking, "the people of North America are a singular model of political virtue and moral rectitude; . . . that nation was cradled in liberty, reared on freedom, and maintained by liberty alone."¹¹ Or again, in an essay on public education, he spoke of "the Republic of the United States, that land of freedom and home of civic virtue."¹² One wonders how an exemplar of civic virtue could be intent on plaguing America with torments, yet Bolívar meant what he said in both cases.

Though it may seem paradoxical at first glance, Bolívar's very admiration for the virtues of the North American people and the excellence of their free institutions put him on guard against them. For one thing, he felt that they evoked an excessive and dangerous fasci-

nation from his fellow Latin Americans, so that he never failed to join his praise of the United States with a stern warning against attempts to copy U.S. institutions. The people of Latin America, as he stated with some exaggeration in the same Angostura Address, had been given over to "the threefold yoke of ignorance, tyranny, and vice";¹³ hence, they could not possibly hope to live under the same laws. Indeed, he half suspected that the political institutions of the United States were too perfect to endure indefinitely even here,¹⁴ which was simply one more reason why the Latin American nations should not even try to adopt them. As he observed on still another occasion, "I think it would be better for South America to adopt the Koran rather than the United States' form of government, *although the latter is the best on earth.*"¹⁵

But the danger of unwise imitation was only part of the problem. In addition, the United States was just too successful for the comfort of its neighbors. In a letter to Gran Colombian Vice-President Francisco de Paula Santander, he warned that "a very rich and powerful nation, extremely war-like and capable of anything, is at the head of this continent."¹⁶ And in large measure, it was "capable of anything" precisely *because* of those admired virtues and institutions. Moreover, Bolívar had a taste of what he at least regarded as North American bellicosity in an earlier encounter with special agent Baptis Irvine, sent to Angostura (now Ciudad Bolívar) on the lower Orinoco River in 1818 to demand satisfaction for the seizure of two U.S. vessels by Venezuelan naval forces. After being cordially received by Bolívar, Irvine pressed his case in terms so vigorous that the former considered them downright offensive. Then, while rebutting Irvine's protests, Bolívar added his own complaint against the official policy of neutrality pursued by Washington toward Latin America's struggle for independence.¹⁷ This policy was essentially the same as that followed by Great Britain, but coming from a New World republic it aroused

more resentment; slightly bitter comments concerning it can be found scattered throughout Bolívar's correspondence. Like Irvine's overzealous pressing of financial claims, it undoubtedly contributed to Bolívar's opinion (again expressed more than once) that the United States in foreign affairs followed a purely "business-like" policy.¹⁸ Perhaps Bolívar's most forceful expression of that particular sentiment took the form of an outburst against "the president of the American hucksters; I detest that lot to such a degree that I would not want it said that a Colombian did anything the same way they do."¹⁹

If any one "huckster president" was alluded to in Bolívar's words, it was probably James Monroe,²⁰ whose famous Monroe Doctrine made little impression on the Liberator, to judge from the lack of direct references to it in his papers. Bolívar did recognize that Latin America could count on the help of the United States in case of any threat to its independence from the continental European powers,²¹ but he was no less convinced, and quite correctly, that at that time the attitude of Great Britain carried far more weight, and accordingly he was always eager to win British favor for his cause. Nor did Bolívar feel that a formal alliance with the United States would be to Latin America's advantage. On the contrary, when he laid plans for the first international conference of American republics—which met in Panama in 1826 under his political sponsorship—he did not even wish the United States to be represented.

It is often stated that Bolívar proposed to organize a system of American states *without* the United States because his aim was to create a Latin American defensive alliance *against* the United States. If such was his purpose, however, it is not one that he expressly avowed, whereas he did offer two quite specific reasons for not wanting to invite the United States to the Panama Congress. One was his desire not to risk offending the British. The other was his feeling that the United States was simply "heterogene-

ous" with respect to its southern neighbors, which was another way of stating his belief in the existence of significant differences of culture and historical traditions between the two Americas.²² Just as the distinctive virtues and institutions of the United States made it an inappropriate model to copy and gave it an uncomfortable superiority in military and other strength, they also stood in the way of close collaboration and joint action with other American states. However, Bolívar proposed in the very same breath to exclude Haiti on the same ground of heterogeneity as the United States—and certainly not in its case because of an unspoken aim to curb Haitian expansionism. Neither did he propose to invite Brazil, whose critical difference was the initial adoption of an openly monarchical form of government that had dynastic links with the European monarchies of the so-called Holy Alliance, whose hostility to the new Latin American republics was a source of concern.²³ In sum, what Bolívar wished was an alliance of former *Spanish* American colonies, which alone had enough in common, he felt, for the alliance to be meaningful.

Contrary to Bolívar's desires, the United States and Brazil were both invited to Panama, on the responsibility of Vice-President Santander and the Colombian foreign minister. Bolívar professed to be pleased when he heard that the United States was coming,²⁴ but most likely he was making the best of a bad bargain. In the end, it made little difference, since one of the two U.S. representatives died on the way, while the other reached Panama after the meeting was over. Brazil failed to act on the invitation received, and the Spanish American nations, a majority of which did send delegates to Panama, failed to accomplish anything of lasting effect at the meeting. The importance of the Panama Congress is thus as a symbol and a precedent, albeit somewhat ambiguous, for later inter-American cooperation.

While not wanting to invite the United States, Bolívar did wish Great Britain to send a

representative of some sort to the Panama gathering, and a British observer was in fact present.²⁵ Bolívar's desire once again underscored his interest in ensuring British favor for the Latin American republics, not simply as a defense against the vague menace of the Holy Alliance but for additional reasons. Undoubtedly, he saw the potential advantage of using Britain in case of need as a counterweight to that "very rich and powerful nation," the United States. But his interest in a special relationship with Great Britain was reinforced by the trend of destabilization that he observed within Gran Colombia itself, as liberals turned against Bolívar in fear that he was determined to foist a Bolivian-type life presidency on them and separatist movements gathered strength in outlying parts of the nation. And when he instructed his ministers in April 1829 to explore the possibility of obtaining some kind of British protectorate for Gran Colombia, they assumed that he also had an overt return to monarchy in mind, because they further assumed that Britain would never consent to such a protectorate unless Gran Colombia first brought its institutions into line with the accepted European model.²⁶ Their subsequent efforts to sound out domestic power brokers and foreign governments on the monarchist option were a poorly kept secret and added to suspicions of Bolívar's intentions on the part of both Colombian liberals and Minister Harrison. It was, in any case, against a background of the protec-

torate scheme and related monarchist intrigues that Bolívar made his statement that the United States appeared destined to "plague America with torments."

Even when the context of that remark is taken properly into account, it does constitute a fairly conclusive reason why Bolívar cannot be accurately claimed as a forerunner of contemporary Pan Americanism. Instead, he was a forerunner of Pan-Latin Americanism, who, if alive today, would presumably be a warm supporter of all common-market projects and Contadora initiatives and possibly even common fronts against the International Monetary Fund. However, this stance would not itself make him a systematic foe of the United States. In his own lifetime, he was enough of a realist to combine warm admiration for the positive features that he saw in North American culture and institutions with a recognition that on specific issues U.S. and Latin American interests would not invariably be the same and that a people of civic virtue would still not have a foreign policy based on virtue alone. It is difficult to argue with these propositions. At the same time, and despite his irritation over the U.S. policy of formal neutrality in the struggle between Spain and her colonies, Bolívar was fully aware that on the one greatest objective of his own career—Latin American independence—the interests of the two Americas really did coincide.

