

Sudan

A Critical Moment, a Comprehensive Approach

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sudan is at an important crossroads that can either lead to steady improvements in the lives of the Sudanese people or degenerate into even more violent conflict and state failure. Now is the time for the United States to act with a sense of urgency and purpose to protect civilians and work toward a comprehensive peace. The consequences are stark. Sudan's implosion could lead to widespread regional instability or new safe havens for international terrorists, significantly threatening US interests. The United States has a clear obligation to the Sudanese people—both in its role as witness to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and as the first country that unequivocally identified events in Darfur as genocide—to help lead an international effort.

The United States and its international partners face multiple challenges in Sudan. Six years after its initiation, the conflict in Darfur remains unresolved. In 2003 the ruling National Congress Party and government-supported militia, sometimes referred to as "Janjaweed," launched a genocidal campaign that targeted ethnic groups affiliated with a brewing Darfur rebellion, leading to the death of hundreds of thousands of people and displacing some 2.7 million people and more than 250,000 refugees. Unfulfilled cease-fire and peace agreements, the proliferation of rebel groups, and the involvement of regional

states have prolonged the crisis and complicated international efforts to reach a peace agreement. Although the intensity of the violence has lessened since 2005, civilians continue to live in unacceptable insecurity. Without an active peace process; a commitment to addressing accountability for crimes committed against civilians; a fully deployed, equipped, and performing African Union–United Nations (AU-UN) peacekeeping force; and serious planning for regional recovery; the situation in Darfur will continue to fester, destabilizing the country and the region.

In a similar vein, delays in implementing key portions of the CPA—the agreement between the National Congress Party and the southern Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that ended more than two decades of conflict between northern and southern Sudan, which left more than 2 million people dead—represent a dangerous flash point for renewed conflict. According to the CPA, the south, where governing capacity is nascent, will vote in a referendum in 2011 on self-determination—whether to secede or remain part of a unified Sudanese state. The "Three Areas" are also flash points for renewed conflict: Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile will engage in a referendum and popular consultations on their status over the next 15 months. In the time remaining before the referenda and consultations, the United States is working to re-

invigorate international engagement in the CPA and to bolster the peace accord by supporting national elections in 2010, working to resolve outstanding border-demarcation disputes and ensuring that the parties live up to their obligations to prevent a return to war.

The international community has demonstrated its commitment to the Sudanese people by supporting deployment of the first hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, sustaining the presence of some 10,000 UN peacekeepers in southern Sudan, and contributing more than \$1 billion in humanitarian assistance to the country every year. Most recently, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in early 2009, charging him with having perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

Despite these significant developments, sustained political will to address Sudan's tough challenges in the international community is sometimes lacking. American leadership is essential to a more effective multilateral approach. The United States is working to reconstitute, broaden, and strengthen the multilateral coalition that helped achieve the signing of the CPA and will work to more concretely transform widespread international concern about Darfur into serious multilateral commitments. This expanded coalition must meet our responsibility to promote security, justice, and development while broadening our leverage moving forward.

Critical Lessons Learned from Past Efforts

- The United States cannot succeed in achieving its policy goals by focusing exclusively on either Darfur or CPA implementation—it must address both

seriously and simultaneously while also working to resolve and prevent conflict throughout Sudan.

- US policy must be agile enough to address discrete, emerging crises while maintaining a sustained focus on long-term stability.
- To advance peace and security in Sudan, we must engage with allies and with those with whom we disagree. US diplomacy must be both sustained and broad, encompassing not only the National Congress Party, SPLM, and major Darfuri rebel groups but also critical regional and international actors.
- Assessments of progress and decisions regarding incentives and disincentives must not be based on process-related accomplishments (i.e., the signing of a memorandum of understanding or the issuance of a set of visas) but on verifiable changes in conditions on the ground.
- Accountability for genocide and atrocities is necessary for reconciliation and lasting peace.
- It must be clear to all parties that Sudanese support for counterterrorism objectives is valued but cannot be used as a bargaining chip to evade assuming responsibilities in Darfur or implementing the CPA.