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Notes

1. "Cronología de Bolívar," in Sociedad Bolivariana de Venezuela, *Escritos del Libertador* (Caracas, 1964), vol. I, p. 156.

2. William R. Manning, editor, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations* (New York, 1925), vol. II, p. 1322.

3. Antonio Maya, Jeannette Hart, *la novia norteamericana de Simón Bolívar* (Caracas, 1974).

4. Rebecca Paulding Meade, *Life of Hiram Paulding Rear-Admiral, U.S.N.* (New York, 1910), p. 68.

5. Simón Bolívar, *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, compiled by Vicente Lecuna and edited by Harold A. Bierck, Jr. (New York, 1951), vol. II, p. 579.

6. For the text of the Bolivian constitution, see David Bushnell,

editor, *The Liberator Simon Bolívar: Man and Image* (New York, 1970), pp. 47-61. In the view of Vice-President Santander, whose thinking was fairly representative of liberal opinion, this project was "the apple of discord" that led to irreparable political divisions in Gran Colombia. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

7. Manning, *Correspondence*, vol. III, pp. 1773-1823, 1844-46.

8. E. Taylor Parks, *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934* (Durham, North Carolina, 1935), pp. 151-52.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-58.

10. Bolívar, *Selected Writings*, vol. II, p. 732.

11. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 179.

12. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 555.

13. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 176.

14. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 179.
15. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 738. Italics added.
16. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 307.
17. Benjamin A. Frankel, *Venezuela y los Estados Unidos 1820-1888* (Caracas, 1977), pp. 31-32; Sociedad Bolivariana de Venezuela, *Escritos del Libertador*, XIV, pp. 125-27, 151-58, 207-10, 228-36, 363-65.
18. Bolívar, *Selected Writings*, vol. I, p. 224. In the Spanish original, the phrase is "*conducta aritmética de negocio*." Simón Bolívar, *Obras completas* (Caracas and Madrid, n.d.), vol. I, p. 429.
19. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 541. Here the Spanish original of "hucksters" is "regatones," with a connotation of petty haggling in the marketplace.
20. The quotation is from a letter of October 1825, when Monroe was no longer president; but it is part of an unfavorable comment on the style of presidential messages, and it is doubtful that Bolívar had as yet formed any opinion of the messages of Monroe's successor, John Quincy Adams.
21. Bolívar, *Selected Writings*, vol. II, p. 482.
22. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 489, 508, 543.
23. Ron L. Seckinger, "South American Power Politics during the 1820s," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May 1976, pp. 243-46.
24. Bolívar, *Selected Writings*, vol. II, p. 585.
25. Juan Diego Jaramillo, *Bolívar y Canning* (Bogotá, 1983), pp. 242-48, 273-78.
26. José Manuel Restrepo, *Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1942-50), vol. VII, pp. 220-37, 245-50.

The kind of paternalistic relationship the United States has had in the past with other hemisphere nations will be increasingly costly and counter-productive in the years ahead. We believe the United States must move increasingly toward a relationship of true partnership, in which it will cooperate with other nations of the hemisphere in those areas where its cooperation can be helpful and is wanted.

The Rockefeller Report on the Americas: The Official Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, 1969, pp. 40-41



You've got the stick

WHY STUDY LATIN AMERICA?

DR. LAWRENCE A. CLAYTON

THE simple question "Why study Latin America?" will very likely produce responses varying from the glib ("Why not?") to the complex. As a legitimate field of scholarship, Latin America is approached by philosophers, economists, political scientists, historians, novelists, and a host of scholarly (and not so scholarly) students. Some claim that Latin America is the birthplace of a new "cosmic" race—the mestizo—and the home of the most creative fiction—magical realism—in the second half of the twentieth century. Others, less laudatory, claim that Latin America is but an unimaginative economic appendage of the Western world. Defenders and detractors are many. There is no lack of controversy, leading one to suppose that the fascination with the region, by its very existence, endows Latin America with an importance to all individuals interested in the world around them.

Latin America is a region that exists both in space (geography) and time (past and present). From the magnificent and ancient Maya ruins in Mexico and Guatemala to the hum of the great modern metropolis of São Paulo in Brazil, Latin America presents an incredibly diversified face to the world, as if almost perversely determined to confound us with its kaleidoscopic nature and character. On the one

hand, we can observe millions of indigenous peoples (in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) living in an age that almost predates the industrial revolution, while other areas pulsate to space-age rhythms of life. Hard-scrabble poverty exists amidst industrial plants producing nuclear power and modern aircraft. The traditional litany and comforting chants of Roman Catholicism cohabit the land with the swaying, demanding hymns of Protestant pentacostal sects. We in the United States still drink the traditional products of land and plantation (sugar with our coffee) before boarding Brazilian-made Bandeirante aircraft for our short commuter hops to nearby cities.

There is another compelling reason to focus our attention on Latin America, even if its magnificent ruins, stunning modern architecture, powerful spiritual and family life, and other attributes were not enough to attract the attention of both scholar and layman. It is part of the same Western Hemisphere which we inhabit, and when Latin America resonates, we feel the vibrations much more intimately than those emanating from Asia or Africa.

The shifting Mexican population across a shared 2300-mile border clearly affects our national policy toward minorities, toward labor,

and toward retaining our dominance of agricultural production in the world. The existence of a communist state in the hemisphere—no matter how much Fidel Castro has toned down his rhetoric in recent times to transmogrify himself into the grand old statesman of Latin America—still presents a major challenge to the liberal form of representative democracy that we extol over totalitarian Marxism. Its latest manifestation in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas reinforces this split vision of the world between the powers of the East and those of the West.

With respect to Central America today, two views prevail. Some see it as but another act in the near galactic struggle between the forces of good (the West) and those of evil (the East/Soviet Union). Others claim that this view is simplistic and demagogic rhetoric which masks the true culprits of Central American problems—poverty, entrenched oligarchies, dependent economies, and unyielding militarism. Many Central Americans blame the United States, a not unlikely bogeyman that intervened with near abandon in the internal affairs of the region half a century ago. Others in the

region just as clearly point the finger to international Marxism.

What is the legitimate U.S. response to Central America? I think that the articles in this issue of the *Air University Review* will help all readers come to a closer understanding of the issues. There are no simple answers. However, we cannot duck the problem by throwing up the smokescreen of "complexity" or ignorance and letting someone else take care of it. The life of nations, as of individuals, consists of hard decisions made both in the short and long run.

In the Western Hemisphere, and especially in Central America and the Caribbean, the United States is the dominant power. How that power is exercised reflects our self-image and our concepts of right and wrong, fairness and unfairness, justice and tyranny. What is not in doubt is that we *will* continue to be a, if not *the*, dominant foreign factor in the equation of modern Central American life. A context for understanding the nature and future of that role is provided in the articles of this issue of the *Review*. Good reading.

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Letters

kudos for Fabyanic

As a military historian and a former member of the Air War College faculty who inherited responsibility for the Clausewitz Seminar Series from its architect, Dr. David MacIsaac, I am compelled to comment on Dr. Thomas A. Fabyanic's article, "War, Doctrine, and the Air War College," in your January-February 1986 issue. My comment is "right on."

I have long contended that the U.S. Air Force has never come to grips with what it really wants professional military education—from Squadron Officer School through the Air War College—to do. At the war college level, the focus should be on education

for waging war. That very important year must be more than a glorified management course or a year to relax and reflect, based on services rendered and potential. Without a thorough grounding in military history and an understanding of what doctrine is, that focus is impossible. And that now appears to be the case.

Congratulations on publishing an article that cuts to the heart of an issue that is vital to our Air Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Howe, USAF
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on creative thinking in the Air Force

Last week I managed to obtain a copy of the March-April 1986 issue of the *Air University Review* and found it interesting. I had to write, though, after reading the "Letters" section.

I greatly appreciate the letters from Lieutenant Colonel Donald Baucom and Colonel Peter Dunn and agree with their points. I know that many USAF people, military and civilian, will not write for publication because they do not want the involvement with bureaucratic censorship. Further, they do not appreciate the imposition of the thoughts of others at the expense of their own in their writings.

I recall writing a handout for use in my classes when we discussed the frequent pettiness of the command structure when the people in charge did not trust those working for them. This handout got great comments from several hundred students and, over the years, I received a great number of requests for additional copies. Further, I received many suggestions that it should be published so that more people might learn from it. So, I submitted it for publication consideration. The Air Staff review denied publication because, as they said, the article might destroy the IG system. My response, which gained me nothing, was that if the IG system was so weak that one small article could destroy it, perhaps it didn't warrant protection. At any rate, the item was never published.

The U.S. Air Force does not now encourage creativity or innovation except in technology. Some small advances might be possible through the Model Installation Program, but that form of challenge does not stretch to concept, principle, or philosophy except in the extreme. We need and should encourage intelligent disagreement with official stances. Certainly the Air Force is sufficiently strong to withstand that form of internal challenge—or does it


truly want challenge only from without, through Congress and the press?

I certainly agree with Colonel Baucom's comment that very few critical articles can be found in the *Air University Review*, *Airman*, or the "unofficial" *Air Force*. Please don't misunderstand. I do not condemn the editors of the *Review* or *Airman*, since they have little choice in the matter, being active-duty Air Force personnel. I do find fault with the editors of *Air Force*, though, because they are not similarly constrained and should be striving to show all facets of USAF thought.

Anyway, all of this is no doubt the reason why most of the really challenging ideas and questions are raised in social conversation and not in professional publications of the Air Force. Too bad, really, because it deprives the Air Force of the power of new thoughts at a time when those thoughts are so urgently needed. While I have hope that the U.S. Air Force will change its stand, I have little faith that it will. Again, too bad!

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Editor's note: We wish to thank Major General Frank T. McCoy, USAF (Ret), for bringing a mistake to our attention. On page 105 of our January-February issue, General Curtis LeMay was identified as "the creator of SAC and its first commander." While no one could deny General LeMay's seminal role in the creation of SAC, General George S. Kenny was the first commander of the Strategic Air Command.



books, images, and ideas

The Evolution of the Cruise Missile by Kenneth P. Werrell. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1985, 289 pages, \$7.00.

The Evolution of the Cruise Missile is a useful survey of the past, present, and future prospects of the cruise missile, written by someone who obviously thinks highly of the program. Professor Kenneth P. Werrell's examination of the historical record reveals two major themes: the impact of technology and the role of politics. While not neglecting the political side of the cruise missile story, Werrell is much stronger on technology.

American efforts to develop pilotless aircraft, he points out, began during World War I. However, these early experimenters encountered problems with basic aerodynamics, guidance systems, and engines; they achieved minimal success. Yet the idea was an attractive one, and it persisted. Interwar developments in electronics shifted attention from preset guidance to radio control, and both the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy conducted a number of technologically interesting research projects. But wartime tests of radio-controlled heavy-bombers (Project Aphrodite) confirmed what earlier experiments had already revealed: flying bombs were "less reliable, less accurate, and more vulnerable than conventional aircraft," (p. 35)

The Germans had much greater success. Their V-1, featuring a cheap and effective pulse-jet engine and a gyroscopic autopilot with preset controls, was a potent weapon that caused more than 24,000 casualties in the greater London area. American attempts over the next quarter of a century to improve on the V-1 proved fruitless. The various cruise missile systems (Snark, Navaho, Regulus et al.) could not compete with manned bombers or ballistic missiles. These years of frustration gave rise to considerable skepticism over the viability of the entire concept—a skepticism that lingers.

Werrell argues that the post-1970 cruise missile

represents a "new and substantially different weapon system." (p. 135) Improved engines, fuels, materials, computers, and inertial and radar-matching guidance systems combined with miniaturized nuclear warheads to create "a very potent war machine" (p. 141)—a fact that often has seemed more appreciated by the Department of Defense than by the Air Force. And the future is even brighter. New computers will improve guidance, stealth technology will be applied to airframes, and improved engines and fuels will permit even greater performance. The prospect of continued technological superiority over enemy defenses, Werrell believes, "ensures that the cruise missile will be vital to American security in the foreseeable future." (p. 212)

Ironically, just as the technological problems were overcome, political considerations became increasingly important in determining the fate of the cruise missile. After urging civilian leaders to continue developmental funding and not to barter the system away "for illusionary gains in arms limitations agreement," Werrell adds a concluding, cautionary note: "All these speculations are based upon the assumption that the cruise missile will approach its potential; that is, there will be no major political or technical obstacles to prevent the cruise missile from achieving its promise." (p. 233) More technically qualified readers of this book might want to debate the magnitude of that assumption.

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Nuclear America: Military and Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States, 1940-1980 by Gerard H. Clarfield and William M. Wiecek. New York: Harper and Row, 1984, 518 pages, \$10.95.

Between December 1942 and July 1945, American scientists and engineers built two uranium-type and

one plutonium-type atomic bombs, at a cost of \$2 billion. According to Gerard Clarfield and William Wiecek, both history professors at the University of Missouri, it was during these years that the basic characteristics of "Nuclear America" emerged: nuclear power's intimate ties to the national security state, plus the subordination of nonmilitary applications of nuclear power to military demands.

Professors Clarfield and Wiecek further contend that three major events or circumstances shaped these outcomes. First, the arms race mentality was spawned out of the pressure that scientists and policymakers alike felt about beating the Germans to the bomb. Second, at the same time that nuclear weapons were becoming a reality in the laboratory, the "nuclear delusion" was forming in the minds of America's political leadership; increasingly, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, as well as those around them, came to view nuclear weapons as some sort of panacea that would provide a cheap solution to the challenges and frustrations they encountered in conducting foreign relations. Third, the nuclear-industrial complex was born, tying universities, institutions that were to become the National Laboratories, defense contractors, and the Defense Department into a tight web of mutual dependence.