US Strategic Objectives

US strategy in Sudan must focus on ending the suffering in Darfur and building a lasting peace. The three principal US strategic priorities in Sudan include

1. definitively ending conflict, gross abuses of human rights, and genocide in Darfur;

2. implementing the North-South CPA, which results in either a peaceful post-2011 Sudan or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and
3. ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.

The United States will use all elements of influence to achieve its strategic objectives. The US special envoy for Sudan will play the leading role in pursuing our Sudan strategy. Fundamental to all US government efforts to bring about peace and security throughout Sudan is the holding of responsible parties accountable for creating conditions that can foster concrete and sustainable improvements in the lives of the Sudanese people. This includes frank dialogue with the government of Sudan about what needs to be accomplished, how the bilateral relationship can improve if conditions transform, and how the government will become even more isolated if conditions remain the same or worsen. The United States will seek to broaden and deepen the multilateral coalition that is actively working toward achieving peace in Darfur and to assure full implementation of the CPA so that backsliding by any party is met with credible, meaningful disincentives leveraged by the United States and the international community.

Each quarter the interagency at senior levels will assess a variety of indicators either of progress or of deepening crisis, and that assessment will include calibrated steps to bolster support for positive change and to discourage backsliding. Progress toward achievement of strategic objectives will trigger steps designed to strengthen the hands of those implementing the changes. Failure to improve con-

ditions will trigger increased pressure on recalcitrant actors.

US policy will also acknowledge that the government of southern Sudan must abide by its responsibilities under the terms of the CPA, prioritizing conflict mitigation and resolution, capacity building, transparency and accountability, and delivery of service. Given the stakes and pace of events, the United States must ensure that its assistance initiatives in the south are both effective and efficient, reflecting these urgent priorities. The special envoy will continue to engage and consult broadly with the SPLM, Darfur rebel and civil society groups, and other actors to ensure that the United States can bring focused efforts to bear on key levers of influence at critical moments.

Key Implementation Elements

Strategic Objective 1: Definitively Ending Conflict, Gross Abuses of Human Rights, and Genocide in Darfur

Enhancing Civilian Protection. The United States will work to fortify the United Nations Mission in Darfur by (1) strengthening multilateral resolve to impose consequences on actors obstructing the mission's operations, access, and performance; (2) providing direct US funding and US diplomatic, logistical, and other support toward the provision of critically needed equipment (including helicopters); and (3) planning contingencies in Darfur by developing a scale of appropriate responses to worsening crises.

Promoting a Negotiated Solution to the Conflict. The special envoy will establish and maintain dialogue with armed movements in Darfur and solicit support for the peace process from Sudan's neighbors. The United States will support a political agreement that addresses the

underlying causes of conflict in Darfur by building on Qatar's peace-negotiation efforts, providing direct support to the joint AU-UN joint chief mediator for Darfur, and encouraging broad participation—including all diverse representations of civil society—in the peace process. The United States will seek to renew all parties' commitment to the 2005 Declaration of Principles that obligates the Sudanese government and all major Darfuri armed groups to seek a peaceful solution to their grievances in Darfur and to adhere to a 2004 humanitarian cease-fire.

Encouraging and Strengthening Initiatives for Ending Violent Conflict. The United States will support international efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities in Darfur and, through a variety of means, will urge Sudan and Chad to cease support to rebel groups under their influence. The United States will seek to work with a broad array of partners on the ground to gather information on and fight sexual and gender-based violence in Sudan as a means of supporting the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1820.

Supporting Accountability. In addition to supporting international efforts to bring individuals responsible for genocide and war crimes in Darfur to justice, the United States will work with Darfuri civil society to endorse locally owned accountability and reconciliation mechanisms that can make peace more sustainable.