Nuclear America, set in thirteen chapters, is a comprehensive historical survey of U.S. nuclear policy. Reflecting on the development and subsequent use of the atomic bomb against Japan in August 1945, Clarfield and Wiecek write: "The decision to use the bomb was implicit in the decision to create it." They further argue that, by using nuclear weapons in combat, the Truman administration established the principle that, though genocidal, such weapons were legitimate. By using the bombs, rather than seeking the establishment of a workable system of international control, the Truman administration made the proliferation of nuclear weapons inevitable.

In discussing nuclear power in the early Truman years, the authors suggest that, in the short term, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had the heaviest impact on two elites—political leaders in the executive branch who were entrusted with foreign and military policy and the scientific community associated with the Manhattan Project. The reactions of these two groups, according to Professors Clarfield and Wiecek, have shaped American military and domestic nuclear policies ever since. By focusing on U.S. presidencies from Truman through Carter, the authors substantiate this thesis through detailed, historical research.

Drawing from a number of the well-known, authoritative works in the field of nuclear policy, Clar-

field and Wiecek provide a readable summary and detailed insights into a much-debated subject. For the specialist, *Nuclear America* offers little. It will, however, provide useful information to the general reader regarding U.S. strategic policies and arms control issues. A glossary, a fourteen-page suggested reading list, and extensive chapter endnotes add to the book's usefulness.

Dr. James B. Motley
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Day of Trinity by Lansing Lamont. New York: Atheneum, 1985, 363 pages, \$11.95 paper.

There are two good reasons for reading *Day of Trinity*. First, it is a vivid, though selective account of the Manhattan Project, especially the first atomic explosion at Los Alamos in July 1945. Reissued twenty years after its first publication, the book has been expanded by a substantial section "bringing the reader up to date on what of importance has transpired during these last decades in the politics, technology, and human understanding of the atomic bomb and the arms competition." (Foreword)

That retrospective is the second reason for reading *Day of Trinity*. It is a valiant attempt and certainly worth reading. However, it is too subjective and selective to stand alone: the standard account will have to be fuller. The core of the book, consisting of 200 pages, remains in the story of what was done at Los Alamos in 1945 to prepare for and carry out the first testing of a nuclear weapon. Here Lansing Lamont has a story to tell, and he tells it well. Desert isolation—friction between scientists and Army management, technical difficulties and triumphs, allies loyal and traitorous, Washington politics, and the suspense of the actual test—it is all here in a colorful, moving story.

The testing of weapons will fascinate the technology buff, but most readers will have wider and higher interests. Hence, a few comments may help to round out somewhat the picture given by Lamont.

When Churchill and Roosevelt drew up the Quebec Agreement on 19 August 1943, its terms were so disadvantageous to the British pioneers of the atomic effort that one highly placed scientific British insider felt "we had signed away our birthright in the postwar development of nuclear energy (Reginald V. Jones, *Most Secret War*, 1978, p. 595, referring to the key provision of the agreement). Splitting the atom threatened to split the alliance.

Now we also know that the security screen protecting the Manhattan Project was penetrated quite

early. By 1943, Soviet intelligence, acting through Peter Ivanov, a Soviet vice-consul in San Francisco, used two intermediaries to approach J. Robert Oppenheimer with the message that technical information could be transmitted secretly to Russia. (See Peter Wyden, *Day One: Before Hiroshima and After*, 1984, pp. 72 ff.) At least one scientist at Berkeley was selling information to Russian agents. (Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance*, 1975, pp. 102 ff.) In short, preexisting Soviet-American suspicion and rivalry were aggravated by the atomic project.

A few years after the Trinity test of 1945, the socialist government of France laid the foundations for the successful nuclear program of General Charles de Gaulle and the strategic theory of General Gallois, proclaiming the incompatibility of national deterrents with integrated NATO command.

As to how *tactical* nuclear weapons came to NATO and how Oppenheimer attempted to play the Army off against SAC, see Freeman Dyson, *Weapons and Hope* (1984), pp. 135-39.

Dr. John E. Tashjean
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The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade, 1973-1983 edited by Bennie J. Wilson III. Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985, 340 pages, no price given.

For better or worse, the citizen-soldier has been the mainstay of the U.S. military tradition. Through most of their history, Americans have preferred to rely on amateurs to defend them. A large standing Army was considered unnecessary, too expensive, and threatening to cherished liberties. Protected by wide oceans and blessed with weak neighbors, the United States maintained a small regular Army and Navy. If war came, those professional cadres would absorb the first blow, mobilize and train a vast force of citizens, and lead the force to victory. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the sheer size and the technological and operational complexities of military forces threatened the assumptions underlying that national security policy. In the twentieth century, participation in two world wars, plus the advent of nuclear weapons and the adoption of a forward defense strategy, seemed to further weaken the case for the citizen-soldier. Nevertheless, the United States continued to maintain a large force of guardsmen and reservists to augment a huge (by American standards) active-duty peacetime military establishment. In 1973, that historic practice was

endorsed and reemphasized by the Department of Defense as its "total force" policy.

Colonel Bennie J. Wilson III, USAF, has edited a fine anthology designed to provide objective assessments of National Guard and Reserve programs after ten years of the total force. *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force* was badly needed. Despite the growing importance of the Reserve components of the American armed forces since the Vietnam War, relatively little reliable information about them was available in the public domain.

The authors—a mix of guardsmen and reservists, active-duty military officers, policy analysts, and scholars—have provided a valuable introduction to a broad range of complex issues associated with the total force policy. They have sought to dispel certain persistent myths that cloud discussions of Reserve policy (i.e., reservists and guardsmen are weekend warriors or, alternatively, Reserve and Guard units are a viable substitute for a strong active-duty force). They have also undermined an equally dangerous misconception fostered by policy analysts trained in the social sciences—that enhancing of the U.S. Armed Forces is primarily a matter of economic efficiency and rational management.

The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force suffers from one important flaw. It fails to understand that the total force policy was a direct outgrowth of the Air Force's experience with its own Reserve components, especially the Air National Guard, since the early 1950s. Dr. Theodore Marrs, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, was the chief architect of the total force policy. Marrs was an avid air guardsman whose ideas on Reserve policy were shaped by his long association with that organization. The success of the Air Guard was predicated on circumstances not always present, even in the Air Force. Once that historic background is grasped, then it is possible to evaluate properly the implementation of the total force throughout the U.S. Armed Forces.

Dr. Charles J. Gross
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War without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam by Thomas C. Thayer. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985, 276 pages, \$22.00.

Between January 1967 and January 1972, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) Southeast Asia office published fifty bimonthly issues of the *Southeast Asia Analysis Report*, which attempted

to analyze the progress of the war. The Vietnam War was dominated by statistics, together with controversies over their meaning, interpretation, and relevance. Until recently, many of the statistics and analyses were classified or at least difficult to obtain. Thus, Thomas Thayer, who directed the Southeast Asia office and the *Analysis Report*, has performed a major service by distilling the collected twelve volumes of the *Report* into his outstanding book *War without Fronts*. Thayer's penetrating analysis and fine narrative make the book accessible and useful for readers of all levels. It is one of the most interesting and valuable works on the Vietnam War published in recent years.

Thayer provides answers as to where and in what months the most combat and deaths took place and how this toll compared with the French experience earlier; where the United States spent the \$150 billion invested in the war; who got killed and how; whether air power worked; how secure the countryside was; how effective the various Vietnamese forces were; how successful the South Vietnamese government was in economic matters, land reform, village security, refugee settlement, and other performance indicators; and many other questions. He also analyzes the numbers and trends of both allied and communist troop concentrations and provides exhaustive information on Vietnamese perceptions and attitudes during the war. The narrative is supported by 121 tables and eight maps and figures.

War without Fronts is replete with revelations that challenge sacred canards and conventional wisdom about the war. To give just one example, it is commonly alleged that blacks suffered a disproportionate number of casualties in Vietnam. Actually, the statistics demonstrate that blacks accounted for 12 percent of American combat deaths while comprising approximately 13.5 percent of military-age male youth in America and of enlisted personnel in the armed forces.

Thayer's ultimate conclusion is that the U.S. military could not have won the war using the strategy and tactics that it employed. The attrition strategy could not go beyond stalemate. Policies such as the one-year tour, six-month rotation of officers, and failure to recognize communist patterns of combat contributed to a higher number of American deaths than might have resulted.

Even if one is suspicious about the systems analysis approach and disagrees with the validity of some of the statistics or the conclusions derived from them (as certainly was the case with many American military commanders during the war), one cannot ignore *War without Fronts*. The amount of material provided is considerable, and the conclusions pro-

vocative. This is a book that should be read by everyone with serious interest in the war.

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Vietnam Veterans: The Road to Recovery by Joel Osler Brende and Erwin Randolph Parson. New York: Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1985. 270 pages, \$17.95.

Due to television interviews, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and several recent studies, the Vietnam veteran is finally gaining the recognition he deserves. In *Vietnam Veterans*, Joel Osler Brende, a psychiatrist, and Erwin Randolph Parson, a clinical psychologist and Vietnam veteran, attempt a comprehensive account of the readjustment problems faced by these vets. They describe the men who fought in Vietnam and compare them to American soldiers in other wars.

Like soldiers from all wars, Vietnam veterans felt strange and disoriented when they returned home. However, Brende and Parson make the rather large claim that 800,000 of the 2.5 million Americans who served in Vietnam experienced lasting readjustment problems. They explain that several factors caused this high rate of emotional problems. The average age for soldiers in Vietnam was 19.2 years, and the lack of well-established identities made these young combatants particularly vulnerable to the stress of war. The unclear nature of their mission and a growing distrust of leadership contributed to the demoralization and anger experienced by many veterans. Homecoming was an abrupt transfer from the intensity of the war zone to the routine of everyday life. No support system eased the readjustment to life away from the combat zone. Instead, soldiers who had served honorably faced rejection, hostility, distrust, and sometimes pity. For many, confusion became alienation; and some veterans could not fit back into society.

Vietnam Veterans addresses pertinent questions and sympathetically presents the problems of veterans. Unfortunately, it is overwritten, with exaggerated rhetoric and grossly overdrawn generalizations that detract from its intent. The authors' attempt to provide a brief survey of the wide range of minority-group veterans is simplistic and stereotyped. In the important process of confronting the problems of Vietnam vets, they create the erroneous impression that all are maladjusted. They fail to acknowledge that many—I believe that the evidence will show,

most—soldiers returned to normal, stable lives. It is time to recognize this fact.

Jeanette R. Dunn
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The U.S. Intelligence Community by Jeffrey T. Richelson. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1985, 358 pages, \$16.95 paper, \$39.95 cloth.

Most books on U.S. intelligence agencies fall into the "exposé" category; the authors are either critics of intelligence activities or disgruntled former agents. Jeffrey T. Richelson of American University has written a much-needed alternative to the exposés—a dispassionate, objective overview of the complex maze of agencies and institutions that make up the U.S. intelligence community. Drawing on interviews, documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, and detailed research in periodical literature, Richelson provides up-to-date information about all aspects of intelligence; and readers may be shocked to see how much sensitive material is readily available from unclassified sources.

The U.S. Intelligence Community begins with a brief discussion of the definition of intelligence and its uses, followed by five chapters that provide a detailed analysis of national, military, and civilian intelligence organizations. These chapters include extremely useful line and block diagrams that help to make the complicated structure of the agencies clear to the reader. In some cases, major subdivisions of agencies are also diagrammed; thus, there are three separate charts depicting the Central Intelligence Agency, and even such little-known agencies as the Air Force's Technical Applications Center are covered by full-page line and block diagrams.

Richelson then describes the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies, with detailed discussion of signals intelligence, ocean and space surveillance, human intelligence, counterintelligence, covert action, and cooperation with other countries for intelligence gathering. Recognizing that the large mass of information gathered by intelligence agencies would be useless without proper evaluation, Richelson also describes the analyses and estimates produced by the intelligence community. In addition, he discusses the management and direction of the entire intelligence process and includes a chapter that explains the complicated realm of security classifications.

The final chapter examines some of the issues involving the intelligence community: the lack of centralized control and the resultant duplication of effort, controversies surrounding covert activities,

the government's quest for greater secrecy than it now maintains, and the use of overseas bases for intelligence activities. The brief coverage of these controversial issues leaves the reader hungry for more details, but there are simply limits to the amount of discussion that can be allotted to particular issues in a book that covers such a wide range of topics. As Richelson himself states in the preface, "this book tries to accomplish in one volume what requires several volumes." He is right, and one wishes that he had written several volumes. However, the present work is still extremely useful. *The U.S. Intelligence Community* is more a reference work than a discussion of intelligence issues—which is perhaps its greatest utility. Both military and academic readers interested in intelligence will find this book an invaluable guide to the agencies and activities of the U.S. intelligence community.

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The Future of American-Israeli Relations: A Parting of the Ways? by James Lee Ray. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985, 157 pages, \$16.00.

In September 1985, Israel and the United States gave application to the free trade zone agreement between them. By the end of December 1985, publicity surrounding the espionage allegations against Jonathan Pollard in spying for Israel receded from the public scene as quickly as it had emerged.

James Lee Ray, of course, did not have the benefit of these events to judge in his brief five-chapter summary of the American-Israeli relationship. But these events may not have mattered anyway to Ray's thesis: unless Israel makes concessions for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied since the 1967 war, Washington's relations with Israel will sour. Further, he argues, unless progress about the occupied territories is made soon, Washington's relations with the Arab world will also decline, and regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be endangered. Finally, he asserts that a demilitarized and independent Palestinian state could enhance Israeli security significantly. Ray does allow that Israel would be justified in retaliation against an entity that threatens its well-being. (p. 84)

To make Israel heed Washington's direction, the author suggests applying economic leverage on Jerusalem. Yet historically, Israel, with its fierce attitude for making its *own* decisions about what is in

its best interests, has reacted least favorably to American overtures perceived as "evenhandedness" or "pressure." (Indeed, it could be postulated that, as 1986 began, Israel was more willing to negotiate about the future of the West Bank and Gaza because she did not feel insecure in her relationships with Washington and the American people.)