Improving the Humanitarian Situation. The United States will work with other donors and humanitarian organizations in the field to insist that the government of Sudan fulfill its obligations to its citizens by improving humanitarian access and coverage in Darfur. The United States will place a premium on core humanitarian principles and on the use of shared, concrete, and transparent humanitarian

indicators to gauge the situation on the ground.

Strategic Objective 2: Implementing the North-South CPA, Which Results in Either a Peaceful Post-2011 Sudan or an Orderly Path toward Two Separate and Viable States at Peace with Each Other

Addressing Unimplemented Elements of the CPA. The United States will work with international partners to encourage the parties to implement necessary legislation and planning for the 2010 elections and the 2011 referenda. Among other issues, the United States will work with international partners by (1) providing assistance for census resolution, voter registration and education, political parties, administration of polling places, balloting mechanics, and the monitoring of international and local domestic elections and referenda, and (2) encouraging the parties to enact necessary legal reforms to create an environment more conducive to a credible election process and referendum, including enactment of a credible referendum law. The United States will assist the parties in resolving census and referendum disputes in accordance with the CPA. In addition, it will support efforts to push for the timely and transparent demarcation of the north-south border through the provision of technical expertise and will back international efforts to professionalize and equip the joint integrated units responsible for providing security in key areas.

Reinvigorating and Strengthening International Engagement on CPA Implementation. The special envoy has organized a "Forum for Supporters of the CPA" and has reinvigorated the "Troika" (the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway, all of whom act as CPA guarantors) to coordinate and rejuvenate international efforts to support implementation of the CPA. The United States will

also work to strengthen the role of the Assessment and Evaluation Committee, the primary forum charged with mediating disputes over CPA implementation between the two parties.

Defusing Tension in the Three Areas. In Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile, the United States will (1) assist in the development and/or reinvigoration of UN-assisted disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs; (2) restore and strengthen the operations of nongovernmental organizations that provide vital development assistance and conflict-prevention resources, and that offset the potential for conflict once new borders are drawn; and (3) provide direct technical support to local administrations, as appropriate.

Promoting the Development of Post-2011 Wealth-Sharing Mechanisms. The United States will work with international partners to support the parties in developing a post-2011 wealth-sharing agreement and resolve other post-2011 political and economic issues.

Promoting Improved Governing Capacity and Greater Transparency in Southern Sudan. The United States will work to improve security for the southern Sudanese people by supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as conflict-prevention initiatives, and by strengthening the capacity of the security sector and criminal justice system. The United States will also work to improve economic conditions and outcomes. It will provide technical advisers to vital ministries and will work to strengthen entities such as the UN Development Program's Local Government Reform Program. The United States will work with international partners to implement the

World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund South Strategy in a timely manner and to improve access to capital, particularly microfinancing, for agricultural enterprises and local private-sector ventures. It will support efforts and initiatives that assist in increasing trade between Sudan and its neighbors. Transparency in fiscal expenditures will be critical to attracting investment, and the United States will support the World Bank's anticorruption efforts in southern Sudan.

Strategic Objective 3: Ensuring That Sudan Does Not Provide a Safe Haven for International Terrorists

Preventing Terrorists from Developing a Foothold in Sudan. The United States has a strategic interest in preventing Sudan from providing safe haven for terrorist organizations. It will work with the international community to reduce the ability of terrorists and nonstate actors inimical to US interests from developing a foothold in Sudan.

Outreach and Consultation

The strong voices of committed advocates and members of Congress have been indispensable in elevating Sudan on the US policy agenda. These stakeholders are assets in US efforts to end the suffering of the Sudanese people and bring stability to the country. Consistent attempts to maintain a regular dialogue with these communities will strengthen US policy and prove vital to success. The special envoy will meet regularly with advocates and will maintain open lines of communication with Congress to ensure that serious and substantive consultations are a regular part of the policy-implementation process. □

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