It is the discussion of these relationships, their evolution, and change that are not sufficiently covered in *The Future of American-Israeli Relations*. Very little analysis is provided to explain how and why the U.S.-Israeli relationship has remained so close even in times of major disagreement, such as the periods during and after Israel's incursions into Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. For example, how deep is the Christian fundamentalist connection to Israel? What value does the Jewish state have in this special Christian identity to Israel? Saying that there is an Israeli lobby that influences U.S. policy toward the Middle East is insufficient. More should have been written about the role that key governmental officials have in determining our relations with Israel.

In writing this book, the author relied almost exclusively on what other researchers and specialists have said or written. Little original data collection is apparent from the sources used. In fact, Ray seems to have made a very selective use of supporting materials, which he employs to buttress his own personal interpretation of history and prescriptions for the future.

The Future of American-Israeli Relations is a limited collection of Ray's interpretations and predictions on various aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is not of the same quality as the solid evaluations of the U.S.-Israeli relationship that can be found in such recently published works as Stephen L. Spiegel's *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (1985) and Wolf Blitzer's *Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook* (1985).

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USSR Foreign Policies after Détente by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1985, 300 pages, \$26.95.

This comprehensive analysis of Soviet foreign policy, based, to a large extent, on primary source materials in the Russian language, is "must" reading for all serious students of Soviet affairs.

Ambassador Richard Staar begins *USSR Foreign Policies after Détente* with a review of the ideologi-

cal basis of Soviet foreign policy and its intrinsic relationship with Communist parties abroad; this review is followed by a description of the formulation and implementation of policy. Staar notes that personalities make little difference in these fundamental areas: a Gorbachev, a Chernenko, an Andropov—all are true believers.

Part II, which I believe is the best part of the book, deals with propaganda, espionage, and active measures, together with military policy. Staar states: "One thing is clear: Soviet participation in the arms control process in particular and détente in general has done nothing to change the USSR's strategic doctrine. This doctrine continues to emphasize counterforce, war-fighting, and war survival more than simple deterrence." (p. 127)

Part III covers regional policies: East Europe, East-West relations in Europe, the Third World, and East Asia. The last chapter deals with U.S.-Soviet relations, including a section on arms control, with which Staar was personally involved. Examples of Soviet treaty violations are cited. Staar also declares: "The potential for a first strike by the U.S.S.R. is in place. As a consequence, Western Europe will remain militarily inferior and vulnerable if the Soviet Union's definition of national security is accepted. None of this, meanwhile, seems to have affected the decisions by a consortium of 31 European, Canadian, and Japanese banks to provide the Soviet Union with new loans, despite the fact that the latter already owes more than \$28.7 billion to the West. Almost two-thirds of this amount has been subsidized by taxpayers." (p. 188)

Staar concludes: "This self-perpetuating elite in the Kremlin looks upon the United States as the main enemy, the last remaining obstacle to the fulfillment of USSR foreign policy objectives." (p. 262)

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The Mind Race by Russell Targ and Keith Harary. New York: Villard Books, 1984, 294 pages, \$16.95.

The reader who expects *The Mind Race* to provide a revealing trip through the psychic realms of the Soviet Union may feel that he has been offered more smoke than substance. Although Russell Targ and Keith Harary, noted for their successful remote-viewing experiments at Stanford Research Institute, suggest in the opening chapter that they will reveal "what is really happening in psi research here and in the Soviet Union," they actually examine little So-

viet research that has not been aired before.

Granted, much Soviet research is closely guarded, even from noted Russian scientists working in related areas of metaphysical investigation. But aside from one chapter written by a Soviet defector, the authors offer scant information that has not been subject to speculation in the press or previously reported in other publications. The student of Soviet psychic research will find the subject covered in much greater depth in the fifteen-year-old *Psychic Discoveries behind the Iron Curtain* by Sheila Ostrander and Lynn Schroeder (1971).

Despite the failure of this book to fulfill its basic promise, it is not without merit. There is a reasonably convincing account of Soviet researchers' successful experiments in remote viewing. These demonstrations, which enabled viewers to describe distant and unfamiliar targets designated by another participant unknown to them, are reported in sufficient detail so that anyone could practice these "psychic sit-ups."

Ironically, the greatest impetus to Soviet research in telepathic communication was the Soviets' belief in a report that the United States had conducted a successful telepathic experiment from the submerged USS *Nautilus* in 1959. This "nonevent" was widely believed in Soviet scientific circles, and there are numerous reports that this feat was later duplicated in the Soviet Union. Following these reports, Stanford Research Institute researchers conducted their own experiments in which messages were mentally transmitted from depths of several hundred feet underwater and over great distances. There appears to be general agreement between Soviet and American researchers that seawater, which acts as a barrier to electromagnetic radiation, does not restrict forms of mental telepathy. This finding would seem to destroy the theory that mental telepathy is conducted by the measurable amount of electrical radiation given off by the brain.

Telepathic communication is not limited to humans, according to experiments devised in the Soviet Union. Two groups of rats housed a mile apart were conditioned to move to the left side of their cage to avoid an electric shock when a red light was turned on. After repeated conditioning, the rats would move simultaneously to the left side of *both* cages when the red light was turned on in only *one* cage.

Having proved to their satisfaction that psychic experiments could be performed in the laboratory consistently, the authors sought to make some practical use of them by forming Delphi Associates. Perhaps their most successful enterprise was the short-term viewing of the silver futures market. They cor-

rectly predicted nine consecutive movements of the market and made seven consecutive profitable investments. The odds against this happening by chance are more than 250,000 to one, according to the authors. However, an interesting postscript to the Delphi Associates account of flawless predictions appeared recently in the *Wall Street Journal*, which reported that the next two predictions proved false and a major client became apoplectic.

There is not enough hard information in *The Mind Race* to arrive at solid conclusions about the relative strengths of U.S. and Soviet psychic research. But there are troubling suggestions that the Soviet program is not only much more comprehensive but concentrated in what might be termed the black areas. There are references to Soviet research in the psychic transmission of disease, remote control or influence of foreign leaders, and military applications that could only be hinted at.

The uninitiated may find this book an eye opener, the student of metaphysics will want to add *The Mind Race* to his or her library, but the majority of readers can skip this volume without suffering intellectual deprivation.

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Military Intervention in the Third World: Threats, Constraints, and Options edited by John H. Maurer and Richard H. Porth. New York: Praeger, 1984, 237 pages, \$29.95.

The authors of the essays in *Military Intervention in the Third World* largely share a common set of policy assumptions about the nature of the security threats facing the United States in the developing world and, differences in emphasis and direction notwithstanding, a general orientation about what to do about them.

As for assumptions: The Soviet Union and its proxies are a clear, present, and permanent threat to vital U.S. security interests; military intervention—direct (Afghanistan) or indirect (arms transfers, advisors, training personnel)—is a preferred instrument of Soviet expansion; reliance on proxies (Cubans, East Europeans, Vietnamese) is an integral part of Soviet strategic penetration; Moscow leaders, while cautious and prudent in intervening, are dogged when engaged and tenacious in protecting a client; and Soviet military capacity to project power abroad, in the form of naval, air transport, and ready airborne combat forces, continues to grow and improve.

As for responses: the United States should reorder its European-centered priorities to respond to the rising communist threat; nonnuclear military capabilities must be increased across the armed services; Washington must be prepared to use its military resources—unilaterally if necessary—to protect U.S. security interests; and the American public must be persuaded to abandon the psychological and material constraints of what is perceived by the authors as a still lingering Vietnam syndrome to deal with the expanding Soviet bloc threat.

Essays by Alvin Rubinstein, Gordon McCormick, and Dov Zakheim sketch, successively, the dimensions of the global threat posed by the Soviet Union, its proxies, and even neutrals who contribute to regional instability. John Maurer suggests that the Soviet threat is merely the lineal descendant of Russian imperial expansion, whose roots lie deep in Russian history. Constraints on U.S. use of various forms of intervention are sketched by W. Scott Thompson and Andrew B. Walworth (domestic political limits), Terry Deibel (allied restraints), and Norman Friedman (logistical and technical obstacles).

Kevin Lewis and William Taylor, Jr., develop a menu of military initiatives that might be taken to meet the communist global challenge. In contrast to the calibrated essays of his collaborations, Michael Vlahos ends with an apocalyptic vision of Western demise unless the United States is prepared to intervene wherever communist influence is felt—if need be in "Lagos, or Jakarta, or Manila, or Caracas, not simply manicured Bavarian towns." (p. 218)

The editors have assembled a useful collection of essays that join critical issues about the need and prospects of U.S. military intervention in the post-Vietnam period. But joining the issues does not resolve them. First, the Soviet and broad communist threat is assumed, not demonstrated. There is no clear link between Soviet and proxy use of force abroad and a direct or fundamental threat to U.S. or Western interests. Further, the authors view Soviet penetrations of the Horn of Africa and Angola as un-mixed successes, while Soviet setbacks in Egypt, China, and Indonesia are given short shrift. Moscow's economic and military problems are downplayed. Would the authors trade American for Soviet security problems, including several thousand miles of common border with a restive China and a doubtfully loyal Eastern Europe? Third World exploitation of the Soviet Union by India, Syria, and Iraq is given insufficient weight. Meanwhile, what of Soviet forces bogged down in a dirty war in Afghanistan?

Second, costs and risks of U.S. intervention, including a direct clash of U.S. and Soviet forces in the developing world, are discounted or ignored. It costs

much in blood and treasure to police the world. The benefits are not as clear as the authors would have us believe. Our experience in Lebanon cautions against precipitate interventions when objectives are unclear and engaged military capabilities (carrier attack planes, naval artillery, and combat forces) are ill-suited to the political and strategic terrain. Building military capabilities to match Soviet capabilities and risk-taking invites a nuclear "Fashoda." There is also the dilemma, accented by Robert Tucker and others, that increased military power creates new interests (and perceived opportunities) that otherwise would not have been pursued, reversing the logical and politically responsible relation between power and interest.

What of other ways than military force to advance American interests? American security lies as much in the current division of the world—at odds by race, region, religion, ethnic, and natural rivalries—as in the direct exercise of American power. Is it reasonable to expect the Soviet Union either to order these intractable conflicts or to respond to the hopes and material needs of the world when it is unable to feed its own population?

Working within their circumscribed framework, the authors have raised important issues. My quarrel is with what I believe is too narrow a conception of the many and varied security challenges confronting the West and the sparse menu of options—mostly military—offered as a solution for our current plight.

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Global Militarization edited by Peter Wallensteen, Johan Galtung, and Carlos Portales. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985, 234 pages, \$24.95.

The authors of *Global Militarization* are an international group of scholars who specialize particularly in world politics and peace research. Defining the state of the world as the "age of militarization," they view military structures, military attitudes, and military societies as some of the most dominant forces in today's world politics. "Repression, armed conflicts, interstate wars, the international arms trade, and increasing worldwide military expenditures are all indications of one particularly significant development in world politics: the recognition of global militarization."

The volume grew out of a conference on militarization in the context of goals, processes, and indicators of military development in general, which was

held in Oslo, Norway, in May 1981. Partial backing for the conference also came from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden.

In many modern societies but particularly within Third World countries, joining the military is a means of upward mobility, the authors note: "Join the military, and it can lead you anywhere." The present growth rate of the military system is much higher in the Third World than elsewhere because military service offers people a way of achieving recognition, status, and financial success in society.

The authors analyze the role of the state and the roots of global militarization and suggest ways out of the increasing spiral of military growth. Militarization of internal politics in Third World countries is investigated through a series of nation-state case studies. Empirically attempted alternatives are analyzed for qualitatively new turns of the arms race.

Militarization is defined in two forms: as a form of behavior in which violence as a course of action is preferred at the expense of nonviolent ways of influence, and as a social formation and structure that is institutionalized within states and in relations between states, in which military behavior, military structure, and military values are the norms of government. The authors discuss a variety of external and internal developments that have promoted the militarization of societies, particularly in Third World developing nations. In the broader, international sphere, the authors link global conflict formations for the 1980s to European conceptions of the state, urbanizing development of industrial nations, and new forms of involvement in international war. Today, as never before, war is a global concern.

A central thesis of the book is that each nation-state has its own local militarization peculiarities, which reflect its economic and social culture through history. Thus, militarization in Thailand is traced to the development of the Thai society prior to the Second World War; in analyzing the constitutional development in Chile, the authors point to the changing balance between civilian and military leadership in controlling the armed forces; and repeated military coups in Ghana reflect a history in which force has been a norm in the long-term cleavage between pro- and anti-Nkrumahist forces—a struggle that continues to this very day.

Together, these three case studies suggest different forms of militarization that are perhaps indicative of the differences among the three continents of the Third World. In the Thai case, the king and traditional authority have played a particular role in militarization of the society; in the Chilean case,

militarization has been linked to the uneven industrialization of the society; in the Ghanaian case, militarization has a more elitist and personalized flavor. The complexities and contradictions in maintaining civilian control over increasingly alert and self-conscious military establishments are well documented.

Needless to say, the alternatives suggested in a world of global militarization by these scholars in peace research reflect combining a low level of vulnerability with a provocative defense, such as the Swiss experience. For some readers, the alternatives will reflect a state of fantasy; for others, a beginning to a new determination to decrease militarization and avert wars, particularly on a global scale. For many, the information presented may not be new, but the combination of military, societal, political, and historical perspectives of these peace researchers yield a distinctive group of alternatives worth considering.

Dr. Caroline S. Westerhof
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Reassessing Arms Control edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 211 pages, \$27.50.

Both "doves" and "hawks" have a vested interest in arms control, for all of us will be affected in some way—for better or for worse—by the control that is so difficult to obtain over the means to destroy much of our civilization.

Basically, *Reassessing Arms Control* is a compilation of views representing individuals from eight different countries. The interests of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Third World are identified so that the reader is able to obtain different and interesting viewpoints. Some of the issues discussed by the contributors concern the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the potential phenomenon of chemical warfare, and the effect of the arms race on Eastern and Western Europe.

Reassessing Arms Control has four main parts. The first part deals with general arms control. The prospect of solving the problem of the arms race does not appear to be promising today, nor is it expected to be so in the future. Considering the fact that history has aptly demonstrated the difficulty of limiting or decreasing arms in the past, one is not surprised to learn how difficult it is to do today. An interesting segment found in this part of the book deals with the media and its effect on arms control.

The second part of the book, which focuses on nuclear arms control, makes one realize that not much progress has been made in this particular area.

A number of obstacles are identified to explain the lack of progress. For example, one superpower may believe that it is on a par with another superpower regarding nuclear capability, or a government may have difficulty in obtaining a national consensus among its citizens in support of nuclear arms control.

The third part of *Reassessing Arms Control* seems to project a more optimistic view of one segment of the arms race—specifically, the area of chemical arms control. A number of reasons for optimism in this particular area are cited. For example, the United States has an adequate supply of chemical agents to bring about deterrence. In addition, the vast amounts of money that might be expended further in this particular endeavor could be allocated for other defense purposes, and beneficial public relations will accrue to a country that attempts to reduce its activity or association with chemical warfare. One receives the impression that the possibility of chemical warfare results in strong emotional responses from the public and lacks the psychological support that might be associated with more conventional types of warfare activity.

"Europe and Arms Control" is the fourth and concluding part of this book. Its last segment concerns the conventional defense of Western Europe. As one might expect, differences of opinion exist regarding the question of how best to defend Western Europe.

Reassessing Arms Control is the type of book that should appeal to students who have an interest in contemporary international politics—especially those who appreciate different perspectives relating to an important and current topic. The style of writing contributes to the value of the book; because it is neither too technical nor redundant, the interested reader will have little difficulty in ascertaining a particular contributor's point of view. Not unexpectedly, there is disagreement among some of the contributors, but it is of the type that creates interest and keeps the reader's attention.

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The Modern Mexican Military: An Overview edited by David Ronfeldt. San Diego, California: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1984, 213 pages, \$15.00.

When North Americans envision Latin countries, they usually picture a society run by the military, with tanks attacking the presidential palace and air-

planes firing rockets at it, as, once again, one more coup by the military results in trading one set of generals for another. This image, though not wholly erroneous, is, in part, created by the media or too many Hollywood movies. However, the principal error comes in thinking that all countries in Latin America are the same or that the military in Latin America is all the same.

The Mexican military is unlike any other in Latin America. It is a pillar of the existing civilian government and is extremely loyal to that government. It is perhaps a unique case in Latin America. Yet the military remains one of the great unknowns of modern Mexico.

The Modern Mexican Military resulted from what is believed to be the first scholarly conference on the Mexican military held in either the United States or Mexico in at least fifteen years. As Mexico gains increasing importance in matters of U.S. security interests, knowledge of the modern Mexican military becomes an important topic for all U.S. military planners and officers. This book fills that need. It includes chapters by researchers who have done specialized studies of the Mexican military, generalists on the Mexican political system, and specialists on the military establishment in other Latin American countries who compare and put the Mexican case in perspective.

This collection of readings reveals the changing conditions of the military itself, as well as the concomitant accession of a new generation of postrevolutionary elites to high government offices. This new generation is more technocratic and statist in its nationalism than the old-style politicians. The officer corps has undergone similar changes. The older generation of generals has been retired, and a new generation of increasingly well-educated officers is taking command. This new crop of officers seems well prepared to support the civilian government's managerial and technocratic approaches to problem solving.

Both the internal and external security roles of the military came to the fore with the violent end to the massive student-led protests in Tlatelolco in 1968, counterinsurgency and antinarcotics campaigns, the need to protect Mexico's new oil fields, and—last, but not least—the growing conflicts in Central America. The military, therefore, is becoming a more visible, respected, and modernized partner in Mexico's ruling circles. A broader civil-military partnership may be developing wherein it may be more appropriate to view the military's role in the *state* rather than in politics. The latter term implies that a military intervenes or interferes in the political process, perhaps usurping some or all of the

civilian authority. This phenomenon, apparently, is not what is happening in Mexico; nor does it seem likely to occur, given current conditions.

The last chapter in *The Modern Mexican Military* gives clues to a traditional fear of military participation in policymaking. It covers Mexico's explosive border situation with Guatemala. The question that comes to mind, however, is why Mexico's fiercely nationalistic government has reacted in such a low-key fashion to the Guatemalan army's repeated raids miles into Mexican territory to capture refugees suspected of having guerrilla connections. Although the book fails to address this question, it seems, at least in part, that Mexican officials fear that a major confrontation with Guatemala will force greater military participation in policymaking—a situation which the government appears to want to avoid. Mexico also seems to be alarmed by the degree of militarization that has already occurred in Central America, a circumstance that may explain Mexico's leading role in the Contadora peace process. Perhaps fear that such militarization will spill over and disrupt its own political order has propelled the traditional lone wolf, Mexico, into coalition diplomacy through the Contadora process. The political order within Mexico, like those of the other Contadora countries, is brittle and could be profoundly affected by events in Central America.

For the officer who wants to know more about the improvements in the capabilities of the Mexican military, including increased education (a new National Defense College) and hardware (F-5s), the military's emerging role in Mexico's changing political system, and the prospects of military intervention in the control of government, *The Modern Mexican Military* is required reading.

Dr. Alex A. Sanchez
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British Special Forces by William Seymour. Salem, New Hampshire: Marrimack Book Service (agent for Sidgwick and Jackson), 1985. 334 pages, \$19.95.

Of all the major military powers, Great Britain is usually thought of when one speaks of daring, dash, and spectacular and unconventional military operations. Thus, it is not surprising that William Seymour, an Englishman and a former Army officer

with experience in special forces, would write *British Special Forces*.

Soon after the British Expeditionary Forces were extricated from Dunkirk, the Commandos began their hit-and-run raids on German-occupied Europe from Norway to France. While the Royal Army provided most of the personnel at first, the Royal Marines also played a significant part. These unconventional operations tied down enemy troops, gained valuable intelligence, often brought back enemy prisoners, and (like the Bruneval operation) brought out important enemy technology (radar components, in this case).

There were many different sorts of British special forces, under differing authorities, and they ranged in size from groups of half a dozen to the larger forces that attacked Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe. They became such a problem to the Germans that Hitler eventually ordered them shot on sight.

Soon, as they did the Royal Air Force, men of many nationalities joined the various special forces. At the war's end, most of these units were disbanded and their unconventional roles incorporated into the missions of more conventional organizations—the Royal Marines and the Special Air Service (SAS), for example.

Of particular interest are the accounts of the special forces in more recent operations—the Dhofar rebellion in Oman (1960s and 1970s), the confrontation with Indonesia (1960s), and operations in the South Atlantic (1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict). And who does not remember the dramatic assault on the Iranian embassy in London in 1980, when the SAS wrote the book on how to kill terrorists without harming hostages?

Most of *British Special Forces* deals with the Royal Army components of the special forces—both the Royal Marine Commandos and the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) have been the subject of another recent book. Since Seymour covers a vast sweep of military operations—from World War II to the Falklands and from the North Cape to Malaya—he can provide only the essentials about the theater and the operation. However, for the average reader, he supplies enough to whet the appetite. A relevant bibliography will point the particularly interested reader to further sources. *British Special Forces* is worthwhile reading for the military professional.

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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Some Thoughts on Clausewitz and Airplanes" by Major James B. Smith as the outstanding article in the May-June 1986 issue of the *Review*.

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